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The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service
Abstract

The lifetime exclusion of felons from jury service is the majority rule in the U.S., used in thirty one states and
in federal courts. The result is that over 6% of the adult population is excluded, including about 30% of black
men.
The parallel issue of felon disenfranchisement has drawn considerable scholarly attention, despite its lower,
declining, and less racially charged numbers. The racial composition of juries has been widely discussed in the
literature as well. By contrast, felon jury service has been almost entirely ignored, despite a mass of legislation
and appellate litigation, and despite glaring racial disparities.
One can hardly argue that the biggest problem with the American legal system is that our juries do not have
enough felons on them. Nevertheless, the question of whether and when felons (principally "ex-felons")
should serve as jurors involves several larger issues.
This article surveys the current law of felon exclusion and surveys its history. It then surveys and proposes
constitutional arguments for and against felon exclusion, and concludes that it is constitutional either to
exclude felons from juries, as most jurisdictions do, or to include them, as others do. While this result is fairly
clear from current doctrine, it exposes flaws and ambiguities in that doctrine. It also undermines the principal
justifications for felon exclusion (protecting the probity of the jury, and eliminating inherently biased jurors).
Because both exclusion and inclusion are legal, the remainder of the article considers policy arguments for and
against felon exclusion: first, the nature of the jury, and whether felon exclusion is compatible with it; next, a
similar analysis regarding the treatment of felons; and finally other, general policy arguments. The discussion
concludes with a recommendation that while some felon exclusion may be appropriate, it should be carefully
considered and should not be based on inflexible generalizations about crimes, criminals, and trials. Instead,
felons who are worthy should have a chance to contend as individuals for a seat on a jury, under the same
constraints as everyone else.
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INTRODUCTION
Thirteen million people, including about thirty percent of black
1
men, are banned for life from jury service because they are felons.
Thirty-one states and the federal government subscribe to the
2
practice of lifetime felon exclusion, but legislators have excised this
considerable swath of the jury pool rather carelessly, without
adequately considering the many policy reasons for giving felons a
chance to serve.
Perhaps more surprising is that scholars have ignored “felon
exclusion” despite a mass of legislation and appellate litigation, and
3
despite the glaring racial disparities. On the rare occasions when
felon exclusion is mentioned, commentators are oddly sanguine
about it, even if they are otherwise strong advocates of felons’ rights
4
or broad jury participation. In stark contrast, the parallel issue of
5
felon voting has drawn considerable attention, even though it is
1. See infra Appendix 2.
2. See infra Appendix 1.A.
3. See, e.g., Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Where Did Black Jurors Go? A Theoretical Synthesis
of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury System and Jury Selection, J. BLACK STUD., Dec.
1991, at 196 (discussing causes of minority under-representation on juries without
mentioning felon exclusion). The only detailed treatment of felon exclusion is a
legal encyclopedia article that categorizes and summarizes statutes and case law.
James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Disqualification or Exemption of Juror for Conviction of,
or Prosecution for, Criminal Offense, 75 A.L.R. 5TH 295 (2000). Other works briefly
discuss felon exclusion. See, e.g., Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project: The
Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1051-59, 1182-83
(1970); William T. Harrison, Jr., Case Comment, Jurors: Federal Felons Not Disqualified,
3 U. FLA. L. REV. 255, 255-58 (1950); Richard G. Singer, Conviction: Civil Disabilities, in
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 243, 245 (Sanford H. Kadish ed. 1983).
4. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the
Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1905-06 (1999) (discussing felon
exclusion from jury service within the context of felon disenfranchisement); Note,
The Congress, The Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights
Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1091 n.120 (1966) [hereinafter Jury Selection: A
Critique] (evincing little concern for disparate impact of objective jury qualifications).
This complacent approach to felon exclusion might be because felon exclusion is
objective, whereas subjectivity was the enemy of equality in jury selection for many
years. See id. at 1094; infra Appendix 1.C (discussing history of juror qualification).
The lack of research and dialogue on felon exclusion might also reflect the fact that
its effect has only recently become overwhelming. See infra Appendix 2.
5. See generally Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159 (2001);
Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: The German Model of
Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 (2000) [hereinafter
Demleitner, Continuing Payment]; Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The
Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153
(1999) [hereinafter Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile]; Alec C. Ewald, “Civil
Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045; Fletcher, supra note 4; Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting
Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727
(1998); Richard L. Lippke, The Disenfranchisement of Felons, 20 LAW & PHIL. 553
(2001); Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Consequence
of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 248 (2000); Jesse Furman, Note,
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6

rarer, less racially charged, and in decline; scholars have also dwelled
at length on the law and policy contours of the racial composition of
7
juries. But felon exclusion, which sits at the intersection of these two
vital issues, has remained unnoticed.
Felon exclusion deserves attention not just because of its stunning
magnitude, but also because of its theoretical significance. The
questions of whether and when felons (principally, so-called “ex8
felons” ) should be eligible to serve as jurors implicates several larger
Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian
Justice, 106 YALE L.J. 1197 (1997); Alice E. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement and its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1145 (1994); Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the ExOffender’s Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721 (1973);
Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV.
845 (1973); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under
the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993); Developments in the
Law—One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939
(2002) [hereinafter One Person, No Vote]; Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons:
Citizenship, Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box”, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989)
[hereinafter The Purity of the Ballot Box].
6. One widely cited estimate suggests that 13% of black men and 3.9 million
citizens overall are disenfranchised as felons. Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Convicted
Felons Deserve the Right to Vote, in HOW SHOULD PRISONS TREAT THEIR INMATES 40, 41
(Michele Wagner ed., 2001); see also infra note 588 (discussing the trend away from
lifetime disenfranchisement of felons).
7. Hundreds of articles have been written on the cross-section requirement,
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that peremptory strikes may not be
used for purposeful racial discrimination), venue issues, and numerous other
disputes at the intersection of race and juries. A few articles are particularly relevant
to felon exclusion, even if they do not treat the issue in detail. See, e.g., James H.
Druff, The Cross-Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1565-78
(1985) (critiquing and contrasting jury venire and jury panel selection policies in the
contexts of diversity and impartiality); Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or
Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707,
712 (1993) (exploring reasons and remedies for minority under-representation on
juries); Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 949-66 (1998) (critiquing conflicting notions, in Batson
and in cross-section cases, of the connection between personal views and group
membership); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The
Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1401-14 (1983)
(providing an excellent historical account of racial discrimination on juries between
the Civil War and New Deal); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in
Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 727 (1992) (arguing
in favor of treating racial discrimination as a violation of jurors’, rather than
litigants’, rights).
8. The term “felon” is occasionally reserved for those currently under sentence
of law. Those who have already served their time are designated as “ex-felons.” The
more accurate definition of the word “felon,” however, is “[o]ne who has committed
[a] felony,” 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 821 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED],
regardless of whether he has served his sentence. This Article uses the term “felon”
in that sense—barring clemency, “felon” is a lifelong label. Given that jury service by
currently incarcerated felons is not greatly contested, all discussion of “felons” in this
Article refers to so-called ex-felons. For the sake of simplicity and because the
overwhelming majority of felons are male, this Article will use male pronouns when
referring to felons.
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issues.
First, felon exclusion forces society to confront its
expectations of what a jury is supposed to look like and achieve, and
what our society’s treatment of criminals is supposed to look like and
achieve. In both cases, felon exclusion reveals ambivalence and
contradiction.
Second, felon exclusion probably passes the
constitutional “cross-section” requirement for juries, but it exposes
the doctrine’s flaws and ambiguities.
This Article argues that excluding all felons from all juries per se is
unwise, and that at least some felons deserve the same individualized
consideration in voir dire as other would-be jurors. This Article also
aims to open an appropriately vigorous debate about felon exclusion.
Part I surveys and proposes constitutional arguments for and against
felon exclusion, and concludes that it is constitutional either to
exclude felons from juries, as do most jurisdictions, or to include
them, as do others. While this result is fairly clear from current
doctrine, this analysis exposes weaknesses in the law.
As a result of both exclusion and inclusion being legal, the Article
next turns to policy arguments for and against felon exclusion. Part
II examines general considerations. The principal justifications for
felon exclusion—that felons are inherently biased against the
government and that they threaten the probity of the jury—may be
sufficient to pass constitutional muster, but they are unsound as a
9
matter of policy. Other policy considerations, such as the long
history of felon exclusion, the availability of clemency, and
administrative costs, also do not suffice to justify denying felons the
10
same individualized consideration that other jurors receive. Part III
turns to the more specific policy context of jury service in general,
and concludes that felon exclusion clashes with the democratic,
functional, and educative purposes of the jury system. Part IV
engages in a similar analysis regarding the societal treatment of
criminals, and finds that felon exclusion does not advance
penological goals, and that it suffers from comparison to other civil
disabilities imposed on felons.
Part V concludes the analytical discussion with a recommendation
that felon exclusion should be carefully considered and should not
be based on inflexible generalizations about crimes, criminals, and
trials. Instead, some felons should have a chance to contend as
individuals for a seat on a jury in some cases, under the same
constraints as other citizens.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Parts II.C, D, E.
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Finally, to support the analysis in Parts I-V, and because felon
exclusion has never received a full treatment in the literature, this
Article concludes with three appendices. Appendix 1 catalogs
11
current American law on felon exclusion from juries, Appendix 2
analyzes its stunning magnitude, and Appendix 3 details the history
of the doctrine.
I.

WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE?

As will be discussed in Appendix 3, felon exclusion (and its close
relatives) has been part of Anglo-American law for centuries. The
details and application of felon exclusion have been litigated
12
extensively for much of that time. Challenges to the practice itself—
the subject of this Part—have a more recent pedigree, and have been
13
uniformly unsuccessful.
The case law reflects a consensus that neither mandatory exclusion
nor mandatory inclusion is required by the federal constitution. The
courts have not considered all of the possible arguments on the
subject, however, and many courts have been cursory with those
arguments they have considered. This Part will summarize and
supplement the case law on felon jurors by surveying the field of
possible legal arguments and concluding that while some arguments
are more promising than others, none is a clear winner for felons.
A. The Constitutionality of Allowing Felons to Serve on Juries
Whether it is unconstitutional to include felons on juries is an issue
that has not been litigated as often as the issue of exclusion. Courts
considering the question have treated a jury that includes a felon as
legitimate, or at least not inherently illegitimate. Specifically, some
courts have held that the Sixth Amendment does not provide a right
14
to have a felon-free jury in criminal cases, and that a state law
11. The discussion will touch on the extent to which criminals other than
convicted felons, such as misdemeanants and those with pending charges, are
excluded. See infra Appendix 1.B.1, 5.
12. See Buchwalter, supra note 3, §§ 7-34 (describing modern cases on felon
exclusion); L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Intelligence, Character, Religious, or Loyalty Tests of
Qualifications of Juror, 126 A.L.R. 506, 517-26 (1940) (surveying case law dating back
to the 1860s).
13. See Buchwalter, supra note 3, § 3b-6 (summarizing constitutional challenges
to felon exclusion).
14. See, e.g., Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir.), rev’d on other
grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit
ex-felons from jury duty); United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 260-61 (8th Cir.
1993) (“The Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury does not require an
absolute bar on felon-jurors.”) (quoting United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633
(D.C. Cir. 1992)).
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excluding felons from juries does not create a liberty interest in a
15
felon-free jury.
The Sixth Amendment argument is that felons are inherently
biased, which means that allowing them on a criminal jury denies a
16
criminal defendant his right to an impartial jury. Courts’ rejection
of that argument sits uneasily alongside other courts’ reliance on the
“inherent bias” argument in cases affirming felon exclusion; as argued
in detail in Part II.C, however, the former holding is more persuasive
than the latter.
Less directly, but more commonly, courts have approved verdicts
where, despite a felon exclusion law, a felon finds his way onto a jury.
As detailed in Appendix I.B.4, states are tolerant of such situations,
typically vacating verdicts only where a felon juror has intentionally
misled the court about his criminal record, or in the rare case where
actual prejudice can be shown.
17
Finally, twenty jurisdictions permit some felons to serve on juries,
and none have ever considered, let alone sustained, a direct legal
challenge to the practice.
B. The Constitutionality of Barring Felons from Jury Service
The more common issue in litigation is whether automatically
excluding felons from juries is unconstitutional. As the Supreme
Court has said, jurisdictions are “free to confine the [jury]
selection . . . to those possessing good intelligence, sound judgment,
18
and fair character.” This Part will survey—and for the most part
reject—all of the legal arguments against felon exclusion that have
been presented, as well as some plausible ones that have not been
raised. In at least one case, however, this Part will suggest that the
constitutionality of felon exclusion speaks more to deficiencies in the
legal standard than to the appropriateness of felon exclusion.
1.

The right to have a jury
Considering whose rights felon exclusion implicates—felons,
litigants, or both—is an important preliminary matter. The answer
15. Coleman, 150 F.3d at 1117.
16. This issue is explored in detail in Boney, 977 F.2d at 633, which is relied upon
by Humphreys, 982 F.2d at 261, and Coleman, 150 F.3d at 1117.
17. See infra notes 377 (Alaska), 378 (Arizona), 381 (Colorado), 382
(Connecticut), 384 (District of Columbia), 388 (Idaho), 389 (Illinois), 390
(Indiana), 391 (Iowa), 392 (Kansas), 395 (Maine), 397 (Massachusetts), 399
(Minnesota), 409 (North Carolina), 410 (North Dakota), 413 (Oregon), 415 (Rhode
Island), 417 (South Dakota), 423 (Washington), 425 (Wisconsin).
18. Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970) (confining rejection of a
state jury statute to its discriminatory application).
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varies according to which of the legal theories discussed below is
adopted. Virtually all of the litigation regarding the composition of
juries has been brought by parties to lawsuits, but it is the interests of
19
the excluded felons that are most directly implicated.
Jurors rarely choose to litigate exclusion, because their rights are
20
limited and violation of those rights is hard to detect. A juror may
never be summoned for jury service, may be dismissed for cause, or
may be peremptorily struck, without any necessary violation of his or
her rights. As a result, it is hard for an improperly excluded juror even
to know that a violation has occurred. Moreover, individual citizens
have little incentive to monitor the demographic composition of the
juries in their communities.
For litigants, however, the composition of a jury (and by extension
the venire) is of the utmost importance. A litigant’s interests are
implicated when a biased jury hears a case, but litigants are not
interested in equal and fair juries. Instead, litigants are interested in
juries that are not unfair in their opponents’ favor. This is not a
problem if both parties can pursue a remedy; assumedly the inclusion
of a particular type of juror will be sought by one side if not by the
21
other.
As a result, courts freely award third-party standing to
litigants to defend the rights of excluded jurors, even when the party
22
is not a member of the same group being unfairly excluded.
Although this increases the likelihood that the jurors’ rights will be
vindicated, it does nothing to protect jurors that neither party wants
to defend, such as members of groups of whom both parties are wary
or jurors whose views the parties are unwilling to stereotype.
Despite the advantages of allowing the parties to litigate on behalf
of excluded jurors, blanket exclusion policies still implicate excluded
jurors’ interests more than litigants’. For example, if a jury is selected
19. See generally Underwood, supra note 7 (discussing whether discriminatory jury
processes affect the rights of jurors or litigants). The first case where excluded jurors
brought a racial discrimination challenge, for example, was Carter. See Carter, 396
U.S. at 329 & nn.8-10 (noting the novelty of the case and listing litigants’ previous
challenges); Underwood, supra note 7, at 726 & n.9 (citing Carter).
Felon exclusion also implicates the rights of the general public, which has an
interest in judicial self-government. See infra Part III.B. This societal interest is
represented indirectly by the prosecution in criminal cases, and in a general sense by
the legislature that writes juror qualification laws.
20. Cf. Underwood, supra note 7, at 757 (stating that excluded jurors rarely
litigate, because of limited economic resources, an anticipated small stake in the
result, or a desire to maintain privacy).
21. See id. at 758-59 (discussing the nature of the injury that an unfair jury poses
to a litigant).
22. See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 400 (1998) (holding that a
white defendant has standing to litigate the equal protection claims of black, wouldbe grand jurors).
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through properly random means that result in an all white and all
male jury, a party has no recourse. But if the exact same jury results
from improper exclusion, the party would have recourse even though
23
he is being tried by the same people. The difference lies in how the
jurors have been treated, not what will happen to the parties.
Perhaps reflecting this notion, virtually all jury qualification
24
statutes refer to jurors, not to parties. As one judge described her
state’s standards, the defendant is not given a right to exclude
criminals from juries; rather, criminals are stripped of the right to
25
serve.
The state’s decision to enforce these restrictions by
harnessing the self-interest of the parties is an acceptable legislative
26
choice, even if the rights at issue are more coherent when
27
considered from the jurors’ perspective.
2.

Rationales
Another preliminary issue that warrants a brief introduction is the
rationales for felon exclusion, which are evaluated in some of the
constitutional tests discussed below. The two main rationales (which
will be explored and critiqued in greater depth in Parts II.B and II.C)
28
are that felon jurors threaten the probity of the jury, and that felon
23. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (“[W]e impose no
requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect
the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a
jury of any particular composition . . . .”); Underwood, supra note 7, at 730
(discussing the acceptability of a randomly selected all-white jury as an illustrative
example that jury rights belong to jurors); cf. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178
(1986) (“[I]t is hard for us to understand the logic of the argument that a given jury
is unconstitutionally partial when it results from a state-ordained process, yet
impartial when exactly the same jury results from mere chance.”).
24. See generally infra notes 375-426. But see infra notes 389 (Illinois), 391 (Iowa),
397 (Massachusetts) (allowing parties to challenge felons for cause).
25. Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (Keller,
J., concurring).
26. In her concurrence, Judge Keller observed:
To the extent that the Legislature has given a criminal defendant the right to
obtain a reversal of his conviction as a result of the service of a thief or felon
on the jury—a right the Legislature was not required to grant—the
Legislature is also empowered to place limits upon that right and to outline
the conditions for exercising that right.
Id.
27. See generally Underwood, supra note 7, at 727-50 (arguing that although
litigants are pressing the issue, the current doctrine reflects jurors’ interests).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993)
(upholding the federal felon exclusion law on grounds of probity); United States v.
Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that felon exclusion “is intended to
assure the ‘probity’ of the jury”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1796); R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. App.
1994) (referring to “purity and efficiency of the jury system” as the basis of criminal
exclusion); Duggar v. State, 43 So. 2d 860, 863 (Fla. 1950) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(referring to the need to prevent “pollution of the jury system”) (quoting Amaya v.
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29

jurors are inherently biased.
(Another objection to felon jury
service, more philosophical than legal, is that felons have violated the
social contract and should be excluded from self-government; this is
discussed in Part III.A.)
In both cases, felon exclusion is meant to define and protect juries
30
rather than to punish or degrade felons. The notion that felons
represent a threat to the “probity” of a jury harkens back to the
ancient formulation of the jury as “twelve good men and true.” The
meaning of “probity” is fairly clear: “[m]oral excellence, integrity,
31
rectitude, uprightness; conscientiousness, honesty, sincerity.” But
courts have been less clear as to whether the threat that felons pose
to jury probity stems from their degraded status or from their actual
characteristics. In either case, because many non-felons lack probity,
and many felons may not, felon exclusion is under- and over-inclusive
to a troubling degree.
The other common basis offered for felon exclusion is that felons
are inherently biased. As one court described the argument:
[A] person who has suffered the most severe form of
condemnation that can be inflicted by the state . . . might well
harbor a continuing resentment against “the system” that punished
him and an equally unthinking bias in favor of the defendant on
32
trial, who is seen as a fellow underdog caught in its toils.

If felons are so inherently biased that they cannot serve on any jury,
one would expect that when they do serve, accidentally or with the
permission of state law, the verdict would be automatically reversed
State, 220 S.W. 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920)); Velmer S. Burton, Jr. et al., The
Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1987, at 52, 58
(citing the fact that felons “can no longer serve in a position of trust” as a basis for
felon exclusion); cf. United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating in a case involving exclusion of jurors with pending felony charges that
“[w]e . . . find jury probity to be the essence of the system”); People ex rel. Hannon v.
Ryan, 312 N.Y.S.2d 706, 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (asserting, in a case involving
exclusion of certain misdemeanants, that “it would be a strange system, indeed,
which permitted those who had been convicted of anti-social and dissolute conduct
to serve on its juries”); Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REV. 403, 406 (1967)
(explaining that “protect[ing] society from [felons’] corrupting influence” is the
purpose of civil disabilities).
29. See, e.g., Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. 1998) (rejecting a
challenge to felon exclusion, citing inherent bias); Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d
595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (plurality opinion) (approving felon exclusion as promoting
impartiality); Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1906 (positing bias theory); Burton et al.,
supra note 28, at 58 (describing one purpose of felon exclusion as preventing felons
from “letting criminals off the hook”); cf. State v. Baxter, 357 So. 2d 271, 275 (La.
1978) (rejecting defendant’s complaint about felon juror because of felons’
tendency toward pro-defendant bias).
30. See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
31. 12 OED, supra note 8, at 540.
32. Rubio, 593 P.2d at 600.
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because the jury was not impartial. But such verdicts are generally
33
At a more basic level, the bias rationale is a gross
upheld.
overgeneralization, and a needless one, given that the rest of the jury
selection process is designed to make individualized determinations
of partiality.
3.

Cross-section
The most common legal argument against felon exclusion is that it
violates litigants’ right to a jury venire comprising an appropriate
34
cross-section of the community. Felons are, after all, members of
the communities in which they live, at least once they have been
released from prison, parole, or probation.
Roughly speaking, the cross-section requirement declares that
juries must be drawn from a broadly representative pool. This
requirement applies to the jury venire only, not to individual jury
35
panels, which are too small to feasibly guarantee inclusiveness. The
cross-section right is most commonly asserted by criminal defendants,
thus this Part will use criminal law terms in most examples, even
though courts and commentators have argued that civil juries should
36
also reflect a cross-section.
33. See infra Appendix 1.B.4.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (7th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting a cross-section challenge to felon exclusion); United States v. Foxworth,
599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979) (rejecting a cross-section challenge to felon exclusion);
United States v. Best, 214 F. Supp. 2d 897, 904-05 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (finding the crosssection argument regarding felon exclusion “unavailing”); State v. Compton, 39 P.3d
833, 842 (Or. 2002) (en banc) (rejecting a cross-section challenge to felon
exclusion); Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. 1998) (rejecting the
ineffective assistance claim relating to the cross-section argument); Rubio, 593 P.2d at
599 (rejecting a cross-section challenge to felon exclusion); State v. Brown, 364 A.2d
186, 190-91 (Conn. 1975) (rejecting a cross-section challenge to felon exclusion).
Criminal defendants who have argued (rather oafishly, considering their
presumed denial of guilt) that their peer criminals must be included in a jury of
their peers, have been defeated, and rightfully so. As one impatient court stated,
“[t]he right to a jury of one’s peers does not entitle him to a jury which includes
convicted felons or bootleggers . . . .” Shows v. State, 267 So. 2d 811, 812 (Miss.
1972).
35. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478-79 (1990) (rejecting a cross-section
challenge to the racially-motivated use of peremptory challenges because
peremptories do not affect the venire); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74
(1986) (holding that cross-section claims apply only to jury venires and not to
peremptories because imposing cross-section standards on petit juries would be
pratically impossible); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section
Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REV. 101, 102 (1996) (“Given their limited size, juries cannot
fully replicate the diversity of the communities from which they are drawn.”). But cf.
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (plurality opinion) (striking down a law
allowing five-person juries, in part because it “prevents juries from truly representing
their communities”).
36. See, e.g., Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t, 241 F.3d 992, 996-97 (8th Cir. 2001)
(noting that defendant’s cross-section claim in a civil case could be viable if the
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Every court that has considered a cross-section argument as applied
37
Courts have given varying
to felon exclusion has rejected it.
accounts of what constitutes a cross-section, why it is important, and
what reasons for flouting it are constitutionally acceptable. The
acceptability of felon exclusion depends on which account one uses;
as cross-section doctrine currently stands, felon exclusion passes
muster. On the other hand, the doctrine and its application are
deeply flawed, and so a good argument can be made that felon
exclusion violates a reconstructed cross-section requirement, even if
current courts would not agree.
a.

The meaning of the cross-section requirement

In the abstract, cross-section doctrine is too muddled to say
definitively that it is either consistent or inconsistent with felon
exclusion. Before applying the doctrine, some appreciation is
needed of the variety of its possible meanings.
38
The cross-section requirement is rooted in equal protection. The
39
seminal 1880 case of Strauder v. West Virginia held that “the very idea
of a jury is a body of men composed . . . of [a criminal defendant’s]
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in
40
society as that which he holds.” In 1940, its enforcement of equal
protection in jury cases renewed, the Supreme Court noted in
sweeping dicta that “[i]t is part of the established tradition in the use
of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly
41
representative of the community.”
evidence offered showed systematic exclusion of black people from the jury venire);
Williams v. Coppola, 549 A.2d 1092, 1095 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding that
cross-section claims apply to civil juries as well as criminal juries); William V.
Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury
Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L.
REV. 887, 922 (1981). Indeed, the cross-section standard can be said to have
originated in the civil case of Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). See infra
notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of the cross-section
standard in Thiel in striking down the exclusion of blue-collar workers from a jury).
37. See supra note 34.
38. See Zuklie, supra note 35, at 107-09 (locating the origins of the cross-section
standard in the U.S. Supreme Court’s invocation of the equal protection rights of
defendants in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940)); Leipold, supra note 7, at 94960 (finding the origins of the cross-section standard in the Court’s “discomfort” with
practices that excluded minorities).
39. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
40. Id. at 308 (finding an equal protection violation where the state barred black
jurors). Strauder’s cross-section standard thus excluded those of degraded “legal
status” including felons (albeit tautologically). On the other hand, the Strauder
Court gave a list of juror limitations that would not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment and, while the list did not purport to be exclusive, it did not mention
felons. Id. at 310.
41. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (approving an equal protection
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The cross-section requirement was first asserted separately from
42
equal protection in 1946 in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., where the
Supreme Court used its supervisory power over the federal courts to
strike down a jury selection practice that discriminated against
43
workers.
The Court stressed that “[j]ury competence is an
44
individual rather than a group or class matter.” In other words, the
Court was concerned not with ensuring an adequate number of
workers in the jury pool, but with ensuring that if any were excluded,
it was on individual grounds rather than per se as members of a
group. This point casts some doubt on the legitimacy of felon
exclusion, but the cross-section doctrine continued to evolve.
In the same year that Thiel was decided, the Court clarified in
45
Ballard v. United States that cross-section analysis is not about
representing viewpoints, but instead is about avoiding “purposeful
and systematic exclusion” of groups that are an inextricable part of
46
the community. The Court understood that the proper functioning
of the judicial system—not just the rights of litigants—depended on
47
it. Even to the extent that these goals are achieved through the
representation of diverse viewpoints, the mechanism is intangible;
while Ballard dealt with gender representation, it did not presume
that each gender represented a particular set of views. As the Court
put it: “[T]he two sexes are not fungible . . . the subtle interplay of
influence one on the other is among the imponderables. To insulate
the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of
48
difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost . . . . ” The unique
challenge to the exclusion of black jurors). The Court used the term “cross-section”
two years later. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83-87 (1942) (quoting Smith
and suggesting that the defendant’s claim of an unrepresentative jury could have
prevailed with adequate proof).
42. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
43. Id. at 224-25 (striking down jury selection practices that excluded day
laborers and longshoremen and asserting supervisory power as a basis for decision).
More recent cases have appeared to narrow or ignore Thiel by accepting jury venires
that exclude blue-collar workers. See Zuklie, supra note 35, at 115-16 (noting lower
courts’ decisions that blue-collar workers can be systematically excluded from the
jury venire).
44. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220.
45. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
46. Id. at 193.
47. See id. at 195 (stating that violations also entailed “injury to the jury system, to
the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal
reflected in the processes of our courts”).
48. Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). This principle was also stated well in Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (plurality opinion):
It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as
a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a
perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any
case that may be presented.
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perspective of felons arguably imparts such a “flavor,” though
admittedly felons are not as inextricable a part of the community as
women.
In 1968, Congress mandated a “fair cross-section” requirement in
49
its new federal jury selection law for both criminal and civil cases.
Seven years later, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court constitutionalized
the cross-section requirement (in criminal trials, at least) by
50
grounding it in the Sixth Amendment’s mandate of an impartial jury
and, against the states, in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
51
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment.
The Taylor Court held that the purpose of the cross-section
requirement is threefold. First, it is “prophylactic”: It ensures that
the “commonsense judgment of the community” is represented and
52
acts as a “hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor.”
Second, “[c]ommunity participation in the administration of the
53
criminal law” is an important component of American democracy.
Third, participation is “critical to public confidence in the fairness of
54
the criminal justice system.” Though the first and third purposes
may be roughly consistent with impartiality, the Taylor Court might
also have meant to root the cross-section requirement more broadly
55
in the “intrinsic nature” of the jury.
56
In 1979, in Duren v. Missouri, the Supreme Court finally supplied a
test for determining whether the cross-section requirement has been
57
met. In Duren, the Court held that a prima facie case of a crosssection violation requires three elements:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive group” in
the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
49. See Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101,
82 Stat. 53, 54 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000)). Several congressmen
apparently thought that the cross-section standard they were legislating was rooted in
the Sixth Amendment. See Leipold, supra note 7, at 957 (discussing legislative history
of the Jury Service and Selection Act).
50. 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (declaring cross-section right to be an “essential
component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial”).
51. Id. at 526 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
(incorporating the Sixth Amendment under the Fourteenth Amendment to reach
state criminal trials)).
52. Id. at 530.
53. Id.; see also infra Part III.B.
54. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31.
55. See Leipold, supra note 7, at 958-59 (suggesting both impartiality and the
“intrinsic nature of a ‘jury’” as possible bases of Taylor).
56. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
57. Id. at 364.
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underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in
the jury-selection process.58

The Court continued, however, noting that “‘States remain free to
59
prescribe relevant qualifications,’” and holding that it would apply
an intermediate sort of scrutiny to a state’s choices, by looking for a
“significant state interest” that is “manifestly and primarily advanced”
60
by the state’s criteria. In so holding, the Court ensured that crosssection challenges would be easier to establish than equal protection
challenges, because cross-section challenges do not require a showing
of discriminatory intent and are not reviewed merely for a rational
61
basis.
For the purposes of this Article, the most important element of a
prima facie cross-section case is the “distinctiveness” prong, because
there is no question that felon exclusion causes systematic
underrepresentation of felons on juries. Few groups have been
62
deemed distinctive; while the standard is vague, and seems easily
met as a literal matter, the underlying purpose of the cross-section
58. Id.
59. Id. at 367 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538).
60. Id. at 367-68; see also Druff, supra note 7, at 1566 (describing the scrutiny
mandated by Duren as less than strict). Duren’s use of this intermediate language is,
perhaps, not coincidental, considering that the exclusion at issue was that of women.
See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 453-54 (1985) (affirming
intermediate review for gender discrimination). The exclusion in Taylor, which was
Duren’s basis for applying a more searching review than mere rational basis, was also
based on gender. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68 (holding that Taylor mandated
intermediate scrutiny); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534-35 (rejecting a state plan that
“exclud[ed] all women”). Both cases, however, used sweeping language that tied the
standard to cross-section claims in general and not gender-related ones in particular.
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 367 (“The right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely
rational grounds.”) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534).
61. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26 (distinguishing cross-section from equal
protection claim in terms of sufficiency in former of showing of “systematic
disproportion itself” without “discriminatory purpose”); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534
(distinguishing cross-section from equal protection and due process claims with
mere rational basis requirement), quoted in Duren, 439 U.S. at 367; Zuklie, supra note
35, at 114 (characterizing Duren as eliminating the intent requirement). But see
United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying, in essence, a
rational-basis test in a cross-section case); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 22.2(d) (2d ed. 2000) (stating the test as requiring narrow tailoring
and a “valid government interest”); Leipold, supra note 7, at 973 (arguing that case
results do not reflect a lower burden for cross-section than for equal protection).
In the voting context, some have argued that the racial disparities found with felon
disenfranchisement constitute a violation of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which also
lacks an intent requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000); see Shapiro, supra note 5, at
573. No similarly vigorous statute protecting jury rights exists, though, and the VRA
argument has never prevailed on the merits in any court. See One Person, No Vote,
supra note 5, at 1954 (describing the failure of the VRA theory).
62. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 203, 209 (1995) (describing the Court’s difficulty in explaining the
distinctiveness or “cognizability” requirement).
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requirement—impartiality—must still be fulfilled. In the 1990 case of
63
Holland v. Illinois, the Supreme Court reiterated this, stating that
“[t]he Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross-section on the
venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the
Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it
64
does).”
By reiterating so strongly that impartiality was the purpose of the
cross-section requirement, Holland drew back from the Court’s earlier
statements that, intrinsically, the jury had to be drawn from a broadly
65
representative and diverse slice of the community.
Perhaps the
Court had belatedly realized the irony of resting a novel diversity
66
requirement on traditional conceptions of the jury. Perhaps the
Court was simply reining in its doctrine, given that many groups are
literally distinctive in ways that have no bearing on their performance
67
as jurors.
Alternatively, the Court may have meant that the
representativeness and community participation required by the
cross-section standard is simply a means to the end of impartiality. In
other words, maybe “‘an impartial jury is one in which . . . biases have
68
the opportunity to interact,’” which is one of the reasons that juries
have many members even though each juror is individually certified
as impartial.
Lower courts have followed Holland without digging very deeply
into the nature of the impartiality that the Court was seeking to
69
protect. Given that the cross-section requirement does not protect
63. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
64. Id. at 480-81. Given that impartiality is paramount at the jury panel level, the
failure to apply the cross-section standard to individual panels must be a practical,
rather than a logical, consideration. See supra text accompanying note 35. But cf.
Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REV.
107, 129-30 (1994) (attacking Holland for ignoring biases that result from
unrepresentative panels).
65. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
66. See Leipold, supra note 7, at 960 (contrasting the traditional exclusiveness of
jury membership with the modern cross-section requirement).
67. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 495 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s statement that impartiality is the purpose of the cross-section
requirement). If this was the Court’s intent, it failed badly. See Zuklie, supra note 35,
at 128-29 (criticizing modern cross-section jurisprudence because it “fails to
distinguish between shared attitudes that are relevant to jury service and those that
are not”).
68. Druff, supra note 7, at 1585 (quoting Comment, Limiting the Peremptory
Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1733 (1977)).
Druff argues persuasively—and well before Holland—that the Court had long seen
the cross-section requirement as a way to guarantee impartiality. Id. at 1559. He also
argues that “the principle of balancing perspectives in the name of impartiality [is]
questionable.” Id. at 1586. See generally Brown, supra note 64 (discussing the nature
of bias and its relation to cross-section analysis).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1995) (adopting
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particular groups because of their particular viewpoints, it is very
difficult to distinguish between groups whose exclusion threatens
impartiality and those whose exclusion does not. The implications
for felon exclusion are, therefore, as unclear as the doctrine itself.
The next Part will demonstrate that, as applied, cross-section doctrine
does not help felon jurors.
If instead the cross-section standard had continued to mean what it
did at its inception—that exclusion should be an individualized
matter—then felon exclusion would face much more serious scrutiny.
The fact that it no longer means this does not, however, mean that
individual jurisdictions cannot choose to include felons. Indeed, it
provides grounds for them to do just that.
b.

Application of the Current Standard

Whatever the cross-section standard means, it remains an obvious
avenue of attack on felon exclusion. Courts have turned away all
such attacks, but in doing so they have highlighted the ambiguities
and contradictions in the cross-section doctrine, the sum of which
suggests that felon exclusion may indeed flout the cross-section
requirement when properly understood. Indeed, the court that
considered the cross-section argument most thoroughly rejected it
70
only narrowly, by a 4-3 vote.
Suggesting closer linkage to its “equal protection” origins than its
current “impartiality” premise, courts have used the cross-section
requirement to strike down the systematic exclusion of women and
71
racial and cultural minorities from jury venires while rejecting
claims concerning such various and sundry groups as:
[Y]oung people, old people, poor people, deaf people, less
educated people, college students, resident aliens, blue-collar
workers, professional workers, felons, juvenile offenders, those not
registered to vote, those opposed to the death penalty, those
affiliated with the National Rifle Association, city residents, and
72
residents of Minneapolis.

the Holland test); United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1078 (11th Cir. 1995)
(following the Holland Court’s reasoning).
70. See Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1979) (plurality opinion).
71. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367 (1979) (striking down a jury
selection system because of its systematic exclusion of women); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975) (striking down a jury selection system for its systematic
exclusion of racial minorities); Leipold, supra note 7, at 968 & nn.111-12 (reviewing
case law on “distinctiveness” of ethnic and religious groups).
72. Leipold, supra note 7, at 968-69 (footnotes omitted); see also Zuklie, supra
note 35, at 102 (criticizing the Court’s “distinctiveness” test).
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To see why felons are on the losing side of this confusing standard,
and to question whether they should be, we must carefully apply the
cross-section standard and explore its underlying contradictions.
The three prima facie elements of a cross-section claim are:
(1) distinctiveness of the group and (2) underrepresentation of the
73
group due to (3) systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.
Felons in jurisdictions that exclude them from juries are infinitely
underrepresented, and their exclusion—being intentional and a
matter of statute—is as systematic as one can imagine. This leaves
only the question of whether felons are a “distinctive” group.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never explained what
74
qualifies a group as “distinct,” but a common court of appeals
definition has emerged:
[A] defendant must show: (1) that the group is defined and
limited by some factor (i.e., that the group has a definite
composition such as by race or sex); (2) that a common thread or
basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience runs through the
group; and (3) that there is a community of interest among
members of the group such that the group’s interests cannot be
adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury
75
selection process.

The argument that felons (along with other groups that ultimately
lose cross-section challenges) are “distinctive” is obvious. First, felons
are easily defined as those who have been convicted of felonies.
Some definitional issues at the margins exist, but surely no more than
exist for race.
Next, felons have a significant common experience that produces
common ideas or attitudes: They “have had the experience of being
deprived of their personal liberty by the state and, upon their return
to the community, of being stigmatized both publicly and privately
76
because of their former status.” Besides criminal supervision and
73. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
74. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (noting the lack of a
definition of distinctiveness and declining to provide one).
75. Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 1983); accord United States v.
Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d
781, 782 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Canfield, 879 F.2d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 1988); Ford v. Seabold, 841
F.2d 677, 681-82 (6th Cir. 1988); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 986-87 (1st Cir.
1985) (en banc).
76. Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 598 (Cal. 1979) (plurality opinion).
But see United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It is possible that
an alleged tax evader may have something in common with a charged kidnapper, but
the remote chance that he might, does not support a finding that the group is
distinct.”); State v. Compton, 39 P.3d 833, 842 (Or. 2002) (en banc) (arguing
similarly that the attitude of a felon that violated environmental or tax laws is likely
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stigma, felons also have the distinct experience of being arrested,
charged, and convicted (if not actually tried). This seems at least as
significant and common as the marks of distinctiveness used in
77
successful cross-section challenges.
Some courts have said that
78
felons have very little common experience, or at least none that are
helpful to jury participation considering that their most obvious
commonality is that they have flouted the rules by which society
lives—hardly a basis to grant and protect their power to determine
society’s order. These courts have held that felons are not a
79
distinctive group for purposes of a cross-section challenge. But this
begs the question of whether felons who have long since served their
sentences should still be considered unfit; to say simply that their
status is justified by their status is circular. In any case, their common
perspectives and experiences seem more patent than their stigma,
80
which is an entirely separate matter from distinctiveness.
Finally, it does not seem that others in society can claim to have
sufficiently similar experiences to adequately represent the felons’
perspective. One court held that relatively more savory characters,
such as convicted misdemeanants, juvenile offenders, and
involuntarily committed (former) mental patients, have similar
enough experiences to felons that they can adequately represent
81
their perspective. But spending a year in a prison is very different
from a month in a jail or time in a hospital. Moreover, the stigma
attached to felonies after release differs greatly from that attached to
misdemeanors or hospitalization. The litany of civil disabilities
82
imposed only on felons bears witness to this fact.
(Admittedly,
much different than one that committed rape or robbery).
77. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 571 S.E.2d 740, 744 (Ga. 2002) (finding Hispanics
distinctive due to “speaking of Spanish, professing the Roman Catholic faith, a strong
work ethic, and strong family traditions”).
78. See, e.g., Barry, 71 F.3d at 1274 (noting diversity of criminal experiences);
Compton, 39 P.3d at 842 (noting that although all convicted felons have been found
guilty of a crime, their reasons for, and ways of, committing the crimes are very
different).
79. See, e.g., Barry, 71 F.3d at 1274; Compton, 39 P.3d at 842.
80. An interesting parallel is the case of People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000), in which the court found lesbians to be distinctive. Garcia was based
on a Batson-like challenge under state law, but applied the distinctiveness test used in
cross-section cases. Id. at 342-46. In finding lesbians to be distinctive, the court
noted that lesbians would be likely to share similar experiences in that they have
been subject to persecution and discrimination and the court thought this
perspective should be represented on the jury. Id. at 344.
81. Rubio, 593 P.2d at 599.
82. See id. at 606-07 (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (discussing the irrationality of the
majority’s theory). But cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003)
(discussing the significant stigma of a misdemeanor sodomy conviction). Other civil
disabilities are discussed in Part IV.C, infra.
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though, it is circular to challenge felon exclusion by arguing that
felons are distinctive, in part because of felon exclusion.)
The adequate representation test makes no sense. Taken literally,
at least, it would allow a jurisdiction to arbitrarily exclude black jurors
“whose last names began with A through L,” under the theory that
those “with last names beginning with M through Z could adequately
83
represent the viewpoints” of the excluded group. The adequate
representation test is also self-contradictory in any jurisdiction that
subscribes to the “inherent bias” rationale for felon exclusion.
Assume that felons are adequately represented by misdemeanants,
juvenile offenders, and mental patients. If felons are supposedly too
biased for jury service, how does it justify their exclusion to say that
other groups with the same perspectives are not excluded? If the two
groups are similar, there is no principled basis for including one but
not the other. On the other hand, if the groups differ in some
84
significant way, there is not adequate representation. To be sure,
adequate representation could be premised on being similarly
situated rather than identically situated, but a more fitting conclusion
is that either the adequate representation test or felon exclusion is
arbitrary.
More broadly, the distinctiveness standard itself is vague, and a lack
of distinctiveness should not be the sole basis for felon exclusion.
Consider this analogy: The Supreme Court refused to deem anti85
death penalty jurors “distinctive” in Lockhart v. McCree, arguing in
dicta that “groups defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that
would prevent or substantially impair members of the group from
performing one of their duties as jurors . . . are not ‘distinctive
86
groups’ for fair-cross-section purposes.” Given that felon exclusion
87
has been accepted as protecting the jury from inherent bias (a
“shared attitude”), the Court could easily apply Lockhart to felons—as
88
one lower court has done. The argument is that while felons are
distinctive, their distinctive quality is their unsuitability for jury
service. But this has nothing to do with distinctiveness (the plaintiff’s
83. Rubio, 593 P.2d at 603 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 606-07 (arguing that felon exclusion reveals the absurdity of the
adequate representation requirement).
85. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
86. Id. at 174.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33; infra Part II.C; cf. United States v.
Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir. 1995). In Barry, the court stated that one purpose
of the cross-section requirement is to infuse the jury with “the common-sense
judgment of the community,” but that those charged with crimes have revealed their
poor judgment, thus justifying their exclusion under the cross-section standard. Id.
88. Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. 1998).
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prima facie case); rather it is a matter of justification (the
government’s response to the prima facie case). Courts should not
distort the distinctiveness test to end the inquiry early; felons do bring
something distinct to a jury, even if not all distinctiveness is worth
preserving.
Because courts do distort the distinctiveness test, they have not
sufficiently analyzed justification—the second step in the analysis—in
which the state must assert a “significant” interest that is “manifestly
89
and primarily advanced” by the exclusion. The most prominent
cases that performed such an analysis concerned the exclusion of
those with pending criminal charges and held probity and inherent
90
bias to constitute adequate justification.
As discussed in greater detail in Parts II.B and II.C, the probity and
inherent bias rationales are flawed. To summarize briefly, the probity
argument is both under- and overinclusive, and somewhat circular.
Many (if not most) “bad people” are not felons, and some felons who
have completed their sentences are not “bad people.”
It is
bootstrapping to define felons as the only people too “bad” to serve,
based on their degraded status, especially when felon exclusion is
much more common than other civil disabilities.
Defining felons as inherently biased is inconsistent with decisions
affirming verdicts rendered by juries with felons, and it is also
overinclusive in many cases and for many felons. Courts typically will
not reverse verdicts rendered by juries with felons absent a showing of
91
actual bias.
While some felons might be biased against the
government, others might not be; any other oft-biased group receives
individualized treatment, not blanket exclusion. Even if felons are
biased against prosecutors, this would not render them unfit for
service in civil litigation between private parties.
In addition to these flaws, both probity and bias seem significant
and “manifestly and primarily advanced” by felon exclusion only in a
vacuum. Old Supreme Court dicta did, in fact, give reason to
conclude that probity is an intrinsic part of the government’s
92
justification requirement, and classifying many or even most felons
89. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
90. See Barry, 71 F.3d at 1274 (citing probity as an adequate justification for
exclusion); United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 795-98 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing bias
and probity as adequate justifications for exclusion); see also Carle, 705 A.2d at 686
(finding that probity and bias defeat a cross-section claim regardless of “whether one
analyzes for ‘distinctive group’ status or asks instead whether the state has a
significant interest in limiting the right of convicted felons to sit as jurors”).
91. See infra Appendix 1.B.4.
92. See Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970) (“The States remain free
to confine the selection to . . . those possessing . . . sound judgment, and fair
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as poor candidates for jury service does have some basis. But given
that without exclusion, felons would still be screened individually like
every other potential juror, it is not clear that felon exclusion adds
enough to probity or impartiality to pass muster. There is thus a basis
to argue that felon exclusion violates the cross-section requirement.
A brief review of the cross-section case law reveals, however, that
there is more to these cases than just an application of the nominal
legal standard. What the de facto cross-section standard is—putting
women and minorities on one side, and the uneducated, blue collar
workers, college students, and felons on the other—is hard to pin
down. Other considerations seem to be added to the legal standard
sub rosa.
One such consideration is the problem of demographic
micromanagement. Because arguing that a group is “distinctive” is
not hard, and allowing systematic statistical discrepancies to creep
into a jury pool is easy, courts are faced with an unmanageable
number of potential bases for cross-section claims. If race and
gender are both distinctive, what about the combination of the two—
what if some policy of jury selection does not have an adverse effect
on blacks qua blacks, or men qua men, but does have one on black
men qua black men? Courts have been reluctant to divide society
into too many subgroups, such as black men, for fear of making the
93
cross-section requirement unmanageable.
This is especially true
where the claim is of a “mere statistical imbalance[]” as opposed to
94
wholesale exclusion. As one court stated, the cross-section standard
“requires only a cross-section that is fair, not one perfectly attuned to

character.”); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953) (rejecting cross-section
standard so long as jury lists “reasonably reflect[ed] a cross-section of the population
suitable in character and intelligence for that civic duty”) (emphasis added), overruled
on other grounds by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 1986)
(refusing to find black males distinctive as opposed to black people in general);
United States v. Blair, 493 F. Supp. 398, 407 (D. Md. 1980) (finding that people
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine are not a distinctive group). Some
courts have rejected cross-section challenges to felon exclusion that are based on the
disparate effect on black men without reaching the distinctiveness question, relying
instead on the fact that felons are excluded qua felons, regardless of their race. See,
e.g., State v. Bell, 745 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tenn. 1988).
94. See United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1446 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[The state]
may not forbid blue collar workers, chess players, Masons, etc. from serving on juries.
But if there are . . . mere statistical imbalances, unexplained, the problem is
different.”); Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (suggesting stricter review
of wholesale exclusion cases as opposed to cases involving “mere statistical
imbalance”). But see Johnson v. McCaughtry, 92 F.3d 585, 591 (7th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to apply a different standard for intentional and systematic exclusion than
for cases involving only statistical imbalance).
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multiple variables.”
This cannot explain why felons are not
protected, however, because they are not subdivided in this way, and
their exclusion is total, not a “mere imbalance.”
Many commentators have surmised that the cross-section standard
correlates with classifications that are “suspect” under equal
protection doctrine, which explains why protection is afforded to
women and minorities but not to felons, blue collar workers,
96
denizens of a particular neighborhood, and the uneducated. This
belies the language that the case law uses to discuss cross-sections; it is
hard to argue that protected groups, like Hispanics, represent a
“community of interest” that is as discrete as unprotected groups,
97
such as welfare recipients. Nevertheless, this would account for the
courts’ failure to protect felons.
Others have suggested that the distinction is one of permanence,
because gender and ethnicity are almost immutable, while
unprotected characteristics such as neighborhood, college
98
enrollment, and criminal history are more matters of choice. This
too might suffice as an explanation of the results of the cross-section
case law, but it clashes with the asserted goals of the cross-section
requirement. Differences based on mutable characteristics are no
less important for impartiality or community participation than
differences based on immutable characteristics. The latter may be
more discrete and easier to administer, but these are practical

95. United States v. Greer, 900 F. Supp. 952, 958 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
96. See Anaya, 781 F.2d at 6 (tying the distinctiveness analysis to the presence or
absence of a history of discrimination against the group in question); Amar, supra
note 62, at 209-10; Leipold, supra note 7, at 968-69; Zuklie, supra note 35, at 103
(“[C]ourts . . . have collapsed their analysis of group distinctiveness into a single
inquiry—whether members of the group are victims of general societal
discrimination.”); id. at 132 (criticizing interpretations of the cross-section test that
render it redundant with the Equal Protection Clause). Amar rejects this equal
protection approach in favor of a political-rights model, though he notes Professor
Underwood’s “thoughtful essay” asserting the doctrinal superiority of the former. See
Underwood, supra note 7; Amar, supra note 62, at 210 n.40 (comparing his own
approach with Underwood). Neither approach, however, follows the letter of the
case law.
97. See Zuklie, supra note 35, at 103 (critiquing courts’ approach to
distinctiveness); id. at 116 n.131 (noting the rejection of food stamp recipients as a
protected category).
98. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986) (justifying the exclusion of
jurors who oppose the death penalty and could not accurately follow the law in a
death penalty case, in part because jurors who are singled out in death penalty cases
are singled out on the basis of something they can control as opposed to other
groups, such as African-Americans, women, and Mexican-Americans); State v.
Crocker, 982 P.2d 45, 48 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (resting the justification of felon
exclusion in part on the fact that “[t]hose who are convicted of felonies freely chose
to commit felonies”); Zuklie, supra note 35, at 118 (citing mutability as a reason given
by courts for rejecting distinctiveness of the poor).
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considerations that no court has defended on legal grounds.
Moreover, a lifetime label of “felon” may be a matter of choice ex
ante, but it is largely immutable ex post.
In any case, none of these alternative explanations of the crosssection case law represents official elements of the cross-section test.
Still, as the cross-section requirement has been applied, felons can be
excluded consistently from juries without violating it. But, if the
cross-section requirement means what it actually says, courts should
think twice before rejecting cross-section challenges to felon
exclusion.
4.

Equal Protection
Felon exclusion has been challenged also as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, but these challenges have been properly
rejected. This category contains two arguments: that felon exclusion
violates the equal protection rights of felons; and that the profoundly
disparate racial impact of felon exclusion violates the equal
99
protection rights of black citizens, especially black men. The right
being violated is that of the juror, not the complaining party, but the
issue is generally litigated by the party and the Supreme Court has
100
been generous in granting third-party standing for such challenges.
The argument that felon exclusion violates the equal protection
101
rights of felons has consistently failed.
This should not be
surprising, though, because no court has ever held that, as a matter
of federal constitutional law, jury service is a fundamental right
102
entitled to strict or even heightened scrutiny. (The Supreme Court
99. One could argue that felon exclusion discriminates against other groups
besides black citizens, but the effect on them is the starkest and they receive
maximum protection under equal protection law—strict scrutiny review. Therefore,
if any such indirect violation were to be found, it would be regarding black citizens.
Another potential argument could be rooted in Article 25 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 52, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International
Covenant], to which the United States is a signatory. Cf. Demleitner, Preventing
Internal Exile, supra note 5, at 160 (positing that felon disenfranchisement violates
Article 25). That covenant states that citizens generally should have equal access to
public service, though it also allows for “[]reasonable restrictions” on that access.
International Covenant, supra.
100. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying
rational basis review); United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1993)
(finding that many other courts have decided the issue similarly); Rubio v. Superior
Court, 593 P.2d 595, 600-01 (Cal. 1979) (plurality opinion) (stating that the right to
serve on a jury is not fundamental).
102. See United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2000)
(noting that courts have consistently found no fundamental right to jury service and
no supect classification in denial of jury service). As already discussed, cross-section
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has considered—and upheld—the exclusion of felons from the
fundamental right of voting, but did so by relying on a constitutional
103
provision that does not apply to jury service. ) Moreover, felons are
104
not entitled to strict scrutiny as a suspect class. All that is required,
105
therefore, is a rational basis for the policy.
Such a rational basis is easy to establish. Courts have accepted both
the need to preserve the probity of the jury and the need to protect
106
against the inherent bias of felons as rational bases.
For reasons
explored in depth in Parts II.B and II.C, neither justification is
particularly compelling. Both are strong enough, however, to survive
rational-basis review. Safeguarding probity and avoiding bias are
clearly legitimate purposes, and even if felon exclusion is not a
sensible way to advance them, it is almost certainly rationally
107
related.
Parties can also argue that felon exclusion affects the equal
protection rights of black people, especially black men. As discussed
in Appendix 2, a leading estimate suggests that felon exclusion affects
from 2% to 6.5% of adult citizens nationally, but 7% to 21% of black
108
citizens, and 12% to 37% of black men.
An equal protection
argument is difficult to sustain, however, on the sole basis of a
disparate impact, even one as stark as this; showing discriminatory
analysis provides a more forgiving standard than equal protection analysis. See supra
notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
103. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56 (1974). The Richardson Court
relied on section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to reject an equal protection
challenge to felon disenfranchisement, finding that section 2 was inconsistent with
any notion that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a ban on felon voting. Id.
Section 2 provides:
But when the right to vote . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced . . . .
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). But cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (rejecting a section 2 argument in a case involving purposeful
racial discrimination in the enforcement of criminal law).
104. See Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that felons
are not a suspect constitutional class and applying the rational basis standard to
discrimination against felons).
105. Id.; Arce, 997 F.2d at 1127; Rubio, 593 P.2d at 600-01.
106. See, e.g., Arce, 997 F.2d at 1127 (accepting probity as a rational basis for
discrimination); Greene, 995 F.2d at 795-96 (accepting probity and bias as rational
bases); Rubio, 593 P.2d at 600-01 (accepting probity and bias as rational bases).
107. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining levels of scrutiny and
respective tests).
108. The lower figures are based on numbers of felons currently in custody. The
higher figures are based on the estimated number of felons in or out of custody. In
the case of the numbers for black citizens, they also reflect upper-bound estimates;
the lower bounds are 6% of black citizens and 29% of black men, which is still very
disparate. See infra note 499 and accompanying text.
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intent is necessary for applying any sort of heightened scrutiny.
The law would be ruled invalid only in the rare case where an
individual who challenges a felon exclusion law is able to show that it
is rooted in discriminatory intent.
110
Any such case would rely heavily on Hunter v. Underwood, in which
the Supreme Court struck down a felon disenfranchisement
111
provision on grounds that it was a thinly veiled Jim Crow law. The
problem with basing equal protection arguments on the Jim Crow
pedigree of felon exclusion statutes is that such arguments are
decades too late. The fatal flaw with the provision in Hunter was that
disenfranchising crimes were chosen (and enforced) so that black
people would be affected vastly more than white people; this
discriminatory intent, coupled with persistent disparate impact,
112
rendered the provision unconstitutional.
While several states
structured their felon disenfranchisement provisions this way, felon
exclusion laws relied instead on the discretion of jury
113
commissioners.
Moreover, most states have changed their felon
exclusion laws since 1900, and now exclude all felons rather than
some, and decide to exclude based on objective criteria rather than
114
commissioners’ whims. The exceptions are Alabama, Arkansas, and
115
Illinois, of which only Alabama has a history of intentionally using
116
civil disabilities for racial cleansing. In the absence of intentionally
109. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976)(finding that intentional
discrimination is required as opposed to simply a disparate impact); United States v.
Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that racial disparity in the
exclusion of those with pending felony charges did not warrant strict scrutiny). But
see Amar, supra note 62, at 256 (hinting that political rights like jury service might be
entitled to a more watered-down intent requirement).
110. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
111. Id. at 226-33. While the Alabama statute in Hunter (unlike the Mississippi
statute discussed in the text accompanying notes 563-64, infra) excluded all felons, it
also excluded those committing misdemeanors involving moral turpitude, which the
state intentionally enforced disparately against black citizens. Id. at 226-27.
112. Id.; cf. infra text accompanying notes 563-65 (explaining a similar system in
Mississippi under which convictions for “white” crimes like murder did not result in
disenfranchisement).
113. See infra text accompanying note 561.
114. See infra Appendix 3.C. Even before Hunter, the Supreme Court expressed
concern about the racist misuse of commissioners’ discretion. In Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346 (1970), the Court upheld a Georgia law barring grand jury service by
“unintelligent” or not “upright citizens.” See id. at 355 n.13 (denying that “the
present requirements serve no rational function other than to afford an opportunity
to state officials to discriminate against Negroes”). In doing so, however, it ruled that
using the law almost exclusively against black citizens was constitutionally troubling
enough to warrant a remand. See id. at 359; see also Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S.
320, 332-37 (1970) (refusing to strike down a jury law according discretion that the
Court found was abused).
115. See infra notes 376 (Alabama), 377 (Alaska), 389 (Illinois).
116. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 541 (naming Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi,
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discriminatory application of these three states’ jury laws, only
Alabama’s law might be susceptible to an equal protection challenge.
The Alabama law has, in fact, been challenged on a similar
117
ground.
Rather than attacking the discretionary portion of the
Alabama law (“honest and intelligent and . . . esteemed in the
community for integrity, good character and sound judgment”), the
challenger, citing Hunter, attacked the portion that excluded those
who had been disenfranchised for crimes involving moral
118
Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Alabama Court
turpitude.
rejected the challenge, noting the absence of a Jim Crow history
behind the moral turpitude exclusion law—especially because it was
limited by Hunter to felonies and because its linkage to
119
disenfranchisement was recent. The United States Supreme Court
120
denied certiorari.
Viewed from another angle, felon exclusion was practiced at
common law, long before black people—felons or non-felons—had
121
any chance to serve on juries. Thus, imputing racial animus to the
historical practice of felon exclusion is difficult. As in Hunter, a
successful equal protection challenge would require clear evidence of
discriminatory intent in actively maintaining or enacting a particular
felon exclusion law.
One could argue that felon exclusion is marked by a sort of racially
discriminatory intent. Prominent critics have noted that the War on
Drugs has led to a vast rise in the number of convicted felons, and
larger increases in rates of imprisonment for black citizens than for
122
white citizens. In the Jim Crow era, felon exclusion was justified on
South Carolina, and Virginia as having Jim Crow felon disenfranchisement
stratagems); infra text accompanying notes 560-65.
117. Anderson v. State, 542 So. 2d 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
118. Id. at 299.
119. Id. at 299-303.
120. Anderson v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 836 (1989).
121. See infra Appendix 1; cf. Ewald, supra note 5, at 1065 (making a similar point
about felon disenfranchisement).
But cf. ANGELA BEHRENS ET AL., BALLOT
MANIPULATION AND THE “MENACE OF NEGRO DOMINATION”: RACIAL THREAT AND FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-2000, at 30-32 (Northwestern Univ.
Inst. for Policy Research, Working Paper 02-40, 2002) (finding an association
between the enactment of felon disenfranchisement laws and the enfranchisement
of black men during Reconstruction), at http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/
publications/workingpapers/wpF02.html (on file with the American University Law
Review). The Behrens paper does not account, however, for changes in “character”
requirements that were previously used to exclude felons from the electorate.
122. See, e.g., JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 13-14 (1998) (discussing the
effect of the War on Drugs on black imprisonment rates); Kweisi Mfume,
Reenfranchisement (citing an eightfold increase in the imprisonment of black citizens
for state drug crimes, compared to a fourfold increase for whites), at
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the grounds that exclusion could be avoided by refraining from
committing crimes—a reasonable enough request, but for the fact
123
If one believes
that enforcement of these laws was racially biased.
that the enforcement of the criminal law is substantially racially
biased today, and that any contemporaneous law maintaining or
expanding felon exclusion is tainted with that bias, then the seeds
124
exist for an equal protection argument—or even legislation.
This
125
Article is not asserting that argument here, but it certainly bears
mentioning because of the prominence with which its underlying
premises seem to be held. This is the only way, however, to hold that
felon exclusion violates the Equal Protection Clause.
5.

Due process
Another potential ground for challenging felon exclusion is a
126
This challenge
litigant’s due process right to a fair tribunal.
properly fails as well. Due process is a vague concept, which means
that a party’s due process rights could be understood in different

http://www.naacp.org/work/voter/reenfranchisement.shtml (on file with the
American University Law Review); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance:
Actuarial Models and Criminal Profiling at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 105, 117-27 (2003) (presenting an actuarial thought experiment showing the
self-fulfilling nature of racial profiling); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE,
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82 (1995) (charging that the War on Drugs was a
“calculated effort” to increase black imprisonment). But see Drew S. Days III, Race
and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L.
REV. 180, 187 (1996) (providing non-racial explanations for some of the racial
disparity in “drug use and drug arrest statistics”).
123. See infra text accompanying note 565.
124. If felon exclusion represents a violation of equal protection, Congress could
pass legislation preventing states from excluding felons from juries, pursuant to its
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But a finding of a violation
would need to be based on judicial standards, not more expansive legislative ones,
thus legislation would not improve opponents’ options much beyond litigation. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that Congress does not
have “power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on
the States”). Congress has debated legislation to ban felon disenfranchisement, but
the legislation has never passed and has similar constitutional problems. See H.R.
5510, 107th Cong. (2002) (proposing a law guaranteeing the voting rights of exfelons); Right of Prisoners to Vote in Federal Elections: Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the House
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999)
(containing testimony debating the constitutionality of similar legislation), available
at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/con1021.htm (on file with the American
University Law Review); Symposium, Enfranchising the Disenfranchised, 9 J.L. & POL’Y
249, 284 n.105 (2001) (describing earlier incarnations of legislation); see also
Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1902 (arguing that Congress has Fifteenth Amendment
power to bar felon disenfranchisement based on racially disparate impact).
125. A related argument about prosecutorial self-dealing, rooted in policy rather
than civil rights law, is presented in Part II.G.
126. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1954) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process.”).

KALT.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC

2003]

EXCLUSION OF FELONS FROM JURY SERVICE

2/23/2004 2:18 PM

93

127

ways.
One way is through the incorporation of the Sixth
Amendment right to criminal trial by jury into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Thus, one may argue that a jury
with a particular composition is not a “jury” in the Sixth Amendment
sense of the word. Unfortunately, this approach is open-ended and
128
If the problem is that the jury is biased, the Sixth
ill-defined.
Amendment’s impartiality and cross-section requirements already
provide a remedy. If the problem is that norms of equality inherent
in the concept of the jury have been violated, equal protection
already supplies a solution.
Another, more general, approach to due process is to assert that a
129
jury is illegally constituted.
Under such a framework, though, a
challenge to a felon exclusion statute once again must be rooted in
some other constitutional violation—one treated in some other
portion of this Article.
The due process rubric quite possibly adds to the reach of the
rights in question. At the very least, it clarifies the fact that the party
is litigating on his own behalf instead of on behalf of the excluded
130
juror.
It may also limit the need to show actual bias: As one
Supreme Court opinion asserted in 1972, “due process is denied by
131
circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias.” As
a practical matter, this means that if a jury has been selected “in an
arbitrary and discriminatory manner, in violation of the Constitution
and laws of the United States,” then there is a due process violation
132
even in the absence of a showing of actual bias or harm. But, the
quoted opinion represented only a plurality, and the Court has since
133
In
resisted describing the due process right more definitively.
short, due process requirements do not strengthen the case against
felon exclusion.
127. See Underwood, supra note 7, at 737-50 (presenting various approaches to
analyzing the due process right to be free from racial discrimination in jury
selection). Underwood concludes that “the jury trial claim . . . has more to do with
antidiscrimination norms than with fair trial rights.” Id. at 739.
128. See id. at 738 (discussing the limitations of this approach).
129. See id. at 739-50 (discussing the notion of a right to a “lawfully constructed
tribunal”).
130. See supra Part I.B.1.
131. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 401 (1998) (noting that a
“majority of Justices could not agree on a comprehensive statement of the rule”).
Many courts, including federal courts, have been fairly strict about requiring a
showing of bias before reversing the result of a trial in which the felon exclusion laws
have been breached. See infra Appendix 1.B.4. This is a different point than the
main one of this Part, though, because it relates to challenges to the inclusion of
felons, while this Part deals with challenges to their exclusion.

KALT.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC

94

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/23/2004 2:18 PM

[Vol. 53:65

6.

Fifteenth Amendment
Relying mainly on the insights of Vikram Amar, one could argue
that the Fifteenth Amendment and other voting amendments are the
sources of jury service rights. Amar’s theory is only slightly helpful to
the constitutional case against felon exclusion, however, and even to
the extent that it is, no court has adopted it.
Amar described his theory in a 1995 article as such:
[T]he Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments (providing for juries)
must be harmonized with the spirit of the Twenty-Sixth (dealing
with age discrimination), just as they have already in effect been
brought into alignment with the Fifteenth (dealing with racial
discrimination), Nineteenth (dealing with gender discrimination),
and Twenty-Fourth (dealing with class discrimination). In the end,
the groups protected from discrimination in jury service should be
the same groups protected from discrimination in voting,
regardless of how these groups fare under Sixth Amendment or
134
equal protection approaches.

Amar makes a persuasive case that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to protect only civil rights, as distinguished from “political”
rights, such as voting and jury service, which are the domain of the
135
Fifteenth Amendment.
Thus, Amar argues against conceiving of
juror rights in terms of Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal
136
protection.
A second step is required, though, to conclude that the Fifteenth
Amendment, which mentions only voting, covers jury service as well.
Amar notes that the Fifteenth Amendment originally contained
language specifically forbidding discrimination not just for voting but
for office holding as well, and he suggests that the language was
excised in a way that implicitly maintained protection of office
137
138
holding. Jurors resemble office holders in important ways, and to

134. Amar, supra note 62, at 206.
135. See id. at 222-38 (explaining that the drafters could not have intended for the
Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses to apply to political rights).
Indeed, if the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to cover political rights—as
we understand it to do today—then the Fifteenth Amendment would not have been
needed. Id. at 222-23 (quoting Justice Harlan’s statement that the passing of the
Fifteenth Amendment alone is evidence of the belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not proscribe voting discrimination).
136. Id. at 236-38.
137. See id. at 228-34 & n.156 (noting that many believed the right to freedom
from discrimination in voting subsumed the right to freedom from discrimination in
holding office). But see Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303,
372 & n.122 (collecting sources to the contrary and stating that Congress did not
intend to protect black office holding).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 339-41.
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the extent that they do not, they resemble voters.
Among Amar’s
most compelling evidence is that the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
forbids juror discrimination on grounds of race, uses language that
140
directly follows the Fifteenth Amendment’s language.
Ergo, according to Amar’s argument, the Fifteenth Amendment
should protect the right of equality in jury service. But no court has
141
adopted Amar’s suggested approach, and even if they did, Amar’s
argument does not answer the question of how ex-felons should be
treated. One must find a way, in other words, in which the Fifteenth
Amendment approach is more helpful than the Fourteenth or other
Amendments for would-be felon jurors.
Viewed broadly, Amar’s theory could mean that the right to serve
142
on a jury must be coterminous with the right to vote. The simplest
application of Amar’s theory, then, would be to note the many states
143
in which felons are allowed to vote but are barred from jury service.
Unlike black people, women, the poor, and the young, however,

139. See Amar, supra note 62, at 239-41 (discussing the analogy between jury
service and office holding and the stronger analogy between jury service and voting).
For example, jurors perform their duty through acts of voting. See id. at 205 (noting
Justice Kennedy’s observations about jurors in Powers v. Ohio, 400 U.S. 499 (1991));
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 274 (1998) (stating that voting is a main
function performed by jurors).
140. See Amar, supra note 62, at 238 (pointing out that the Act does not track the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment). Other provisions in the Act, struck down
in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), protected civil rights and were rooted in
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Amar, supra note 62, at 228 (discussing the
provision for freedom from discrimination in office holding).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding
that “there is no support in law or logic for the proposition that the right of jury
service is a concomitant subsidiary of the franchise” and rejecting a Twenty-Sixth
Amendment challenge to an age minimum for jury service). Perhaps most strikingly,
the landmark Strauder case in 1880 analyzed a state law excluding black men from
juries solely in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (finding that a state may discriminate when prescribing the
qualifications of jurors, but it may not discriminate on the basis of race or color). It
may be significant, though, that the facts in the case occurred in 1874, before the
passage of the 1875 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 304.
142. Amar notes de Tocqueville’s statement that “it is essential that the jury lists
should expand or shrink with the lists of voters,” and de Tocqueville’s citation of the
fact that all states besides New York provided as much. See Amar, supra note 62, at
220 & nn.102-03 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250-51,
app. I at 702 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966)). As
discussed below, jury service was more restricted than voting in the mid-nineteenth
century, but property qualifications had begun melting away. See infra note 546 and
accompanying text.
For his part, Amar makes a subtler argument that jury service should be located “in
the broader context of political participation rights.” Amar, supra note 62, at 207.
This does not necessarily mean that the Court will provide causes of action for
excluded jurors based on the Voting Amendments. See id. at 254-59 (providing other
doctrinal bases for application of Amar’s insight).
143. See infra text accompanying note 332.
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felons have no amendment protecting their right to vote. Moreover,
the Constitution does not implicitly require that felons be allowed to
144
If jury
vote, despite litigation and other foment to the contrary.
service is linked to voting, felons lose.
An argument that attempts to combine Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment protections to protect felon jurors is equally unavailing.
145
In People v. DeStefano,
a criminal defendant unsuccessfully
challenged felon disenfranchisement by tying together the
146
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Fifteenth Amendment
prohibits voting discrimination on grounds of “previous condition of
147
servitude,” and the Thirteenth Amendment allows “involuntary
148
servitude . . . as a punishment for crime,” and thus DeStefano read
the Fifteenth Amendment as precluding discrimination on the basis
of a criminal conviction. Bolstering this view is historical evidence
that the Jim Crow-era criminal justice system was a de facto
reintroduction of slavery; losing one’s status as a citizen—voter and
149
juror—was an obvious badge and incident of this status.
150
But servitude is not coterminous with a felony conviction, and
felon exclusion is based on a conviction, not servitude. Put another
way, exclusion does not stem from servitude as forbidden by the
Fifteenth Amendment; rather, exclusion and servitude both stem
from conviction. The argument is also historically inadequate. The
design of the Fifteenth Amendment seems to have stemmed from the
recognition that it would not have done much good to strike down a
state statute that said “black people cannot vote” if the state could
simply pass a new statute saying “former slaves cannot vote.” By the
time the Fifteenth Amendment was added, however, felon
disenfranchisement and exclusion from juries were widespread and
144. See supra notes 4, 103; infra note 333.
145. 212 N.E.2d 327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
146. See id. at 362 (finding defendant’s contention to be without merit); see also
Ewald, supra note 5, at 1131 (calling the Thirteenth Amendment disenfranchisement
argument “not implausible” but unlikely to succeed in court); Fletcher, supra note 4,
at 1904 (endorsing Thirteenth/Fifteenth Amendment argument); Grant et al., supra
note 3, at 1174-75 (expressing sympathy for the argument in DeStefano).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
148. Id. amend. XIII.
149. See NICOLE HAHN RAFTER & DEBRA L. STANLEY, PRISONS IN AMERICA 12-13
(1999) (describing the system of harsh sentences for minor offenses coupled with
the state’s renting of prisoners as unpaid labor); Schmidt, supra note 7, at 1411-12
(describing the racist use of the criminal justice system in the South as a “pipeline for
forced labor”).
150. See Furman, supra note 5, at 1223 (“As late as the late nineteenth century,
courts held that a prisoner was for all intents and purposes a slave of the state.
Today, however, courts no longer hold such a view.”) (footnote omitted). More
directly, most felons are not sentenced to prison. See infra note 322.
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long accepted.
For these reasons, the Thirteenth Amendment
would not combine with Amar’s theory to help felons who would be
voters—or jurors.
A final Amarian path, and the only one with any promise, is for
black felons to assert that the racial disparity that their exclusion
entails is so severe as to constitute a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Amar argues that the Fifteenth Amendment goes
farther than the Fourteenth Amendment in allowing plaintiffs to
premise their claims on a showing of disparate impact; if his
argument on this point is ever accepted, felon exclusion would be a
152
very vulnerable target.
7.

Bill of attainder and ex post facto
Some have argued that civil disabilities imposed on felons are bills
153
Punishments, such as
of attainder, and thus are unconstitutional.
disqualification from voting or jury service, must be imposed
individually by a court, and not categorically by a legislature, to be
154
constitutional. But a felon is not barred from jury service because a
legislature has considered his case and decided to punish him;
155
rather, a court of law has convicted him individually.
This explanation does not apply, however, when a new felon
156
Such a situation arguably
exclusion law is applied retrospectively.
implicates both attainder and the Constitution’s ban on ex post facto
157
criminal punishment.
To violate these provisions, though, felon
158
The typical response to such
exclusion must be a “punishment.”
151. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48-53 & n.14 (1974) (describing the
status of felon disenfranchisement law during the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was adopted two years before the Fifteenth Amendment); infra
text accompanying notes 546-54.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 108-24; note 109 (discussing Amar and
disparate racial impact arguments); cf. supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text
(discussing the lack of an intent requirement under the cross-section standard).
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1 (banning bills of attainder); see, e.g.,
Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1967) (rejecting an attainder
attack on felon disenfranchisement); Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1905 (making an
attainder argument against felon disenfranchisement); Note, supra note 28, at 418-22
(considering and rejecting an attainder argument against civil disabilities).
154. See Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1905 (making an attainder argument against
felon disenfranchisement).
155. See Green, 380 F.2d at 450 (rejecting an attainder attack on felon
disenfranchisement); Note, supra note 28, at 418-22 (rejecting an attainder argument
on civil disabilities).
156. See, e.g., infra note 398 (Michigan). But see infra note 423 (Washington)
(applying new law prospectively).
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1 (banning ex post facto laws); Collins
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (defining ex post facto laws as including laws
that increase punishment for a crime after its commission).
158. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1978) (requiring an actual infliction of
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challenges has been to say that it is not a punishment, a conclusion
that is consistent with current case law.
Felon exclusion from jury service, like felon disenfranchisement,
160
can be seen as a sort of expulsion from the realm of full citizenship.
It can be analogized accordingly to the case of Kennedy v. Mendoza161
Martinez, in which a felon sentenced to prison was also stripped of
his citizenship; in that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the loss of
162
citizenship was a punishment. An even more direct analogy is the
163
Civil War-era attainder/ex post facto case of Cummings v. Missouri,
which treated the exclusion of a priest from his profession as
punishment, and stated that punishment “embrac[ed] deprivation or
164
suspension of political or civil rights.” The fact that a pardon is
required to undo felon exclusion also suggests that it is a penalty.
Assorted analogies aside, though, more recent case law has treated
issues like felon exclusion as regulation, not punishment. For one
thing, felon exclusion usually does not purport to be punishment.
Most states treat it as a condition of eligibility, alongside citizenship,
165
literacy, and physical ability.
The inquiry does not end there,
166
though such a legislative characterization is difficult to override.
The Supreme Court has looked to seven factors, five of which are
applicable here:

punishment for designation as ex post facto); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 472-73 (1976) (noting the same for categorization as a bill of attainder). See
generally Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1280-86 (1998) (exploring Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the definition of punishment).
159. See, e.g., Garrett v. Weinberg, 31 S.E. 341, 344-45 (S.C. 1898) (applying felon
exclusion retroactively).
160. See infra Part III.A.
161. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
162. Id. at 147, 165-66 (1963) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of punitive
sanction without Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections). The Mendoza-Martinez
standard for determining punitive character has been used in ex post facto and
attainder cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1149 (2003) (discussing ex
post facto); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478 (involving attainder).
163. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
164. Id. at 322.
165. See generally Appendix 1.A. Recent legislative arguments in favor of felon
exclusion emphasize jury qualification, not punishment. See infra note 325. To be
sure, though, some states do discuss felon exclusion as a criminal punishment
instead of, or in addition to, a juror qualification. See infra notes 378 (Arizona), 388
(Idaho), 396 (Maryland), 417 (South Dakota); see also Young v. United States, 694
A.2d 891, 895 (D.C. 1997) (“[T]he historical reasons for keeping felons out of the
jury pool have had more to do with notions of punishment or civic service than
perceived bias.”). An older court took the alternative tack of construing jury service
as a burden, not a right subject to protection from “devesting.” Garrett v. Weinberg,
31 S.E. 341, 344 (S.C. 1898).
166. See Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1147 (according deep deference to legislative intent).
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[W]hether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme:
[1] has been regarded in our history and traditions as a
punishment; [2] imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; [3]
promotes the traditional aims of punishment; [4] has a rational
connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or [5] is excessive with
167
respect to this purpose.
168

Felon exclusion has a long pedigree, but not as a punishment. It
imposes something of an affirmative disability—as does any law that
169
imposes burdens—but not a physical or economic restraint. It does
170
not promote the penological aims of retribution and deterrence.
Most significant is the “rational connection” of felon exclusion to
its non-punitive purpose: safeguarding the jury process. As already
discussed, the notion that felon exclusion protects the jury’s probity
and impartiality may be somewhat flawed, but it is rational enough to
171
clear this low threshold. This result is consistent with most courts’
treatment of other civil disabilities, such as sex offender registration,
172
For these reasons,
disenfranchisement, and firearms restrictions.
the attainder and ex post facto arguments against felon exclusion are
unavailing.
C. Conclusion
Several constitutional challenges to felon exclusion suggest
themselves, mainly because felon exclusion produces juries that are
less representative and much more white. The standard legal tests,
167. Id. at 1149 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69). The other two
factors, “whether [the regulation] comes into play only on a finding of scienter” and
“whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,” are redundant given
the fact that felon exclusion requires a felony conviction by definition. See id. at 1154
(making analogous point for a “regulatory scheme [that] applies only to past
conduct, which was, and is, a crime”).
168. See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
169. See Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1151 (analyzing the “disability or restraint” factor);
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 (1977) (stating that the attainder
ban is not meant to “invalidat[e] every Act of Congress or the States that legislatively
burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals”).
170. See infra Part IV.B; Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (defining
“traditional aims of punishment” as “retribution and deterrence”) (quoting MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
172. See, e.g., Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1153-54 (sex offender registration); Green v. Bd.
of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967) (felon disenfranchisement); State v.
Schmidt, 23 P.3d 462, 471-72 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (firearms restriction); see also
infra note 330; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958) (plurality opinion) (dicta on
felon disenfranchisement); Melanie Popper, Note, Retrospective Application of State
Firearm Prohibitions Triggering Enhanced Sentencing under Federal Law: A Violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause? The Circuits Split, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
307, 313-23 (2001) (describing 2-1 circuit split against treating firearm prohibitions
as punishment).
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however, grant substantial deference to the justifications for the
practice that jurisdictions have asserted: probity and inherent bias.
These justifications are weak but not wholly empty, and they probably
suffice under currently accepted doctrine to protect felon exclusion
from unconstitutionality. Should courts ever take a properly robust
view of the cross-section standard, or a dimmer view of the flawed
probity and inherent bias theories, felon exclusion could be struck
down. Failing that, and given the fact that felon inclusion is not
unconstitutional either, the main debate over felon jurors should be
one of policy, to which this Article will now turn.
II. GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This Part considers a series of general policy arguments concerning
felon exclusion. It critiques four common bases for the practice:
history, maintaining probity, maintaining impartiality, and reliance
on the clemency process. It then confronts additional policy
considerations that bear deeper analysis:
difficulties in
administration, racial disparities, agency costs, and, finally, the ideal
of individualization. Although this discussion raises arguments for
and against felon exclusion, it suggests that felon exclusion is
fundamentally flawed.
A. A History of Exclusion
As discussed in Appendix 3.A, felon exclusion’s pedigree is
extensive. Almost as long as there have been juries, the law
governing their operation has sought to exclude felons. Intrinsically,
173
then, the very idea of the jury is of “twelve good men and true.”
Even so, the history of felon exclusion does not justify its continued
practice.
For grand juries, felon exclusion dates back to the Assize of
Clarendon in 1166 and, in more specific form, to a 1410 statute of
174
Henry IV. As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously stated, however:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
175
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.

173. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *348 (1769).
174. See infra text accompanying notes 513-15.
175. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
The spirit of Holmes’s admonition could be seen in this 1914 attack on civil
disabilities by the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
[T]he principles of law which this verbiage literally imports had its origin in
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After all, one could argue just as easily for the exclusion of female
jurors because a jury has always meant “twelve good men and true.”
Indeed, women were not allowed to serve as jurors in every state until
176
1966, which was decades after women achieved suffrage.
But
women’s place in America has changed, as have the places of juries
and felons.
One can debate the value of Holmes’s statement in a legal
argument. In the realm of policy, however, it is a fair comment that
should be addressed by asking whether this rule has persisted merely
from “blind imitation of the past,” and whether there are “no better
reason[s]” for its continued existence (the latter point being
discussed in the other Subsections of this Part). While the nature of
the jury has changed over the centuries, felon exclusion has not
varied accordingly.
As discussed in Appendix 3, while jury
participation has broadened and a citizen’s qualification for jury
service has become the rule rather than the exception, felon
exclusion has persisted. In context, then, the history of felon
exclusion has been one of relative change.
Also changing in recent years is the nature—or, more to the point,
177
the number—of felons. Regardless of whether the increase in the
population of felons reflects an increase in those qualities from which
felon exclusion seeks to insulate juries, the fact remains that
ostracism means something very different now then it did in the
1970s, when the proportion of felons in the population was less than
178
one-half of what it is today.

the fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubtlessly has been
brought forward into modern statutes without fully realizing either the effect
of its literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of
our system of government.
Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914) (striking down a civil disability
that precluded a felon from entering into a contract).
176. See Karen L. Cipriani, The Numbers Don’t Add Up: Challenging the Premise of
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1253, 1255-58 (1994) (detailing the
history of female jurors). Also, a jury of twelve good men and true is not
constitutionally required. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (ruling that
a twelve-person panel of jurors is not required under the constitutional definition of
“trial by jury”).
177. See infra text accompanying notes 488-90.
178. See Christopher Uggen et al., Crime, Class, and Reintegration: The Scope
and Social Distribution of America’s Criminal Class, Paper delivered to American
Society of Criminology 17 (Nov. 18, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
American University Law Review). I am rounding off the Uggen figures, which show
that an estimated 3% of the population were felons from 1968 to 1978, compared to
6.5% in 2000. See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2001, at 494 tbl. 6.23 (2002) (providing
incarceration rates from 1925 to 2001, suggesting that Uggen’s 1978 figure was stable
back to the 1920s).
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In this regard, the most troubling aspect of the persistence of the
historical practice of felon exclusion is not that it exists, but rather
that a more probing discussion has not accompanied it. The
question of the proper place of felons in society or the best way to
constitute a jury are hardly rarefied or unpopular topics. If the
meaning of a jury and the meaning of being a felon have changed
significantly, then perhaps felon exclusion policy needs to be
179
adjusted accordingly to serve its original goals.
Even if the long
history of felon exclusion is impressive, it does not demonstrate that
the practice is necessary. Instead, the extensive history of a
substantial minority of states—which have maintained functioning
jury systems for generations without excluding felons—suggests the
180
opposite.
B. Probity
The principal justification for felon exclusion has been protection
181
of the probity of the jury. The precise mechanism by which felons
threaten jury probity is unclear. Two possibilities are felons’ actual
characteristics, and their badges of shame. If the problem is felons’
actual characteristics—poor character or innate untrustworthiness—
then blanket felon exclusion is both under- and overinclusive.
Asserting that felons are or were presumably “bad” in this way is not
unfair. As one pro-exclusion commenter resoundingly declared, “[i]f
someone is not responsible enough to follow the law, how can they
182
[sic] be responsible enough to decide guilt or innocence[?]”
But
some felons are responsible enough to follow the law now, at least as
much as other non-felons like misdemeanants, juvenile offenders,
and everyone in the population who has ever committed a crime
183
without being caught.
Assume hypothetically that 95% of felons lack probity, that just
10% of non-felons do, and that only felons—all felons—are excluded
184
from juries. If 6.5% of the jury-age population are felons, then over
179. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1264 (1993)
(“[A]rguments from translation accommodate changes in context so as to preserve
meaning across contexts.”). Lessig was referring to constitutional interpretation, not
policy decision making; nonetheless, his ideas are relevant.
180. See infra Appendix 1.A.
181. See supra Part I.B.2.
182. State of Oregon Special Election Voters’ Pamphlet, Ballot Measure 75,
Arguments in Favor (1999) (on file with the American University Law Review).
183. Cf. Lippke, supra note 5, at 563 (discussing the line drawing problems
presented by the argument that committing crime reveals an inherent “contempt for
democratic political processes”).
184. See infra note 499 and accompanying text.
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60% of those who are unfit to serve would be non-felons who are not
excluded. If anything, this hypothetical is extremely conservative.
Many adult Americans, if not most, have committed crimes; for
185
example, over 40% of adult Americans have used illegal drugs. The
fact that these non-felons are the beneficiaries of limited police
resources and prosecutorial discretion does not render them
sufficiently responsible to determine guilt and innocence. If one
concludes that they are able to be responsible now if they have not
recently broken the law, why could not that same assumption be
made for some felons?
A jurisdiction may conclude fairly that felons are inherently “bad”
enough and non-felons are inherently “good” enough that excluding
all felons (with exceptions dealt with through clemency) and
including non-felons (with exceptions dealt with through voir dire) is
simply more efficient. Because discretionary grants of clemency are
186
rare, however, most “good” felons will be left out. As for the “bad”
non-felons, society seems to assume (with an excess of optimism) that
the combination of voir dire, challenges for cause, and peremptory
strikes suffice to remove the remainder of the wicked. But if this
assumption is correct, then it should work a fortiori on unreformed
felons, without the “false negatives” associated with blanket felon
exclusion. The question is, how many false negatives are too many?
If 99% of felons are so inherently immoral that they would bring
infamy to the jury, and voir dire does not work properly, then
excluding the other 1% is a small loss to the system. If the number of
false negatives is 5%, 10%, 20%, or higher, though, felon exclusion
becomes less appropriate.
A jurisdiction that would like to ban felons from juries because the
felons’ bad character threatens the probity of the jury should make
two initial determinations. First, the state should ask whether it has a
reliable mechanism for excluding from juries “bad” characters who
are not felons. If it does not, then excluding felons probably is not
completely solving its probity problem. If it does have such a
mechanism, it should use it for felons instead of relying on a blanket
exclusion, unless it can make a second determination—that there are
185. See 2001 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE tbl. H.18 (showing
that 43.3% of adults report illicit drug use during their lifetimes), available at
http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/NHSDA/2k1NHSDA/vol2/appendixh_1.htm (on file
with the American University Law Review). Many of these people may have
committed these crimes as minors, though the same survey data showed that 11.6%
of adults reported illegal drug use in the past year and 6.6% in the previous month.
Id.
186. See infra note 451 and accompanying text.
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very few “good” felons that the blanket exclusion eliminates. A
jurisdiction might sincerely make both of these determinations.
Alternatively, it could conclude that removing many “bad” people
from juries is worthwhile, even if some “bad” people remain and
some “good” ones are lost. But it should confront these issues and
wrestle with their ramifications, rather than conclude blithely that
felon exclusion is appropriate because felons are “bad.”
The other possibility broached above is that felons threaten the
probity of the jury because of their degraded status; whether or not
individual felons are “bad,” the idea of having tainted people on
juries might undermine the integrity of the institution. That this is
anyone’s intention is belied by the fact that jurisdictions speak of
probity rather than the appearance of probity. Nevertheless, it is an
argument worth considering.
The “taint” argument is arbitrary. Considering that most states that
exclude felons from juries nevertheless allow them to vote is proof of
187
this arbitrariness.
If a state truly subscribes to the taint theory, it
must account for why appearances on a jury are different from those
in the electorate. There are, to be sure, ample differences between
188
jury service and voting, but why an electorate with some percentage
of felons in it is not tainted as badly as a jury with the same
percentage is unclear. Indeed, juries are less tainted insofar as they
are screened through voir dire—a fact that may explain why courts
are usually untroubled when a banned felon somehow ends up on a
189
jury, another mark of arbitrariness.
The arbitrariness of the taint argument is also evident from the fact
190
that most states exclude felons but not misdemeanants. While the
taint from felons might be more significant, who is to say that
misdemeanants do not discredit the institution of the jury as well?
Arguing that “felons are felons” is the difference may have historical
or metaphysical importance, but it may also just be a bootstrap.
As with the argument on personal characteristics, the taint
argument may be defensible, but only if the jurisdiction confronts the
underlying assumptions and the potential contradictions. Such
careful consideration might—and should—reduce the prevalence
and scope of felon exclusion.
187. See infra text accompanying note 332.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 331-36.
189. See infra Appendix 1.B.4.
190. See infra Appendix 1.B.1. The Supreme Court has noted the arbitrariness of
the distinction in another context. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985)
(criticizing the common-law rule allowing police to shoot fleeing felons but not
fleeing misdemeanants).
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C. Inherent Bias
The notion that felons should be excluded from jury service
because they are inherently biased against the government may pass
the rational basis test, but that is meaningless from a policy
standpoint. The inherent bias theory is inconsistent with broad
participation in the venire and with trust in the integrity of voir dire.
Other groups that are highly likely to be biased in certain cases are,
nonetheless, allowed into the venire and screened individually. Only
felons are automatically excluded en masse. The notion that felons
are so biased against the government that they must be banned from
even going through voir dire is not persuasive.
The core of the inherent bias argument is that felons remain
adversarial to the government, and will sympathize unduly with any
191
criminal defendant.
Alternately, a felon’s “former conviction and
imprisonment [may] ordinarily incline him to compassion for others
192
accused of crime.” In other words, a felon will be less willing, if not
unwilling altogether, to subject another person to the horrors of
punishment that he has endured, and may engage in nullification.
He may also exhibit mistrust of police and prosecutors, and give
unduly short shrift to their testimony and arguments. One could
argue further that a community with many felons probably suffers
from high crime, a situation that would be worsened by turning over
adjudicatory discretion to the criminals themselves, and alleviated by
193
excluding them.
All of this is undoubtedly an accurate description of how some
felons would approach some criminal cases. It falls short, however, of
justifying excluding all felons, per se, from all cases. Most obviously,
the inherent bias argument does not explain why felons should be
excluded from civil juries in cases where the government is not a
party. Nevertheless, virtually every state fails to distinguish between
194
the two types of trials.
Another point is that many groups have generally strong biases in
criminal cases. For example, in the case of crime victims, the justice
system does not presume that they are all incapable of being objective
in all trials, but it is concerned enough about the possibility that
individualized analyses are performed. They are screened in voir
191. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 32.
192. State v. Baxter, 357 So. 2d 271, 275 (La. 1978).
193. Cf. Clegg, supra note 5, at 177 (making a similar argument in the context of
felon disenfranchisement).
194. Only Oregon distinguishes between the two types of trials; Michigan did so
until October 2003. See infra notes 398 (Michigan), 413 (Oregon).
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dire, and if the crime was particularly traumatic, or if the type of
offense was similar to the one then being tried, such jurors are
presumably excluded by defense counsel, if not by the court for
cause. Families of crime victims, victims of torts and their families,
police officers, and many others are similarly screened.
Perhaps these disparate processes are justifiable because victims
deserve more solicitude than perpetrators. Treating a would-be juror
the same as other would-be jurors—presuming inclusion but testing
for bias just in case—is not solicitude, though. The question is not
why biased felons should be treated differently than the rest of the
population, but rather why they should be treated differently than
the rest of the biased population?
If the answer is only that felons are more likely to be biased than
victims, there is a numerical problem similar to that with probity195
based exclusion discussed above.
Because crime victims vastly
outnumber convicted felons—not to mention close relatives of crime
196
victims—eliminating just felons leaves plenty of unaccounted bias.
To the extent that voir dire and peremptories root out this other bias,
the same processes could be applied to felons, while reducing the
number of felons who are unduly excluded. Only if every, or almost
every, felon is irretrievably biased against the government might it
make sense to have a blanket exclusion of felons from criminal juries
on these grounds.
Such a notion of universal, unidirectional bias is not particularly
plausible. A felon could have other inclinations besides wanting to
acquit a defendant. Indeed, most complaints about the presence of
felons on juries are lodged by criminal defendants. To be sure, this is
largely a function of defendants’ powerful incentive to complain
197
about any plausible basis for reversal of a conviction. Nevertheless,
195. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
196. The Justice Department once predicted, based on crime data from the 1970s
and 1980s, a ninety-nine percent lifetime probability of being the victim of theft, and
an eighty-three percent probability for rape, robbery, or assault. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF VICTIMIZATION 3 (1987).
One study of Washington, D.C. jurors found that one-fourth of prospective jurors
responded affirmatively when asked in voir dire if they or their close family members
had been the victim of a crime, but 46% responded affirmatively when asked the
same question by researchers in a non-courtroom environment. Richard Seltzer et
al., Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, J. CRIM. JUST. 451, 455 (1991).
197. See State v. Hopper, 203 So. 2d 222, 244 (La. 1967) (asserting in a case
rejecting a criminal defendant’s challenge to the striking of a juror that “[h]ad [the
juror] been accepted, these same [defense] attorneys would be arguing to the Court
now, that this juror was incompetent”), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 658 (1968);
cf. Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 216 A.2d 50, 54 n.6 (Pa. 1966) (“It is well known by
Judges and lawyers that in the selection of a jury, most defense lawyers welcome a
person who has been previously convicted of a crime.”).
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some of the pro-conviction bias arguments they have made are at
least potentially valid. For example, a felon who is on parole or
probation, or who is still under the watchful eye of the local
authorities, might wish to please the prosecutor’s office by voting to
198
convict. Relatedly, a felon’s experiences might lead him to develop
such biases as a “callous cynicism about protestations of innocence,”
or an outsized desire to prove himself, “lead[ing] him to display an
199
excess of rectitude.”
A felon also might have a “hazing” mentality
and be inclined to replicate the treatment he suffered from his jury
by convicting the defendant. Alternatively, a felon might be a
forceful advocate for acquittal, but knowing of his degraded status,
200
the other jurors might be less inclined to follow his lead.
Anti-government sentiments also may not be inherently
inappropriate. A juror should be excluded for bias if he is so antigovernment that he cannot follow his instructions and view the
evidence as a reasonable juror. But what if a felon is reasonably
skeptical of police and prosecutors? What if a felon is reasonably wary
of convicting the defendant when he is not certain of the defendant’s
guilt? To the extent that inherent bias among felon jurors leads to
legitimate skepticism, the automatic exclusion of felons is less
201
acceptable, and smacks of viewpoint discrimination.
The practice
of determining disqualifications for jury service based on viewpoints,
rather than on ability to follow instructions and decide cases
impartially, is highly suspect.
Courts do allow some viewpoint discrimination in jury selection,
namely the exclusion from death penalty juries of people who have
202
strong qualms about applying the death penalty.
But anti-death
198. Cf. infra note 479 and accompanying text (discussing a similar rationale for
excluding those with pending charges from jury service). But see Young v. United
States, 694 A.2d 891, 896 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting such an argument because of
unlikelihood that the juror’s parole officer had any interest in the result of trial).
199. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J.,
dissenting).
200. See infra note 298 (citing an actual case in which a juror reported these facts).
201. Some might even argue that the likelihood of nullification is no reason to
exclude felons either. In a provocative essay, former federal prosecutor Paul Butler
discusses the phenomenon of black jurors nullifying prosecutions against black
defendants in drug cases. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in
the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1995). Butler’s Essay suggests a
presumption of nullification for nonviolent malum prohibitum crimes, and a
presumption against nullification that is rebuttable for nonviolent malum in se crimes.
Id. at 715. My statement presumes that those subscribing to Butler’s views would
likely be unwilling to exclude people whose convictions they feel should have been
nullified in the first place.
202. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986) (noting that it is
constitutionally permissible to remove jurors for cause whose opposition to capital
punishment would impair their role as impartial jurors).
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penalty jurors are not thrown out of the venire altogether; they are
tested for bias during voir dire and excluded from the small subset of
cases in which their views are so strong as to “substantially impair the
203
performance of their duties as jurors.”
Felons’ ability to perform
their duties, by contrast, are not rated at all. Ending felon exclusion
thus would just make felons more like these death penalty jury
castoffs.
A final inconsistency in the “inherent bias” argument emerges
from the treatment of verdicts from juries that include a felon. If
felons are really inherently biased, then any jurisdiction that allowed
them on a jury would violate the constitutional requirement of jury
impartiality. This, however, is not the case; exclusion based on
inherent bias may be permissible, but it is not mandatory. Similarly,
if within a single jurisdiction felons are considered so inherently
biased that they cannot serve, one would expect that if a felon
somehow slipped onto a jury, the resulting verdict would be reversed
automatically, without the need to demonstrate actual bias. But this
is not the case either, suggesting that in these jurisdictions the
204
inherent bias theory is a convenience rather than a sincere belief.
In sum, the inherent bias argument has little to commend it. It
should be rejected, or at least seriously questioned, as a policy basis
for excluding felons wholesale instead of screening them individually
for bias.
D. Clemency
One defense of felon exclusion is that any felon deserving and
205
desirous of serving on a jury can seek a pardon. This argument is
compelling in structural, abstract terms because it treats felons and
their cases individually; thus it theoretically eliminates over-exclusion.
Felon exclusion is only an injustice to the extent that there are
improper exclusions—people who should be eligible for
consideration for jury service but are not. Improper inclusions—
people who should be excluded but are not—are troublesome too,
but cannot result from felon exclusion. Unfortunately, reducing
improper exclusions tends to increase improper inclusions, and vice
versa. All improper inclusions can be avoided by not allowing any
felons on juries, but this creates improper exclusions. All improper
exclusions can be avoided by allowing all felons on juries, but this
203. Id.
204. See infra Appendix 1.B.4.
205. Cf. Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 418 (Cal. 1966) (declining to strike down
felon disenfranchisement in part because of the availability of pardons).
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may cause improper inclusions. This problematic trade-off, however,
only exists with one-size-fits-all solutions; with a clemency process, an
initial rule that errs on the side of exclusion can be used, but then
206
improper exclusions can be eliminated on a case-by-case basis.
This approach harnesses the asymmetric incentives present in
exclusion. Compare two felons who, assuming arguendo, know about
207
their jury eligibility.
One felon lives in a state that excludes all
unpardoned felons but he feels worthy of serving on a jury. The
other felon lives in a state that allows all felons into the venire once
their sentences expire, but he feels unreformed and unworthy of
serving on a jury. It would seem that the former felon would be more
motivated to rectify his situation (via clemency) than the latter felon
would be to assert his unfitness.
Relying on clemency, however, is problematic. Pardon processes
208
are typically small-scale and cumbersome. Very few felons apply for
restoration of their rights, and even fewer of those have their
209
petitions granted. A pardon is an exceptional remedy and requires
a careful case-by-case review to ensure that the petitioner’s case
somehow falls outside the mainstream of felons’ usual treatment.
Like the naturalized citizen whose requisite knowledge of American
history is superior to that of relatively ignorant natural-born citizens,
the usual felon whose political rights have been restored may be
overqualified to serve on a jury, while merely adequate felons remain
in the cold.
The more case-specific the clemency process becomes, the more
the process will be resource-intensive. Assuming that a state does not
want to allocate too many of its resources in this way, it is forced to
adopt a sweeping default rule with a small number of individualized
exceptions. This is exactly the path that many states have followed.
Most states reject most petitions and only those with compelling facts
210
or significant references receive detailed consideration.
A few
states use generalized rules to restore rights automatically upon the
211
One state restores rights automatically
completion of a sentence.
206. Cf. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 167-68 (1989) (discussing the usefulness of pardons in retributive
punishment “when the lingering effects of a felony conviction add punishment
beyond what is deserved”).
207. Cf. infra Part II.E (discussing deficiencies in felons’ awareness of their status).
208. See infra note 451 and accompanying text; Grant et al., supra note 3, at 115859 (criticizing state pardon and clemency processes).
209. See infra note 451 and accompanying text (using examples to show the rarity
of pardons).
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., infra notes 377 (Alaska), 399 (Minnesota), 409 (North Carolina), 425
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212

only to first-time offenders. Such approaches are efficient, but like
any bright-line rule, they trade efficiency for accuracy and forgo the
benefits of individualized treatment enjoyed by more cumbersome
and restrictive processes.
Of course, there is another solution that avoids the one-size-fits-all
problem without requiring as large an allocation of resources.
Instead of excluding most felons and including a few exceptions via
clemency, states can include most felons and exclude the exceptions
via voir dire. Like clemency, this avoids the trade-off between
improper exclusions and inclusions. Unlike clemency, it takes
advantage of a system that is already in automatic and comprehensive
use.
These are all policy decisions, and states can choose from a range
of reasonable options to structure a program as they see fit,
depending on their particular feelings about felon jurors. They can
even combine approaches. For instance, a jurisdiction could err on
the side of exclusion, make broad exceptions for categories of
relatively worthy felons (e.g., nonviolent, not sentenced to prison,
long ago), and allow for individual applications for clemency for the
213
remainder.
Alternatively, a jurisdiction could err on the side of
inclusion, make broad exceptions for categories of relatively
unworthy felons (e.g., deceptive, recently released, repeat offenders)
214
and rely more heavily on voir dire.
E. Administration
As in any theoretical discussion, one must eventually return to
reality. One reality of felon exclusion is that record keeping is not
perfect or even very good. While some people might entertain a
notion of the jury list as a computerized file from which names are
deleted when their owners suffer convictions, the reality is much less
formal. In fact, states typically rely on self-reporting to screen felons
from the jury pool, asking those summoned for jury duty to check off
215
a box on a form if they have been convicted of a felony.
(Wisconsin). States whose process is this automatic are not listed in Appendix 1.A as
having lifetime exclusion.
212. See infra note 378 (noting that the Arizona statute restores civil rights to firsttime offenders after they complete their sentences).
213. See, e.g., infra note 421 (noting that Vermont excludes only felons sentenced
to prison).
214. As related in Appendix 1.A, several states limit exclusion to time spent in
prison or under sentence. Arizona imposes a lifetime exclusion only if a felon is
convicted more than once. See infra note 378 and accompanying text.
215. A sampling of jurisdictions revealed that reliance on self-reporting is
common. See Telephone Interview by Jeff Jocks with Marilyn Tokarski, Baltimore
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Unfortunately, self-reporting is inadequate.
Many jurors may
misunderstand the felony/misdemeanor distinction or fail to
217
Some may misunderstand
remember their records in detail.
clemency, either because the law is confusing, or because they
entertain peculiar notions—such as the felon who did not report his
felon status because he was a born-again Christian and felt that he
218
had been absolved of his sins.
County, Maryland Jury Commissioner (Nov. 20, 2002); Telephone Interview by Jeff
Jocks with Clyde Carson, Shelby County, Tennessee Jury Commissioner (Nov. 18,
2002); Telephone Interview by Jane Edwards with Henrico County, Virginia County
Clerk’s Office (Feb. 13, 2003). This was also the author’s experience when, while
writing this Article, he served on a criminal jury in Michigan District Court. See also
Lance Salyers, Note, Invaluable Tool vs. Unfair Use of Private Information: Examining
Prosecutors’ Use of Jurors’ Criminal History Records in Voir Dire, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1079, 1092 & n.87 (1999) (discussing problems with self-reporting).
216. The numerous cases dealing with illicit felon jurors who participate in cases
and render verdicts make clear that the error rate is not negligible. See, e.g.,
Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1058-62 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a
juror answered “no” to questions about criminal history despite a felony conviction
and several misdemeanor convictions); see also infra Appendix 1.B.4. In one
assessment, Joseph G. Weis reports that validity coefficients between official records
and self-reporting of official records “are high, in the .8 [eighty percent] range.”
Joseph G. Weis, Issues in the Measurement of Criminal Careers, in 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS
AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” 1, 13-14 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986). That may be
high by social science standards, but anything short of one hundred percent validity
presents a problem in a legal context.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Ippolito, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
vacated sub nom. United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing,
forgivingly, a juror’s “mistaking or misunderstanding the distinction between a
misdemeanor and a felony or in misjudging the taxonomic effect of a withheld
adjudication”); Salyers, supra note 215, at 1080 (describing a hypothetical juror who
thinks a conviction was not a felony because the sentence was a fine). David Feige,
Bumble in the Bronx, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2002, at 22, depicts a real life example
where a felon juror ends up on a jury and is charged with contempt. The following
exchange took place with his public defender:
“Look,” I asked, “were you ever convicted of a felony?”
“I don’t think so,” he said. “I mean, I got some time, but it was for
possession, not sale.” This seemed like a perfectly reasonable explanation to
me. Most of the people I represent have some mistaken but understandable
notions about the meanings of legal terms.
“Did you want to be on a jury?” I asked.
“Not at all,” Fred said. “I got that thing in the mail and I didn’t want them to
put a warrant out on me, so I went down. I figured that since they sent it to
me, I had to go.”
“Did the fact that you were in jail make it hard for you to send someone else
to jail?”
“Nah. On my last trial, I found the guy guilty.”
“Your last trial?” I asked, gulping.
“Yeah, right there in that same building, a few years ago.”
Oh boy, I thought. Here we go.
Id. at 25. The juror was jailed and, after his release, was summoned again for jury
duty. Id. at 27.
218. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 609 A.2d 175, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). The Kelly
Court vacated the judgment of the jury on which the man served and remanded for a
new trial. Id. at 177.
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Others may simply lie, for a variety of reasons. Some felons may be
219
too ashamed to admit their record in “public.” Others might have a
strong desire to get on the jury, perhaps out of an ironic desire to
220
serve the system or, potentially, out of a desire to undermine it.
Indeed, research suggests that jurors—felons and non-felons—lie
221
quite often in voir dire.
In the absence of better maintenance of juror lists, two problematic
asymmetries will persist. First, the most understanding and lawabiding felons will be excluded disproportionately more than less
intelligent or iniquitous ones. Second, the prosecution in criminal
cases will have an informational advantage over the defense because
of the former’s superior knowledge of, and access to, criminal
prosecution histories. This is a problem not just where felons are
222
supposed to be excluded but also where they are not.
While this
problem may seem easily remedied, it raises complicated privacy
223
concerns.
In many cases, the same states that are so adamant about keeping
felons off of juries seem wholly untroubled when one slips through
224
and makes it onto a jury.
This may just reflect a belief that other
safeguards reduce the potential danger. Voir dire is supposed to
screen out biased or insufficiently intelligent jurors. Therefore, if a
felon really should not be on a particular jury, he will be tossed out
even if he slips past the per se felon exclusion. It may also reflect a
realistic balancing of the practical costs and benefits of felon
exclusion—the cost of absolutely perfect exclusion may exceed the
cost of occasional mistakes, which in turn is outweighed by the
benefit of broad-but-imperfect exclusion. As one court asserted,
while discussing the biases of felons: “Because these antisocial
feelings would often be consciously or subconsciously concealed . . .
the risk of such prejudice infecting the trial outweighs the possibility

219. Cf. Salyers, supra note 215, at 1080 (describing a hypothetical juror who is
humiliated by a prostitution arrest).
220. See, e.g., Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 672-75 (9th Cir. 2000) (overturning a
murder conviction because of the possibility that a felon juror lied about his status in
order to serve on the jury and act upon prejudicial assumptions about the
defendant); State v. Harris, 652 N.W.2d 585, 592-93 (Neb. 2002) (concluding that a
felon juror deliberately concealed a criminal record in order to serve on a jury).
221. See Seltzer et al., supra note 196 at 452-53, 460 (reviewing literature and
research indicating jurors’ lack of candor during voire dire).
222. This is also a problem whether the defense generally wants felon jurors or
not. The defense might mistakenly exclude someone, unaware he is a felon, or
mistakenly include him, unaware he is a felon.
223. See generally Salyers, supra note 215.
224. See infra Appendix 1.B.4.
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of detecting it in jury selection proceedings.”
A state should be
certain, however, that it truly believes that the costs balance this way,
and that it sufficiently distrusts the adequacy of voir dire, before it
imposes felon exclusion.
To be sure, jurisdictions cannot take for granted that other
safeguards will exclude felons whose convictions are unknown to the
parties. This Article has argued repeatedly that voir dire may be
reliable enough to root out felons who are unfit for jury service, but if
a felony conviction is relevant to this individualized inquiry, this
confidence in voir dire must be tempered. To function properly, voir
dire requires good information, and the data on criminal convictions
are not always good. Then again, it is also not good for other crucial
226
questions regarding bias.
In general, this may reflect a need to
upgrade record keeping more than it justifies felon exclusion.
F.

Racial Disparity

Reducing the representation of black men on juries by thirty
percent without dissent is difficult to imagine, but felon exclusion
does just that. Answering concerns about this racial disparity by
pointing helplessly at the racial disparity in the commission of crimes,
arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and imprisonment is not
227
sufficient.
Those disparities—or at least their magnitude—are of
recent origin, may reflect affirmative choices by legislators and
228
prosecutors, and are far from inevitable.
Further, other facially
neutral policies of jury administration also have a dampening effect
229
on minority participation.
The imposition of civil disabilities is a
legislative choice, not a requirement, and trumpeting the formal
neutrality of their criteria “allow[s] self-serving, subjective statements
230
of non-discrimination to trump racial reality.”
225. Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (plurality opinion).
226. See supra notes 196, 216 (denoting the unreliable aspects of voir dire).
227. Harvey, supra note 5, at 1157-59 (describing the comparatively harsher
sentencing of black criminals).
228. See supra note 122 (discussing the racial imbalance that pervades the
imprisonment rate for drug crimes).
229. See Fukurai et al., supra note 3, at 201-05 (discussing the racially disparate
effect of residency requirements, blue ribbon juries, smaller-than-twelve juries, and
non-unanimity rules). See generally Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of
Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 238,
239 (1994) (examining “the variety of legal and non-legal factors that play a
significant role in Black representativeness on both petit and grand juries”).
230. Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection, and Jury Selection: Denying
That Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 622. Brand is writing about the Batson
line of cases, not civil disabilities; the self-serving statements of non-discrimination to
which he refers are excuses given for using peremptory challenges against black
jurors, such as living in a neighborhood with a “history of bad relations with the
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Limiting felon exclusion would reduce racial disparities in absolute
terms, but it would not reduce them in relative terms, and gaping
imbalances would remain. This can be seen from federal jury
numbers. Instead of eliminating 29 to 37% of black men and 16 to
21% of all black adults versus 6.5% for the entire adult population,
excluding current inmates alone would bar “only” 8% of black men
231
and 4% of all black adults versus 1% of the entire adult population.
Barring those under sentence would yield intermediate figures of
232
12%, 7% and 2% respectively.
Racial disparities are worth eliminating, all other things being
equal. The catch is that all other things are not equal. Felons may be
more likely to be unsuitable jurors than non-felons; indeed, it is hard
to gauge the effect of felon exclusion precisely, because felons would
likely be challenged and dismissed disproportionately even if they
were eligible to serve. In the absence of careful consideration and
persuasive reasons to exclude felons from juries, however, the sheer
size of these racial disparities should give pause to any jurisdiction
that is satisfied with the racial neutrality of its juror qualification
standards.
G. Prosecutorial Self-Dealing
Another policy argument against felon exclusion is that it gives
prosecutors too much power to control the content of juries in
criminal cases over the long term. Prosecutors choose who to
prosecute; those who they prosecute successfully are taken out of the
jury pool, and those who they leave alone are not. This is a serious
“agency cost” given that juries are supposed to be an independent
233
“hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor.”
As with the racial disparity problem, self-dealing is only an issue if
there is a high prosecution rate or a significant exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. For example, when Jim Crow laws kept jury

police.” Id. at 613. The point is that defending the racial disparity present with felon
exclusion on grounds that it is a neutral criterion overlooks the reasons for the
disparity and begs the question of whether all felons are actually unsuitable for jury
service. Cf. King, supra note 7, at 768-72 (discussing the uses of “affirmative action”
in rectifying disparate representation of minorities on juries). Professor King
recognizes that race-conscious measures may appear unfair and promote the notion
that a juror’s race determines his or her vote, and so she advocates exhausting raceneutral methods first. Id. at 768-71.
231. Uggen et al., supra note 178, at 16-17. If felons are not banned outright, they
might still be disproportionately struck for cause or via peremptory strikes. This
might push the disparate racial impact back up, at least partially.
232. Id. at 17.
233. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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boxes lily white—even as late as the 1970s—they did so by means of
234
prosecutorial discretion. A prosecutor cannot make a white person
black, but he can make a non-felon a felon if the non-felon meets
him halfway. By contrast, if prosecution rates are low and resources
are high enough that prosecutors do not have to choose to overlook
large numbers of crimes and criminals, their discretion will not
distort the content of the jury venire.
If a prosecutor wants certain criminals off of his juries but can
tolerate others, he need only prosecute crimes accordingly. If a
defendant in a criminal case wants to reduce the number of
(unconvicted) drug dealers, or tax evaders, or illegal gun owners on
his jury, however, he must rely on his intuition, on the honesty of the
jurors (not all of whom would answer the question “are you a law
breaker?” honestly at voir dire), and on his peremptory challenges.
Admittedly, stacking the deck on future juries seems like, at most, a
peripheral factor in a prosecutor’s decision of whom to prosecute,
compared to more direct factors like crime control and immediate
cost-benefit issues. Then again, one relatively direct constraint on
prosecutorial discretion is political accountability, either through the
direct election of local prosecutors or their appointment by state and
federal superiors. This raises the specter of self-dealing very
prominently in the case of felon disenfranchisement—the prosecutor
can target for prosecution (and thus remove from the electorate)
people or groups that are likely to vote against him. In the case of
felon exclusion from juries, the effect is less direct but still worth
considering—the prosecutor can target for prosecution (and thus
remove from the venire) people or groups that are more likely to be
235
unsympathetic jurors and to interfere with his agenda.
H. The Ideal of Individualization
The theme of individualization has recurred throughout this
Article, and it is worth summarizing and elaborating here. As with
other civil disabilities, most felon exclusion statutes treat all felons
236
uniformly.
In sharp contrast to the blunt imposition of civil
234. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1970) (objecting to the fact that
ninety-six percent of the uses of the discretionary “unintelligent or not upright”
grand jury disqualification standard were against black citizens).
235. To take the starkest of examples, prosecutors afraid of potential nullifiers
could increase their prosecution of them. Cf. Butler, supra note 201, at 715
(advocating nullification of nonviolent drug prosecutions by black jurors).
236. Only a few states provide distinctions. See infra notes 378 (Arizona) (treating
repeat offenders more harshly), 382 (Connecticut) (disqualifying anyone in prison,
convicted of a felony within seven years, or with pending felony charges), 392
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disabilities, the other significant elements of a criminal’s path
through the justice system are individualized. Only some wrongdoers
are arrested, only some arrestees are charged. The precise charges
leveled may be based even on a compromise with the prosecutor.
Many criminal defendants are acquitted, and those that are not
receive sentences based on their personal histories and the details of
237
their particular offenses. Parole, probation, and clemency are also
generally individualized.
Similarly, jury qualification is otherwise a largely individual
238
matter.
Voir dire and peremptory challenges are individualized,
and they are based not just on the juror but on the case. For
example, a juror who is struck in a slip and fall civil case might be
perfectly acceptable in a murder case. By the same token, a justreleased rapist would not be a very good juror for a rape trial, but
someone convicted forty years ago for defacing a gravestone might be
239
just fine.

(Kansas) (disqualifying anyone under sentence or convicted of a felony within ten
years of service), 397 (Massachusetts) (disqualifying anyone in prison or convicted of
a felony within seven years), 423 (Washington) (providing a mechanism for early
relief from civil disabilities); cf. Note, supra note 28, at 403 (complaining that the
government often classifies people as “forever unfit” as opposed to examining the
particular circumstances of their cases); id. at 423 (decrying “automatic, indirect
sanctions following upon a conviction without regard to the merits of the individual
involved”) (quoting Governor’s Memoranda, MCKINNEY’S SESSION LAW NEWS, July 10,
1966, at A-266).
237. While sentences are individualized, they are much more uniform than they
were in previous decades. See Harcourt, supra note 122, at 105-07 (discussing shift
from individualized treatment of offenders to “mandatory sentences, fixed
guidelines, and sentencing enhancements” and to “actuarial” methods of fighting
crime).
In an article critiquing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Professor Alschuler
makes some cogent points that are ready analogies for felon exclusion. Albert W.
Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 901 (1991). He notes the distinction between treating like cases alike and
treating all cases alike. Id. at 916. The Sentencing Guidelines, like felon exclusion,
treat like cases alike only in the sense that they define them as like cases. Id. at 917.
By analogy, then, instead of defining all felons as unsuitable for jury service and
congratulating themselves for being consistent when they apply such a sweeping rule,
jurisdictions could distinguish between different sorts of crimes, different sorts of
criminals, and different sorts of juries; they could create paradigmatic cases and
allow judges to reason by analogy and make individualized determinations within the
bounds of a “common law” of sentencing. See id. at 939-49 (making a similar
proposal for sentencing in general); infra Part V.
238. To the extent that there are other objective qualifications, such as literacy,
age, and infirmity, they are distinguishable. See infra notes 277-80 and accompanying
text (describing such classes of people statutorily excluded from jury service in
certain states).
239. See Grant et al., supra note 3, at 1155 & n.2 (decrying the imposition of civil
disabilities based on a potential one-year sentence under a Massachusetts gravestone
defacement law (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 73 (1968))).
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A final analogy is instructive. Felon jury disqualification shares
240
The common
historical roots with felon witness disqualification.
law rejected the notion that a known felon or convict of crimen falsi
could give reliable testimony, given that he had revealed himself to
241
be generally dishonest and antisocial.
To find someone liable or
guilty on the basis of the testimony of a scoundrel would taint the
verdict and, by extension, the authority of the court that issued it.
The truth—the object of the trial—needed protection from such
242
unsavory influences.
The parallels to felon exclusion are obvious.
At some point, though, the common law recognized that reliability
was a matter of degree, and that the entire process of presenting
evidence to the fact finder rested on the assumption that it could
decide for itself, based on all of the variables, whether testimony was
243
entitled to consideration or not.
The cost to society of excluding
evidence that was at least potentially reliable was greater than the
benefit of continuing to shun criminals. Just because all testimony
was subject to impeachment did not mean that felon witnesses were
placed in the same position as other witnesses, considering that felon
witnesses offered more fodder for impeachment. But the outright
ban on felon testimony faded into history.
Just as the common law eventually recognized that the mechanism
by which all other testimony was gauged could be applied to felon
testimony, policy makers today could recognize that the same jury
selection process used for non-felons would be valid for felons too.
Further, just as the common law of evidence recognized that the costs
of erring on the side of exclusion were not worthwhile, so too could
the common policy of jury service.
I.

Conclusion

There are many reasons to exclude released felons from juries, but
current policy is based more on inertia than careful consideration.
Felon exclusion is arbitrary, overinclusive, underinclusive, difficult to
administer, presents agency costs, and threatens racial equality. The

240. See infra note 517 and accompanying text.
241. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 519, at 72529 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed., 1979) (explaining that a man who has been
convicted of an egregious crime cannot be trusted).
242. See id. at 726 (explaining that, alternatively, an honest man’s oath is
credible).
243. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 294-95 (4th ed.
2001) (describing modern practice under FED. R. EVID. 609); 2 WIGMORE, supra note
241, § 519, at 727 (explaining that the aforementioned common-law rule has been
abolished).
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courts of those jurisdictions that do allow felons on juries have not
crumbled under the weight of opprobrium or bias; to conclude
otherwise would be to conclude that the general jury selection
process for non-felons is inadequate. As a matter of general policy,
felon exclusion is questionable at best. As the next two Parts discuss,
it is also questionable as a matter of jury and penal policy.
III. THE NATURE OF THE JURY
In discussing whether felons should ever serve on juries, it is worth
considering if anyone should. Despite the centuries-old grounding of
the jury in the Anglo-American legal tradition (or perhaps because of
it), it is not particularly clear why the jury is used today. Some
theories and thoughts on the nature of jury trial have coalesced in
the literature, however, and they are elaborated in this Part. Crosscutting these themes and this discussion are three general
justifications for jury trials: They are beneficial for society, litigants,
244
and the jurors themselves.
Felon exclusion is not fatally
incompatible with these ideals, but it does them a disservice. Felons
are part of the community, they would bring specialized knowledge
and experiences to the task of finding and interpreting facts, and
they stand to benefit greatly from the engagement that jury service
demands.
A. The Nature of Jury Service and the Nature of Citizenship
245

If jury service is a “basic right[] of citizenship,” it is not a
particularly vigorous one, and it is subject to substantial limitation
and qualification. Large swathes of the citizenry are routinely barred
from juries, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that
246
“[s]tates [may] prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors,”
244. Cf. Lippke, supra note 5, at 556 (classifying “interests secured by a right to
participation in democratic political processes” as societal—improving outcomes, or
personal—improving status or civic education).
245. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986) (referring to complete
exclusion from jury service as “substantial deprivation of [a] basic right[] of
citizenship”); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 131, 138 n.9 (1994)
(referring to women’s constitutional right to serve on juries); United States v. Caron,
941 F. Supp. 238, 255 (D. Mass. 1996) (describing jury service as a “crucial civil
right”); cf. Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968) (using petitioner’s exclusion
from jury service as a basis for a habeas corpus challenge to a sentence already
served).
246. Carter v. Jury Comm’r, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970); see also Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 474 (1953) (rejecting cross-section challenge so long as jury list “reasonably
reflect[ed] a cross-section of the population suitable in character and intelligence for
that civic duty”) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
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and that “[j]ury service is a duty as well as a privilege of citizenship.”
Some state courts have gone further, saying that jury service is no
right at all, and is instead just “a duty imposed by the state on such
248
terms as the state may set.” The rights of the parties are protected
more scrupulously than those of jurors, who are seen as simply
249
After all, it is called jury “duty.”
performing a democratic chore.
Those citizens who, after being randomly selected, do qualify for petit
jury service are subject to dismissal on practically any ground, via
peremptory challenges. It is therefore a bit odd to think of jury
service itself as a right; at most it is a right to have a fair chance at jury
250
service. Further mitigating the notion of jury service as a “right” is
251
the fact that jury service is distasteful to many people. One might
ask whether excluding a person from jury service is really a penalty,
252
or if instead it is actually something of a reward.
Given how
unpleasant most people find being called for jury duty, one could
almost suggest that felons be required to serve on juries to reduce the
253
burden on law-abiding citizens.
Excluding felons is perfectly
sensible under such an understanding.
247. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946); see also Carter, 396 U.S. at 330
(reiterating that jury service can be considered a right, privilege, or duty).
248. State v. Bojorquez, 535 P.2d 6, 12 (Ariz. 1975) (in banc); see also State v.
Haynes, 514 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (distinguishing the rights to vote,
work, and hold office—the fundamental rights of citizenship—from the more
legislatively limitable ability to serve on jury).
249. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 756.001 (West 2001) (“(1) Trial by jury is a
cherished constitutional right. (2) Jury service is a civic duty.”); see also Adams v.
Superior Court, 524 P.2d 375, 379 (Cal. 1974) (explaining that although trial by jury
is part of the constitutional system of justice, jury service is considered more of a duty
or privilege than a right).
250. See Adams, 524 P.2d at 379 (stating that citizens cannot demand to serve on a
jury; they are only entitled to be considered for service); Jury Selection: A Critique,
supra note 4, at 1124 (explaining that an individual’s right to serve on a jury cannot
be distinctively identified because jury lists only contain a representative sampling
rather than all eligible jurors).
251. See, e.g., Jury Selection: A Critique, supra note 4, at 1124 (characterizing jury
service in the eyes of many potential jurors as an “onerous” burden rather than a
right). Though distaste for jury service is much storied, most people who actually
serve on juries look favorably upon their experience. See George L. Priest, Justifying
the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 103, 104-05, 110 (Robert E.
Litan ed., 1993) (describing “nearly uniform[]” perception of jury service by civil
jurors as “interesting,” “important,” and “educational”); Developments in the Law—The
Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1440 (1997) [hereinafter The Civil Jury] (stating
that most citizens’ experiences serving as jurors are positive).
252. This question has been important to some courts as a legal matter too. See,
e.g., Garrett v. Weinberg, 31 S.E. 341, 344 (S.C. 1898) (explaining that serving on a
jury is a public duty that is enforceable by penalties and is usually regarded as a
burden rather than a privilege); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship
Between Obligations and Rights of Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1730 (2001)
(criticizing Justice Powell’s opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), for
treating jury service as “a pain in the neck”).
253. My colleague Mae Kuykendall deserves credit for this proposal, which she
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But if jury service is not quite a “right,” it is not just a chore either.
So what is it? Comparing jury service to voting is helpful because
felon disenfranchisement parallels felon exclusion in important ways.
Both practices are often justified in the name of probity and
254
propriety.
Both voters and jurors play a part in democratic selfgovernment, controlling the power to lead in one case and the power
to punish or enrich in the other. But voting is a more robust right.
About four times as many states ban felon jurors for life as ban felon
255
voters for life. The Constitution speaks of a right to vote, but not a
256
right to serve on a jury.
The right to vote is comprehensive—any
voter can vote, even if most people usually do not—while jury service
is a matter of a chance selection and the whim of the parties.
257
Conversely, voting is voluntary, while jury service is coerced.
While jury service resembles voting in some ways, it resembles the
(erstwhile) draft and militia systems in others. In each case, the
government summons a citizen to appear, tests him for fitness, and
258
coerces him to serve if he passes muster.
It gives him and his
squadron awesome powers over the lives of others, but for most of the
time it just uproots and bores them. More to the point of their
nature as rights, though, even if an individual does not want to be
drafted—either into the military or onto a jury—at least a draftee is
259
considered part of the community.
When we focus on self-government in this way, the complex
interplay that the jury exemplifies takes shape; the political rights of
citizens, marshaled in the service of the political institutions of a
democratic republic, marshaled in turn in the service of the civil
rights of citizens. Defining the right to serve on a jury in this way—as

made only somewhat facetiously.
254. See The Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1301-03 (discussing the policy
justifications for felon disenfranchisement); supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the
rationales of felon exclusion).
255. See infra note 588 and accompanying text (listing the eight states that still
disenfranchise felons for life).
256. The Voting Amendments all mention “the right of the citizens of the United
States to vote.” U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. The only “rights”
concerning juries that the Constitution mentions are those of criminal defendants
and civil litigants. Id. amends. VI, VII.
257. See ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 63 (2001) (noting the
uniqueness of jury’s forced participation).
258. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional
Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 894 (analogizing juries to militias).
259. For an important discussion that goes further in linking juries and militias,
see id. (linking juries and militias in the Founders’ world-view); Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1171, 1183-89 (1991)
(analogizing militias and juries as localist, democratic, educative, and temporary
institutions).

KALT.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC

2003]

EXCLUSION OF FELONS FROM JURY SERVICE

2/23/2004 2:18 PM

121

a political right rather than a civil right—clarifies the fact that jury
duty is not simply some right to be free from government
interference, but rather an amalgam of right and responsibility and
260
of power and duty.
Viewed in this light, the irony of felon
exclusion—that it strips a right from a felon by lifting a disagreeable
burden from him—evaporates. Both the right and the burden are
the product of a broader sense of citizenship. Excluding a felon from
a jury means excluding him from society even after his term of direct
supervision has ended. It also means exempting him from a
responsibility that other members of the community share, and
increasing the burden on those members.
This implicates the theories of social contractarianism and civic
republicanism. An analysis of felon exclusion under either theory
could be the subject of its own article; both theories are too broad
261
and diverse to be summarized and applied mechanically here.
What is evident is that both theories can be deployed either in favor
of or against felon exclusion.
Civic republicanism emphasizes moral competence and civic
responsibility as important components to any understanding of
262
government, citizenship, and rights.
The jury is a quintessential
civic republican institution because it brings the moral authority of
the community to bear in self-government, and it demands dutiful
263
participation, dialogue, and service from average citizens.
Felons
can fairly be said to have demonstrated through their crimes that

260. See Eskridge, supra note 252, at 1723 (discussing Francis Lieber’s nineteenthcentury theory that a citizen’s relationship with the state involves the “exercise of
civic virtue,” rather than mere compliance with its laws).
261. Articles discussing civic republicanism and social contractarianism in the
context of civil disabilities include Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5,
at 158 (discussing theoretical bases for denying “citizenship rights” to felons); Ewald,
supra note 5, at 1095-120 (critiquing social contract and civic republican justifications
for felon disenfranchisement); Furman, supra note 5, at 1221-26 (discussing the selfcontradiction of Rawlsian theories when applied to felon disenfranchisement); and
The Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1304-09 (discussing social contract and
civic republican theories in the context of felon disenfranchisement).
262. See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 801, 806-10 (1993) (discussing civic virtue, which is “the leitmotif of all civic
republican theory”). Obviously there is much more to civic republican theory than
can be summarized in this single phrase. See id. at 804-06 (discussing the difficulty of
defining civic republicanism).
263. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (“[S]haring in the administration of
justice is a phase of civic responsibility.”) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); SWARD, supra note 257, at 59 (stating that,
in the United States, the jury is the sole “civic republican or communitarian
government institution”).
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they lack the moral competence and civic responsibility necessary for
264
participation in self-government.
On the other hand, some reckonings of civic republicanism
emphasize the role of government and civic participation in nurturing
265
moral competence and civic responsibility.
The jury is also
important as a civic republican institution because it educates and
nurtures citizens to be citizens, and it disserves these goals to exclude
266
the most civically needy citizens.
While placing the power of the
community in the hands of irreparable moral monsters would be
counterproductive, a civic republican might at least want to try to
rescue those felons who are morally salvageable. Excluding a felon
who was convicted of a single crime during his youth, for example,
and who has not reoffended since, harms the community by limiting
community participation, and the felon by foreclosing his moral
267
development. Excluding someone with repeated felon convictions
who appears incapable of or uninterested in performing his civic duty
is another matter altogether. Jurisdictions could make such
distinctions, however, rather than excluding all felons.
The application of social contractarianism yields similarly
ambiguous results. At first blush, the notion of a social contract
264. This undertone can be detected in cases approving felon exclusion in the
name of defending the probity of the jury. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the
rationales of felon exclusion). An analogous argument has been made in felon
disenfranchisement cases. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884)
(“[O]ne rendered infamous by conviction of felony . . . is unfit to exercise the
privilege of suffrage, or to hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen who are
clothed by the State with the toga of political citizenship.”); The Purity of the Ballot Box,
supra note 5, at 1307-08 (discussing cases that argue that felons lack the moral
competence to vote in elections); see also Elizabeth Simson, Justice Denied: How Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws Undermine American Democracy (Mar. 2002) (attributing felon
disenfranchisement to the “exclusionary tendency” of civic republicanism), at
http://www.adaction.org/lizfullpaper.pdf (on file with the American University Law
Review).
265. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 128-33 (1996)
(discussing the Founders’ belief that the form of government would cause citizens to
become attached to their nation, which would promote the virtue they believed was
necessary for the success of a republican government); The Purity of the Ballot Box,
supra note 5, at 1309 (stating that one aim of republicanism is to instill civic virtue in
citizens).
266. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 226 (Bruce Frohnen ed. &
Henry Reeve trans., 2002) (“The jury, and more especially the jury in civil cases,
serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and
this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free
institutions.”); Ewald, supra note 5, at 1112 (describing contemporary republicans as
believing that voting can “redeem wrongdoers”); infra Part III.D (discussing the role
of the jury as a forum for civic education and democratic engagement); cf. SANDEL,
supra note 265, at 348 (praising federalism for creating civic activity and political
power that engenders virtue and prepares citizens for self government).
267. See The Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1309 (discussing a civic
republican self-critique favoring an increased sense of inclusiveness).
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justifies felon exclusion quite easily: “A man who breaks the laws he
has authorized his agent to make for his own governance could fairly
have been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in
268
further administering the compact.” Such a black-and-white notion
of citizenship may have been appropriate in the age of “civil death”
statutes and property qualifications for voting, but in an age where
citizenship is seen as more universal and immutable, it no longer
269
goes without saying. A felon who has served his sentence—who has
paid his debt to society—could just as easily be deemed to have recontracted with society. Even before returning to society, a felon
retains some constitutional rights; once he has returned he regains
more, including in most states the right to work, vote, and serve in
270
public office. This belies the notion that a felon is wholly excluded
271
from the social contract for life.
Classifying jury service as an inferior right that can be stripped
casually from inferior citizens is insufficient. Jury service is more
textured. It is an amalgam of a right, a duty, and a badge of
community membership, and excluding felons deprives them of all of
this. Viewed most simply, being a felon may still be incompatible with
the essence of the citizen-juror, but a more modern and nuanced

268. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.).
Green discussed disenfranchisement, but the point is applicable to juries. See also
Ewald, supra note 5, at 1073-75 (discussing the well-engrained Lockean notion that
criminals give up the liberties and protections that the social contract affords); The
Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1304-07 (citing Green and analyzing
contractarians’ approach to felon disenfranchisement).
269. See Ewald, supra note 5, at 1107-08 (summarizing the democratic shift of
modern liberal contractarian thought away from Locke); Furman, supra note 5, at
1219-20 (discussing Supreme Court precedent that state citizenship is an inalienable
right that cannot be revoked as a punishment); infra note 520 (explaining that felons
were considered “civilly dead” and forfeited their civil and property rights); see also
The Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1306 (discussing the Rawlsian notion that
some rights pursuant to social contract cannot be bargained away).
270. See infra notes 328-29 and accompanying text (discussing felon restrictions on
voting and holding a public office).
271. Contractarianism has a more liberal, nurturing side as well. See The Purity of
the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1306 (stating that the aim of a social contract is to allow
citizens to realize freedom and development, not simply repressing impulses, which
is why a single criminal act does not destroy the entire contract); see also Harvey,
supra note 5, at 1170 (applying Lockean and Rawlsian theories to argue against felon
disenfranchisement); Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Note, Felon Disenfranchisement: The
Unconscionable Social Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109 (2003) (condemning
contractarian justifications for felon disenfranchisement on grounds that the social
contract is unconscionable). Additionally, to the extent that felon exclusion is harsh
treatment, it exposes an illiberal ambivalence in Rawlsian thought toward the
inevitability of crime in modern society. See Furman, supra note 5, at 1231 (arguing
that a certain amount of crime is part of a normal, healthy society whose norms
permit an amount of laxity).
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view is that the essence of the citizen-jury is incompatible with
excluding every felon.
B. For Society: Democratic Self-Government
To a degree often unappreciated, jury trials serve the interests not
272
just of jurors and litigants but of the public as a whole. As G.K.
Chesterton once wrote:
Our civilization has decided, and very justly decided, that
determining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too important
to be trusted to trained men. . . . When it wants a library
catalogued, or the solar system discovered, or any trifle of that
kind, it uses up its specialists. But when it wishes anything done
which is really serious, it collects twelve of the ordinary men
273
standing round.

This is the essence of democratic self-government. Having a group
of citizens decide who is guilty of a crime or liable for damages—as
opposed to having elites decide—is perhaps the most feasible way to
274
have cases decided by “the community.”
For all of their learning
and training, judges—even elected ones—do not represent the
275
community as well as a jury.
To be representative, a jury must stand for the whole community,
276
not just subsets of it.
Given the semi-skilled nature of the juror’s
task, it is necessary to impose some qualifications; to understand
testimony and be able to deliberate about it, jurors must be physically
and mentally capable of understanding testimony and

272. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54; HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19 (1981) (stating that the Anti-Federalists’ concern with
preserving jury trials was rooted in protecting the role of citizens in government
administration more than in protecting individual rights); Akhil Reed Amar,
Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1174 (1995)
(explaining that the jury’s constitutional function serves the people rather than
litigants because it allows the people to participate in the administration of justice
and democracy).
273. Shirley S. Abrahamson, A View from the Other Side of the Bench, 69 MARQ. L. REV.
463, 493 (1986) (quoting G.K. Chesterton, The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES
56-58 (1968)).
274. That it is proper as a matter of policy to have the community adjudicate cases
is something of an article of faith. See Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 50 (1994) (decrying the typical facile conflation of democracy
and juries that avoids analyzing adjudicatory competencies of the latter).
275. See United States v. Caron, 941 F. Supp. 238, 255 (D. Mass. 1996) (describing
jury service as the most important example of direct democracy in America). A
single elected judge cannot be as representative as a group of six or twelve randomly
selected jurors.
276. See Leipold, supra note 7, at 1006-07 (stating that a verdict rendered by a
diverse, rather than a homogeneous, jury pool would be more likely to mirror local
sentiment).
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277

communicating with the other jurors in English. Jurisdictions may
278
also have minimum age, residency, or citizenship requirements.
None of these qualifications threaten the representativeness of the
jury as felon exclusion does. Automatic physical and mental
279
disqualifications have largely receded.
Age and residency
requirements are inherently temporary. Excluding aliens interferes
with representativeness, especially in communities with large
immigrant populations, but compared with getting a pardon, it is
much easier, more common, and a matter of personal choice to be
280
naturalized.
By contrast, felon exclusion is a permanent disqualification of
about 6.5% of the adult population nationally, and much more in
281
urban and poor communities.
Admittedly, the fact that felon
exclusion affects many people does not answer the question of
whether felons deserve to be considered part of “the community” as a

277. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2)-(4) (2000) (“In making such determination
the chief judge of the district court, or such other district court judge as the plan
may provide, shall deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in
the district court unless he (2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English
language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror
qualification form; (3) is unable to speak; (4) is incapable, by reason of mental or
physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service.”).
278. Some states require jurors to be older than eighteen. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 12-16-60 (1995) (requiring jurors to be over the age of nineteen); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-5-1 (2002) (requiring jurors to be twenty-one); MO. ANN. STAT. § 494.425 (West
1996) (requiring jurors to be twenty-one); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1995)
(requiring jurors to be over nineteen). Residency requirements vary; the most
extreme is one year. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (2000) (requiring prospective
jurors to live in the judicial district for one year); ALA. CODE § 12-16-60 (1995)
(requiring prospective jurors to be residents of the county for more than one year);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(a)(1) (West 2003) (requiring prospective jurors
to live in the judicial parish for more than one year). No state uses non-citizens as
jurors; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3041 (West 1991) (incorporating the criminal
standard by reference for civil juries).
279. See Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to Jury Service for People
with Disabilities, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1997) (describing cases invalidating
statutes that automatically excluded physically disabled persons from jury service).
Weis notes the recent liberalization in treatment of disabled jurors and explains that
state statutes no longer automatically exclude disabled potential jurors, though he
details and criticizes the less absolute barriers that remain. The distinction between
per se exclusion and case-by-case exclusion is, of course, at the heart of this Article.
Cf. id. at 40 (noting that, although there are no longer per se exclusion statutes,
judges can achieve the same effect of excluding disabled jurors by finding them
incapable on a case-by-case basis).
280. Courts have accepted non-citizen exclusion, even when the numbers are
stark. See United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1975)
(finding no violation of cross-section requirement even where 30% of the population
were resident aliens); United States v. Morillo, 34 F. Supp. 2d 105, 106 (D.P.R. 1999)
(discussing cases where non-citizens were lawfully excluded from jury service).
281. See infra text accompanying note 499 (discussing the racial demographics of
the adult felon population).
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282

theoretical or legal matter. But if the numbers become sufficiently
high, the notion of the jury system as self-government begins to fade.
If community participation is truly an essential underpinning of “our
democratic heritage,” and that absence injures “the democratic ideal
reflected in the processes of our courts,” then a system of
qualification that eliminates such a wide swath of the community is
283
suspect.
C. For Parties: Impartial, Canny, Unassailable Decision Makers
Jury trials would not be held if criminal defendants and civil
litigants did not want them, regardless of their benefits to society and
284
the jurors themselves.
This confidence in juries has both an
idealistic and a cynical basis. The idealistic notion is that juries are
good at deciding cases. A group of six or twelve jurors is considered
“a superior fact-finder,” compared with a single judge, because of
“the knowledge and experience that citizen-jurors bring to bear on a
285
case.”
Juries are designed and tested to ensure their impartiality.
They bring a sense of shrewdness, common knowledge, and “street
smarts” to the process that is missing from cosseted, elite judges. Jury
decision making is usually done in a “black box”—so long as a case
can reasonably be decided for either party, the jury chooses the
winner and no one other than the jurors needs to know why. From
judges, by contrast, extra accountability and openness in the form of
written findings are expected. Juries thus possess a superior sort of
legitimacy that allows society to be comfortable with having lives and
livelihoods altered by untrained, unaccountable, ordinary people.
Parties are essentially choosing this impartiality, these sensibilities,
and this legitimacy when they choose to have a jury trial.
But that is the idealistic vision. Alternatively, criminal juries might
persist because pro-jury defendants perceive juries not as impartial
and shrewd, but rather as sympathetic and naïve. Similarly, the
282. See supra Part III.A (discussing the role of the jury under civic republican
theory); cf. Ewald, supra note 5, at 1045 (stating that the contradictory paradoxes of
inclusion and exclusion are part of American political theory and that of other
democracies).
283. Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 605 (Cal. 1979) (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)). Tobriner is
not making this precise point, but he uses the quoted language.
284. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 293-98 (1930) (refusing to hold
waiver of criminal jury trial unconstitutional despite language of U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 3, that “The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury”); Bank of Columbia v.
Okley, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (holding that the right to civil jury trial
can be waived).
285. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979)
(approving the use of a civil jury in complex civil litigation).
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persistence of the civil jury may reflect the fact that when both parties
perceive the predilections and tendencies of their judge the same
way, it is likely that one of them will want a jury to decide the case
instead of the judge. Moreover, there are plenty of cases in which
neither party trusts a jury to handle the case. Thus, parties may
choose jury trials—when they do—not because of juries’ virtues, but
because of their self-interested gaming of the system. If the cynical
explanation controls, it does not matter whether felons are included
on juries or not; the parties will simply adjust their analyses
accordingly and any proposal for more or less participation by felons
would be based on the perception of a particular substantive
outcome.
If the idealistic vision is the rationale for choosing jury trials,
including felons cuts both ways. Felons might bring certain biases,
antisocial behavior, and disrepute to juries. At the same time,
however, they might also bring perspective and specialized
knowledge. If the jury has retained its usefulness, centuries after
straying from its origin as a source of “local knowledge . . .
unavailable to the judge,” it may be because of the related notion
expressed by Professor Haddon that “truth is socially constructed and
that the interchange of views of members of diverse communities . . .
286
meaningfully contributes to the derivation of truth.”
Indeed,
society expects jurors to process evidence in light of their common
287
As a result of their common sense being informed by
sense.
experiences with crime, dealing both first- and second-hand with
criminals and police, felons can make an important contribution to
the jury’s construction of the truth, particularly in criminal cases.
Taking felons out of the jury pool leaves a remainder of jurors who
have skewed or ignorant views on such matters.
286. Haddon, supra note 274, at 52; see also id. at 81 (arguing that properly
assembled juries can guarantee the social construction of truth); Brown, supra note
64, at 140-47 (discussing the “antifoundationalist-hermeneutic” notion that social
diversity within a jury is essential to all of its tasks, including fact-finding); M.
Catherine Miller, Finding “the More Satisfactory Type of Jurymen”: Class and the
Construction of Federal Juries, 1926-1954, 88 J. AM. HIST. 979, 987 & n.20 (2001)
(discussing evidence from the 1950s and 1960s that jurors’ class affected their beliefs
about property and justice). The social construction of truth may be more apparent
when the “truth” being sought concerns an actor’s intent rather than whether some
event occurred. See Brown, supra note 64, at 140-41 (suggesting the relative ease of
discovering historical facts compared to assessing moral culpability).
The value of a diverse jury might also lie in “improving the effectiveness and
experience of the deliberation process,” independent of any effects on the verdict
itself. Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 701
(2002) (discussing advantages of gender-diverse juries).
287. See Abrahamson, supra note 273, at 487 (discussing jury instructions to use
“experiences, knowledge, and common sense”).
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To be sure, felons’ exposure to such situations might also make
them jaded or partial to the point where their participation threatens
the search for truth. But the same can be said of many groups—
crime victims, police officers, lawyers, and others—who are tested
individually for such biases rather than excluded wholesale. As
members of their communities who are otherwise unrepresented,
felons who make it through voir dire are likely to add more to the
jury’s collective aptitude than they subtract.
D. For Jurors: Education, Democratic Engagement, and Dialogue
Jury service is also of benefit to jurors themselves. This benefit has
traditionally been described as educative, democratic, and dialogic
because serving on a jury teaches jurors about life and the law,
engages them in self-government, and forces them into a serious civic
288
interchange with their fellow jurors.
All of these benefits are
applicable to felons. While the utility enjoyed by jurors alone cannot
justify the decision to include particular jurors or to use a jury system,
in marginal cases, such as felon exclusion, every factor counts. Put
simply, because felons gain from jury service, excluding them makes
less sense.
The educative value of jury service to jurors has long been
recognized. Alexis de Tocqueville famously opined in the 1830s: “I
do not know whether the jury is useful to those who are in litigation;
but I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who decide the
289
litigation.”
Specifically, de Tocqueville saw jury service as “a
gratuitous public school” in which jurors not only learn about the law
and the real-life conflicts of others, but also learn “to practice equity”
290
and apply the Golden Rule.
Another visitor from France later in
the century expressed these similar sentiments:
The Americans consider and value the jury otherwise than as a
judicial institution; they think that the jury constitutes the best
political school in a popular government. Its operation puts the
people in repeated contact with the elite of democratic countries,
the lawyers and magistracy. In this instructive business, [the juror]

288. A good example of this understanding of jury service can be found in AMAR,
supra note 139, at 93-96; see also THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 214, 249 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) (stating that, during the constitutional ratification period, it was
believed that the jury gives citizens the opportunity to become involved with and
learn about the affairs of society and government). But see Priest, supra note 251, at
104 (arguing that there is no foundation for the idea that jury duty can transform
someone from a modest to heroic person).
289. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 266, at 226-27.
290. Id. at 226.
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is initiated into the ideas of law and of justice; he develops respect
for the laws and for the feeling of dignity and individual
291
responsibility.

Felons are more in need of this sort of training and experience than
other members of society, though they might come to the task
particularly ill-equipped to learn.
Jury service is the pinnacle of democratic participation; by serving
292
on a jury, an individual is a citizen in the most direct way. Voting is
293
relatively anonymous and one vote almost never makes a difference.
Jurors, by contrast, have direct and obvious effects. Where a
unanimous verdict is required, jurors vote publicly (if they reach a
verdict) and one vote always makes a difference. Even where
unanimity is not required, and even when a juror is on the losing
side, the interchange that is required to reach a verdict brings the
juror closer to the ideals of direct democracy than any other activity.
Such democratic participation is valuable to anyone who engages in
294
it, and perhaps more so to felons.
The dialogic value of jury service is significant to all of the
participants:
“In our multicultural society of often estranged
individuals and communities, jury duty can be a useful opportunity
for citizens to come together in a public setting which promotes
exchange . . . [and] to explore competing or emerging normative
295
understandings and to achieve consensus through deliberation.” In
291. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 876 n.47 (1994) (quoting HORACE HELBRONNER,
LE POUVOIR JUDICIAIRE AUX ETATS-UNIS: SON ORGANISATION ET SES ATTRIBUTIONS 10
(Imprimerie de A. Parent, 1872)).
292. See SWARD, supra note 257, at 52 (stating that the jury is an example of
participatory democracy); cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (explaining
that, for the majority of citizens, jury duty is their most significant participatory
experience in the democratic process, besides voting).
293. But cf. Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884) (describing the threat posed
by felon-voters “at least in close political contests”).
294. See Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 605 n.11 (Cal. 1979) (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he political and social value of governmental participation through
jury service may be especially significant to groups historically disenfranchised and
victimized by public and private discrimination, as [felons] are.”).
On the other hand, participatory democracy may be understood to require certain
minimum qualifying commitments, and being a felon may cast a person outside of
this democratic circle. See supra Part III.A; cf. Eskridge, supra note 252, at 1727
(“[T]he Court ought to insist upon . . . jury service . . . as a . . . right . . . that the
states are essentially prohibited from apportioning on a discriminatory basis . . .
because it denies [citizens] the respect and community bonding entailed in their
assuming the obligations of citizenship.”). Eskridge believes that jury service is a
particularly weighty “appurtenance of citizenship.” Id. at 1729.
295. Haddon, supra note 274, at 52; see Zuklie, supra note 35, at 145 (discussing
the value of dialogue). Haddon makes the additional point that judges can be
educated by their exposure to jurors with “differences.” Haddon, supra note 274, at
62. But cf. Eskridge, supra note 252, at 1751 (stating that jury service is “erod[ing] as
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other words, juries bring together diverse people who might rarely
even see each other, let alone speak to each other or debate and
296
Jurors are thus exposed not just to
decide the fortunes of others.
the problems of one criminal or two civil litigants; they are also
exposed to the perspectives of five or eleven or twenty-two of their
fellow citizens.
This exposure to different people may affect the juror and the
dialogue for better or worse. In the best sense of diversity, a juror
may be forced to confront (and may learn to appreciate) different
ways of looking at the world. A juror might also be more reluctant to
express certain sentiments—such as sexist or racist or classist ones—
297
about litigants if it would offend a fellow juror. A felon could reap
these sorts of benefits from engaging in dialogue with non-felons,
and vice versa. On the other hand, diversity is not always for the best.
A juror may be turned off by the perceived shortcomings of her
“neighbors” through this sort of dialogue, or her fear of offending
fellow jurors might lead her to suppress sentiments that are valid.
Jurors can also mistreat each other, and felons would seem
298
particularly vulnerable to such negative experiences, but one could
say the same thing for women and minorities as well—such
paternalistic protection hardly justifies wholesale exclusion of any of
these groups from the venire.
In sum, felons can benefit from serving on juries, and their fellow
jurors can benefit from their presence as well. Excluding felons
wholesale means foregoing these benefits, however modest they may
be.

[a] bridging institution that bring[s] people together”) (emphasis added).
296. See SWARD, supra note 257, at 64 (noting the jury’s distinction as a rare
situation where diverse people are put together and made to interact); The Civil Jury,
supra note 251, at 1440-41 (discussing value of deliberation in providing “communal
voice in law”); Abrahamson, supra note 273, at 491 (“We were twelve . . . strangers
chosen at random from a county of more than 300,000 . . . sitting in judgment of
another human being to decide whether the community labels him a thief . . . .”).
297. For an empirical study of the effects of diversity on the quality of
deliberations, see Marder, supra note 286. Professor Marder found that gender
diversity improved the harmony of deliberations, but that racial diversity had no such
effect. Id. at 687. The effect was the same on jurors’ satisfaction with their
experience. Id. at 692; cf. Miller, supra note 286, at 988 (describing “paeans to
women’s special competence” as jurors in the 1930s).
298. See, e.g., State v. Bongalis, 378 S.E.2d 449, 455 (W. Va. 1989) (“[T]he juror . . .
indicates that during the deliberations, he and three other jurors were inclined
toward acquitting the defendant. When he revealed that he was an ex-felon, the
other three jurors then shifted to a guilty verdict.”); Feige, supra note 217, at 22
(describing the case of a felon juror jailed after being improperly accused by a fellow
juror of partiality during contentious deliberations).
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E. Conclusion
Trial by jury serves the interests of society, the parties to a case, and
the jurors themselves. In each case, on balance, these interests are
advanced when felons are left in the jury pool. When felons are
excluded, the result is a less representative, more blinkered, and less
enlightening jury. Gaining the full range of benefits offered by the
jury system requires that the full range of qualified citizens be given a
chance, at least, to participate.
IV. THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS
Ever since the death penalty ceased to be the principal sentence in
Anglo-American criminal law, the question of what to do with
299
convicted felons has loomed large—and remained unresolved.
This Part discusses in turn the main goals suggested for criminal
punishment as they relate to felon exclusion:
rehabilitation,
deterrence, incapacitation, punishment, and retribution.
It
concludes that felon exclusion is not particularly consistent with
these goals, and to some degree interferes with them. Thus, as a
policy matter, felon exclusion is penologically unjustified. Felon
exclusion is also part of the package of civil disabilities doled out to
felons upon conviction. It is imposed more widely than any other
300
civil disability, and with less justification.
A. Rehabilitation
Intrinsic to the practice of imprisonment that arose in the early
301
years of the Republic was the rehabilitative ideal.
The ideal
302
Scores of training,
dominated penology up through the 1960s.
education, and treatment programs were created, with the notion

299. See RAFTER & STANLEY, supra note 149, at 24 (asserting that prison managers,
along with the general public, have conflicting views on the penal system’s purpose);
see also id. at 3-4 (describing eighteenth-century revolution in penal theory,
influenced by the works of Beccaria, which recast punishment as a debt to society for
damage done rather than a harm to be done to the prisoner through capital
punishment or harsh treatment); Edward L. Rubin, The Inevitability of Rehabilitation,
19 LAW & INEQ. 343, 345-52 (2001) (discussing parallel decline of the death penalty
and rise of other dispositions, including the rehabilitative ideal).
300. See Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5, at 154 (illustrating how
jury exclusion is a collateral sentencing consequence).
301. See Rubin, supra note 299, at 346-52. The very name of the “penitentiary”
suggests the redemptive purposes of confinement. See RAFTER & STANLEY, supra note
149, at 26 (making this verbal connection); see also infra text accompanying notes
536-37 (relating history of pre-imprisonment penology to felon exclusion).
302. See RAFTER & STANLEY, supra note 149, at 16 (stating that, historically,
rehabilitation was viewed as the primary purpose of prison).
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that recidivism was preventable through these avenues.
In 1974,
though, an influential meta-analysis by Robert Martinson asked the
question What Works? and concluded that none of these rehabilitative
304
programs were actually successful. When combined with a sense of
resentment that criminals were being “rewarded” with resources and
benefits that were unavailable to underprivileged law-abiding folk,
305
rehabilitation as a goal began waning.
In its place rose other
objectives such as deterrence, incapacitation, punishment, and
retribution.
Rehabilitation, though, has never completely faded away as a goal
306
of penology.
Dozens of programs are still employed in prisons to
educate, train, and rehabilitate criminals, and some of them work—
307
even if only a few prisoners avail themselves of these programs.
Given that most felons will leave prison some day, and that recidivism
is high, rehabilitation can be viewed as a means of crime control, not
just as a reward to a malefactor. Indeed, states have taken legislative
steps toward reducing the civil disabilities imposed on felons, with the
308
In any case, it
express purpose of helping their rehabilitation.
seems fair to assume that most people would prefer, all other things
being equal, that felons become productive and law-abiding members
of society.
Felon exclusion does not aid in rehabilitation. Granted, it is
unclear if jury service helps either, but if it has any effect on the mind
of a felon, it is likely a positive one. Additionally, declaring felons
unfit for jury service for life amounts to a societal admission that in-

303. See id. (describing the efforts to promote rehabilitation as a goal of the penal
system).
304. See Rubin, supra note 299, at 343-44 (discussing Robert Martinson, What
Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974)).
Martinson later backed away from his claims. See id. at 367 & n.87 (citing Robert
Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979)).
305. See RAFTER & STANLEY, supra note 149, at 27 (discussing the “principle of least
eligibility,” which suggests that criminals are the group least deserving of social
services).
306. See Rubin, supra note 299, at 366-70 (explaining that rehabilitation has
historically been and remained the driving concept behind American prisons); The
Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1301 n.4 (illustrating the history of
rehabilitation in the American penal system).
307. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 93-97 (2003) (describing participation); Rubin, supra note 299, at 366-68
(debunking the notion that rehabilitation is ineffective).
308. See, e.g., Froede v. Holland Ladder & Mfg., 523 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994) (discussing the legislative purpose of rehabilitating offenders by
preventing the denial of vocational licenses solely because of conviction); Note, supra
note 28, at 423 (quoting the Governor of New York’s statement praising a new law
reducing civil disabilities).
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309

prison rehabilitation is futile.
Of course, if rehabilitation is
considered impossible to achieve in prison, achieving it after prison
310
by any means available is all the more imperative.
Opponents of felon disenfranchisement have argued vociferously
that political disabilities undermine rehabilitation and promote
311
recidivism. The inability to vote, they say, promotes alienation and
312
a sense of ostracism. But these arguments seem exaggerated, both
because other more immediate factors such as employment and
education make more of a difference in rehabilitation and recidivism,
313
and because voting is voluntary and unpopular.
One critical
309. See Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5, at 154 (detailing the
practical message that is sent, regarding rehabilitation, by barring felons from sitting
on juries); cf. The Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1306-07 (arguing that felon
disenfranchisement belies any confidence in the possibility of rehabilitation). An
example of the lack of faith in the power of penology to rehabilitate felons can be
seen in one case in which the court supported lifetime felon exclusion:
[A]rticle I, section 15 of the Bill of Rights [] requires the legislature to
maintain the purity and efficiency of the jury system. It cannot be said that
such purity and efficiency is maintained by permitting juries to be composed
of thieves, robbers, murderers, kidnappers, perjurers, rapists, drug dealers
and others convicted of felonies simply because they successfully completed
their terms of probation.
R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that a statutory
provision terminating probation did not restore the right to serve on a jury).
310. See Lynne Goodstein, Inmate Adjustment to Prison and the Transition to
Community Life, J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ., July 1979, at 246, 247 (describing feelings
of “personal inefficacy” and problems with initiative that result from “forced
dependency” of prison life); Louis Hiken & Marti Hiken, Imprisonment—America’s
Drug of Choice, 52 GUILD PRAC. 65 (1995) (describing an increasing structure of
isolation in prisons as opposed to reintegration).
311. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he denial of the right to vote . . . is a hindrance to the efforts of
society to rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law-abiding and
productive citizens.”); NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CORRECTIONS 593 (1973) (supporting the stance that disenfranchisement detracts
from the ability to rehabilitate); Roger Chesley, Efforts to Restore Voting Rights to ExFelons Grind Along, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov. 17, 2001, at B9 (quoting Marc Mauer’s
statement that “[m]ore than 95 percent of felons sentenced to state prisons are
coming home someday . . . . If they feel a sense of community, they’re less likely to
victimize their neighbors”), available at 2001 WL 26280862; Demleitner, Preventing
Internal Exile, supra note 5, at 160-61 (detailing the effects of disenfranchisement);
Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 5, at 732 (supporting the position that disenfranchised
felons are less likely to rehabilitate completely).
312. See Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1907 (discussing the relation between
disenfranchisement and alienation); Grant et al., supra note 3, at 1228 (attributing
this effect to juror exclusion and office holding restrictions).
313. See PETERSILIA, supra note 307 (recounting, with excellence and
completeness, the barriers facing ex-prisoners); see also Bruce E. May, The Character
Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s
Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 187-88 (1995) (discussing effects of
licensing restrictions on felons); A Stigma That Never Fades, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 10,
2002, at 25, 26 (reporting survey data showing that 65% of employers in five major
American cities “would not knowingly hire an ex-convict”); cf. Grant et al., supra note
3, at 1229 n.372 (describing survey data in which most ex-offenders and businessmen
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analysis decrying felon disenfranchisement asked:
“How can
[prisoners] reclaim their role in society if they cannot exercise the
314
most basic right of citizenship?” The obvious retort is that they can
rejoin society by working, living, raising families, and doing all of the
other things that other Americans—few of whom vote very often—do.
Moreover, felons who are public-spirited enough to want to vote are
probably the least likely to withdraw from society and return to an
anti-social life of crime, and are the most likely to obtain clemency.
Disenfranchisement certainly does not help matters, but the notion
that it is, by itself, a key barrier to rehabilitation seems overstated.
Compare disenfranchisement to felon exclusion, about which
315
much less has been written in the context of rehabilitation. In one
sense, felon exclusion is less alienating than disenfranchisement
because one or more opportunities typically occur to vote every year,
while jury service is much rarer. Voting is also much more visible;
one cannot help but be aware of an election, whether or not one
votes. Jury trials are more hidden and those who are not involved
have no particular reason to notice or feel excluded.
In another sense, though, felon exclusion is more alienating.
Typically, felons are on the jury rolls and are excluded only after
316
being called, when it is established that they are felons.
Those
affected by felon exclusion, therefore, necessarily experience it as a
direct slap at their citizenship, as opposed to the disenfranchised,
most of whom have no contact with the electoral system anyway.
Moreover, one is either allowed to vote or not, but in the jury system
one is either “chosen,” “excluded,” or “rejected.” Those who are
excluded from juries (whether as felons or in some other way) are in
effect declared unworthy, and may take rejection quite personally.
Of course, if felons are not automatically excluded they may still be
struck from a jury, but a peremptory challenge does not render the
same decisive stamp of unfitness as a disqualification.
On the flip side, and more significantly, when a felon is allowed to
serve on a jury, it contributes positively to engagement in the
317
community, which is an important part of rehabilitation.
As
said that jury exclusion affected a criminal’s ability to “be a good citizen and earn a
decent living,” though most other civil disabilities were perceived that way by even
more respondents).
314. Jeremy Travis et al., Prisoner Reentry: Issues for Practice and Policy, CRIM. JUST.,
Spring 2002, at 12, 17.
315. But see Grant et al., supra note 3, at 1183 (arguing that jury service can restore
felons’ faith in the judicial system).
316. See supra text accompanying note 215.
317. See PETERSILIA, supra note 307, at 213 (describing positive effects of “social
networks”); Tucker Carlson, Thy Neighbor’s Rap Sheet, POL’Y REV., Spring 1995, at 50
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described in Part III.D, jury service presents a rare opportunity for
empowerment, civic education, the instilment of civic virtue, and
commitment. Citizens who serve on juries, whether felons or not,
318
enjoy these benefits during their experiences.
Depriving felons of
this opportunity robs them of an opportunity to better themselves in
a way that could aid their rehabilitation.
It may strain credulity to picture a felon returning to prison
thinking that he would not have returned to a life of crime, if only he
had been allowed to serve on a jury. At the same time, though, it is
hard to picture a felon who is empowered and engaged in the
community readily resuming his life of crime. Real life lies
somewhere in between these two portraits. Jury service surely is not
enough to rehabilitate felons on its own, but it might help, and
cannot hurt, the rehabilitation effort.
B. Other Goals of Penology
Besides rehabilitation, the criminal justice system has been
employed in the service of other goals such as deterrence,
319
incapacitation, punishment, and retribution.
Excluding felons
from juries may be somewhat consistent with the latter two goals, but
it is not consistent with the former two.
General deterrence (giving the public incentives not to commit a
crime) and special deterrence (giving the particular offender such
incentives) are not served by felon exclusion. Whether felon
exclusion even meets the first criterion of an incentive—being
320
known—is unclear. Even if would-be criminals and actual criminals
are aware that felons cannot serve on juries, there is little evidence to
suggest that jury duty is a particularly cherished right. Those citizens
who serve on juries tend to appreciate and see the value in them, to
be sure, but it is hard to imagine a criminal undeterred by the
prospect of incarceration until the prospect of being barred from jury
321
service is included.
(describing how community involvement and support can prevent crime and
recidivism).
318. See supra note 251 (describing the emotions jurors experience during jury
duty).
319. See RAFTER & STANLEY, supra note 149, at 25-27 (surveying penological goals).
One source adds “denunciation” as a goal that civil disabilities fail to fulfill.
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5, at 160.
320. Cf. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5, at 154 (“Sentencing
courts should announce all collateral consequences publicly and factor them into the
overall sentence.”).
321. Cf. Lippke, supra note 5, at 568 (questioning the marginal deterrent effect of
disenfranchisement).
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Incapacitation is a reason to hold criminals under lock and key, not
to keep them off of juries. The only exception to this is the possibility
of those crimes that one can commit as a juror, such as selling a
verdict. Given the other safeguards that exist to prevent such crimes,
though, incapacitation provides little support for the practice of
excluding all felons for life.
Punishment, or “just deserts,” is a more promising candidate. It is
plausible to say that someone who has committed a felony no longer
deserves to participate fully in civic society. The deserts must be just,
however; punishment must be proportionate. While it is true that
felonies are serious crimes whose commission merits the most serious
of consequences, excluding felons from juries does not always fit.
One can make a much better case for banning serial murderers or
jury tamperers from juries for life than young, nonviolent offenders
sentenced to probation. One would think that imprisonment or
probation—the terms of which are highly variable depending on the
crime and the circumstances—represent the principal punishments
322
for a crime. Indeed, an American ideal is that a criminal who has
finished his term of criminal supervision has “paid his debt to society”
323
and is seen as fit to rejoin it.
Perhaps part of the debt for some
felons should include exclusion from juries, but for others it should
not. At the very least, exclusion from jury service should not be a
one-size-fits-all component of punishment any more than should be
the original sentence.
Another problem with categorizing felon exclusion as an element
of punishment is that courts considering the constitutionality of felon
exclusion classify it not as punishment for the offender but rather as
324
protection of the sanctity of the jury. These decisions likely reflect
a realization that removing the obligation of jury service is hardly the
keenest weapon in the penological arsenal. Even supporters of felon
exclusion recognize this, relying as they do on other rationales to
325
promote the practice.
322. Most felons are not imprisoned. See Uggen et al., supra note 178, at 16-17
(estimating total population of prisoners and ex-prisoners at about five million, out
of a total population of felons of about thirteen million).
323. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“The Court today holds that a State may strip ex-felons who have fully paid their
debt to society of their fundamental right to vote without running afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”); cf. Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of
Conviction and Their Removal, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 352
(1968) (discussing Enlightenment-era Tuscan/Austrian practice of restoring rights
to released prisoners based on liberal contractarian notion of having repaid debt to
society).
324. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., infra note 406; State of Oregon Special Election Voters’ Pamphlet,
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The same is true, albeit to a lesser degree, for retribution.
Retribution may explain some part of the popularity of felon
326
Nevertheless, felon exclusion applies to “victimless
exclusion.
crimes” as well. Even where retribution is implicated, felon exclusion
does not seem like a particularly substantial payback. Moreover, as
with just deserts, supporters of felon exclusion typically do not
advance retribution as a significant justification—a telling fact, given
the general popularity of retributive arguments elsewhere in public
327
discourse.
In sum, felon exclusion is only somewhat consistent with the goals
of punishment and retribution, and not enough to motivate
supporters of felon exclusion. Felon exclusion is incompatible with
other penological goals, subtracting further from its justification as
prudent public policy.
C. Other Civil Disabilities
Exclusion from jury service is only one of many civil disabilities
imposed on felons, including limitations on voting, office holding,
gun ownership, and occupational licensing. These other disabilities
have been the subject of a vigorous dialogue comprising litigation,
328
legislation, and scholarship.
By contrast, exclusion from jury
service has not been widely discussed, despite being the most
329
commonly applied civil disability of the lot.
Comparing and
supra note 182 (imputing bias to felon jurors by asking: “If you were a crime victim,
would you want a jury of fair-minded citizens? Or instead, would you like to have a
jury full of felons, sex offenders, and thieves?”) (emphasis omitted).
326. See Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction:
A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10,
16 (“[T]he push for punishment and retribution, in light of growing legal
restrictions for former felons, has pushed the issue of correctional reintegration
aside.”).
327. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845-47 (2002) (discussing the ascendancy of
retributivism).
328. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); OFFICE OF THE
PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996) [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY]; Demleitner,
Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5; Alan Ellis & Peter J. Scherr, Federal Felony
Conviction, Collateral Civil Disabilities, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1996, at 42; Grant et al., supra
note 3; Olivares et al., supra note 326. On voting restrictions, see supra note 5. On
office holding restrictions, see Steven B. Snyder, Let My People Run: The Rights of
Voters and Candidates under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. &
POL. 543 (1988). On firearm restrictions, see infra notes 342-43 and accompanying
text. On licensing restrictions, see May, supra note 313.
329. See supra note 3; DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328, at 3 (deeming jury
service the “right generally hardest to regain” for felons); Olivares et al., supra note
326, at 15 (describing jury service as the “most restricted” right of felons); see also Ellis
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contrasting felon exclusion with these other disabilities further
illuminates its lack of justification.
Like the ban on felon jurors, all of these civil disabilities are
justified primarily as a safeguard for the public (i.e., protecting the
ballot box, public offices, consumers, and potential gun victims), not
330
as punishment for felons per se.
331
Voting restrictions have been the most fertile ground for debate.
Only eight states impose a lifetime ban on voting by felons, compared
332
to thirty-one that exclude felons from juries. Relative to the steady
support for felon exclusion, felon disenfranchisement has waned
significantly; only a generation ago, forty-two states stripped felons of
333
the vote for life.
Voting and jury service have important differences that may
account for the more liberal treatment of the former. The cost of
including a voter on the fringes of the community—like a felon—is
much lower than the cost of including such a juror. A juror must
interact intimately and publicly with her neighbors. In individual
cases, numerous potential jurors may be excluded to ensure that the
jury is properly composed. By contrast, voting is a more atomized,
anonymous experience, and elections are generally inclusive; voting
thus does not require as robust a notion of “community”
membership. One policy justification for felon disenfranchisement is
that felons might produce an anti-law enforcement voting bloc; this
334
argument has been rightly criticized and largely rejected. Inherent
& Scherr, supra note 328, at 43 (describing the harsh treatment of jury rights and
noting that in Vermont jury service is the sole right lost by felons).
330. See, e.g., supra notes 165-72, 282 and accompanying text; Amaya v. State, 220
S.W. 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920) (affirming the use of an out-of-state conviction as
a basis for exclusion, in part because of perceived legislative intent toward “the
protection of the society against the pollution of the jury system by committing its
execution to persons whose moral status has been judicially established as criminal”);
Tex. Supporters of Workers v. Strake, 511 F. Supp. 149, 153 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (“The
State has a valid interest in ensuring that the rules of its society are made by those
who have not shown an unwillingness to abide by those rules.”); Grant et al., supra
note 3, at 961-62 (describing majority view that “disability statutes are designed to
protect the public’s interests rather than to punish the offender”); May, supra note
313, at 190-91 (describing protective purposes of licensing laws); Popper, supra note
172, at 309-10 (describing the legislative purpose of federal felon gun restriction);
Snyder, supra note 328, at 566-70 (discussing office holding restrictions as protecting
offices and the public); cf. Damaska, supra note 323, at 354 (referring to newly
obsolete Continental civil disabilities: “There is little doubt that the motive behind
their infliction is that of degrading the offender . . . .”). But see Grant et al., supra
note 3, at 964-65 (describing minority view of the purpose of civil disabilities as
punishment).
331. See supra note 5.
332. See infra text accompanying note 588.
333. See infra note 588 and accompanying text; infra Appendix 1.C.
334. See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 5, at 1080, 1099-102 (criticizing the “subversive
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bias is not a problem in voting, where participants are supposed to be
335
partial, by definition. Moreover, a bloc is most effective as part of a
336
majority. Compare this to the jury, where a bloc of one can define
the result of a trial, and where impartiality is expected. While felon
exclusion is easier to justify than felon disenfranchisement, however,
this does not establish that it is, on the whole, justified.
Office holding restrictions provide an interesting analogy to felon
exclusion; the two disabilities are comparably defective. Jurors do not
hold an office per se, but in some ways jury service resembles office
holding more than it does voting. Voters select representatives;
jurors and office holders are representatives. Voters simply vote;
jurors and office holders deliberate, and then act. Some states bar
337
official misfeasors from jury service alongside felons. On the other
hand, jurors do not formulate “broad governmental policy” the way
338
that office holders do.
Office holding restrictions on felons are common, but less so than
339
jury restrictions.
An important parallel between them is that they
duplicate—and thus trivialize—existing safeguards. Typically, public
340
officials (if high-ranking enough to be subject to felon exclusion )
are either elected or appointed by an elected official. If voters or top
officials know about a candidate’s criminal history but would choose
voting” justification for felon disenfranchisement). The rejection of this idea is
implicit in the fading popularity of felon disenfranchisement. See supra text
accompanying note 333.
335. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 81-82 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing cases for the proposition that disenfranchisement cannot be based on
“differences of opinion”); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (stating that the
right to vote “cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political
views of a particular group of bona fide residents”); Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1906
(distinguishing between the exclusion of felons from voting and serving on juries on
the grounds that “voting is precisely about expressing biases”). But cf. Rubio v.
Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 601 n.13 (Cal. 1979) (plurality opinion)
(distinguishing the treatment of felon jurors and felon voters by arguing that felons
would feel more strongly about a jury trial than an election).
336. See Ewald, supra note 5, at 1102 (downplaying “voting bloc” problem in felon
disenfranchisement because of majority rule).
337. See infra notes 376 (Alabama), 380 (California), 402 (Montana).
338. This fact does not make jury service any less of a fundamental right than
office holding; indeed, if it did, voting would be even less of a “fundamental right,”
which is certainly not the case. It just makes it more of an individual right and less of
a right or interest inhering in the community as a whole. Justice Tobriner of
California made this point in Rubio, 593 P.2d at 610 n.21 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
339. See Olivares et al., supra note 326, at 12 (listing between eighteen and twentyfive states as disqualifying some felons from office); Snyder, supra note 328, at 544 &
n.6, 575-77 (listing between twenty-one and thirty-one states that disqualify some
felons from office for life). The discrepancies in reporting are due to states that only
disqualify for specified offenses.
340. See Olivares et al., supra note 326, at 13 (listing only six states that bar felons
from all public employment).
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him anyway, it is undemocratic to prevent him from serving.
Similarly, jurors are subjected to a process of selection that weeds out
unfit jurors, either on the agreement of one party and the court, or at
the whim of one party alone. Felon exclusion disparages this process.
The analogy, nevertheless, is not perfect. The initial panel from
which a jury is drawn is selected at random, not by the parties;
keeping a particular person off of a jury does not violate an
affirmative democratic expression the same way as does keeping the
winner of an election out of office. But if the parties would not
exclude a particular felon from their panel, it is hard to understand
why he should not be able to serve. If they would exclude him, he
has simply been treated the same as any other unfit juror—or any
candidate for office who, while allowed to serve if chosen, simply was
not elected or appointed. If restrictions on felons holding office and
serving on juries are justified, it suggests that society feels that voters
and litigants need to be protected from themselves. As a matter of
policy, such a sentiment is questionable.
The restriction of gun ownership by felons provides a telling
contrast. Federal law bars felons from owning guns unless they have
342
had their rights restored by the authority that convicted them.
Felons convicted in a jurisdiction that restores rights only with a
pardon, then, are essentially banned for life from owning guns in the
same way that they are banned in most states from serving on a jury.
Individual consideration of each felon’s suitability for safe gun
ownership does not occur, which makes this the only civil disability

341. See Snyder, supra note 328, at 558-62 (arguing that office holding restrictions
on felons violate voters’ rights). The most prominent example of the democratic
process politically nullifying a conviction is the eighteenth-century case of John
Wilkes. For a good description of the Wilkes case, see Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 527-29 (1969). Though the Powell case turns on specific constitutional
grounds and does not involve a felon, it is a hallmark of the right of the people to
select their own representatives, regardless of the indignation of others.
342. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000) (making it unlawful for felons to “possess in
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce”), § 921(a)(20)(B) (restoring the firearms possession rights of felons
whose civil rights were restored after their convictions); Beecham v. United States,
511 U.S. 368, 372 (1994) (holding that the restoration of a felon’s civil rights restores
the felon’s firearms possession privileges only when the rights were restored by the
convicting jurisdiction); see also United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002) (forbidding
judicial review of a felon’s application to restore firearms privileges where the initial
authority to grant the application is vested in an administrative body that cannot act
on the application because of congressional budget restrictions). But see 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(20)(A) (2000) (exempting certain business-related crimes from the federal
ban). See generally Ryan Laurence Nelson, Comment, Rearming Felons: Federal
Jurisdiction under 18 USC § 925(C), 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 551, 552-57 (reviewing the
history of federal firearms restrictions on felons).
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that, like felon exclusion, is both pervasive and absolute. But firearm
restrictions on felons do not supplant an underlying individualized
procedure—if someone is not a felon, he undergoes no voir dire
before obtaining a gun—which quite readily distinguishes felon
343
exclusion.
A final civil disability is the exclusion of felons from certain
licensed occupations. Most states make licensing determinations a
matter of discretion, and about half require either that the conviction
be related in some way to the occupation, or that it be used only as
344
evidence in the determination of qualifications.
Even those that
allow a conviction to be a sufficient basis for denial of a license
345
usually make it a matter of the licensing authority’s discretion.
Here too, then, felons receive individualized consideration, and even
if most are subjected to a disability as a rule, they at least have a
chance to be an exception.
In sum, comparing and contrasting felon exclusion with other civil
disabilities provides further evidence that it is not a good policy. It is
imposed much more widely than disenfranchisement.
Unlike
licensing restrictions it is applied with a broad brush. Firearm
restrictions are applied with a broad brush as well but do not
supplant an underlying system of safeguards the way felon exclusion
supplants voir dire. The only civil disabilities applied in a similar way,

343. The statute containes other per se limits on gun possession. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (2000) (restricting gun rights of fugitives, drug addicts, “mental
defective[s],” some aliens, dishonorably discharged veterans, United States citizens
who have renounced their citizenship, subjects of certain restraining orders, and
those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence).
344. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328 (surveying approaches to
licensing restrictions for felons in American jurisdictions); 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and
Permits § 84 (2000) (indicating that a state may not deny an individual an
occupational license on the basis of a past criminal conviction unless the crime
directly relates to the profession); 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 39 (1987) (stating that an
individual may only be denied an occupational license on the basis of a prior
criminal conviction if the conviction is relevant to the conduct of the occupation for
which the license is sought). The C.J.S. and Am. Jur. 2d statements appear to be
overstated. See, e.g., Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1042-44 (6th Cir.
1984) (rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to the city’s practice of
automatically denying dance hall licenses to felons). Characterizing licensing
statutes is difficult because they typically vary within states, and different vocations
receive differing treatment. A study in the early 1970s revealed 1,948 provisions that
limited the ability of persons with criminal convictions to gain occupational licenses.
See May, supra note 313, at 193 (listing barbers, beauticians, and hearing aid dealers
among occupations where the licensing of felons is restricted).
345. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328 (surveying approaches in all
American jurisdictions). For a typical example, see GA. CODE ANN. § 43-11A-15
(2003) (stating for dietician licensing that “[t]he board may refuse to grant . . . a
license” if the applicant is a convicted felon) (emphasis added).
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and with similar frequency, are restrictions on office holding, but this
means only that such restrictions have similar flaws as well.
D. Conclusion
Felon exclusion highlights American ambivalence about
rehabilitating criminals. Although the rehabilitative effects of jury
service itself are unclear, shutting out felons from civic participation
is plainly inconsistent with any notion of restoring them to a
productive place in the social order. It serves no other penological
purpose—deterrence, incapacitation, punishment, or retribution—
very robustly either, if at all. Finally, it is the worst of the civil
disabilities imposed on felons in terms of its combination of poor
justification and widespread application.
As a policy matter, felon exclusion must be justified as an essential
ingredient in forming proper juries, as an important part of proper
treatment of felons, or in some other way. Thus, because a lifetime,
blanket felon exclusion may clash with the purposes of the jury
system; because it is not a well-suited element of criminal
punishment; and because it is insufficiently justified on any other
policy grounds, the policy value of felon exclusion is quite low.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The problem with felon exclusion is not that all felons should be
on juries; some should not. The problem is not that it does not go
far enough; some felons would be perfectly fine jurors. The problem
is that the typical state statute makes no effort to distinguish between
good and bad felon jurors. The solution is to avoid blanket exclusion
in favor of a more nuanced system. This proposal is not original. A
presidential task force recommended in 1967 that:
[T]here seems little justification for . . . permanently disqualifying
all convicted felons from serving as jurors. Reliance should instead
be placed primarily on the powers given both parties to challenge
jurors, since they and the judge are in a position to consider the
relevance of a particular case. The legislature might prescribe
certain convictions as grounds for challenge for cause; the judge
could allow other convictions to constitute such grounds according
to their relevance to the case. In addition, it might be appropriate
for the legislature to provide for disqualification in certain cases at
346
least for some period of years.
346. TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 90 (1967) (footnote
omitted) (analyzing the American corrections system in 1967 and recommending
AND
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This Part will consider and elaborate on the task force’s
recommendation, suggesting ways in which jurisdictions can treat
felon jurors more sensibly. The simplest approach, followed by ten
347
states, is to allow felons to serve on juries after they have been
released from prison or completed their sentences. The discussion
that follows considers some intermediate alternatives.
A. Individualized Treatment of Crimes
Blanket felon exclusion considers that there is something inherent
in a felony—any felony—that makes one who is convicted of it unfit
for jury service. This conclusion is permissible as a matter of law, but
it lacks appeal as a matter of fact. To be sure, certain felonies may be
so heinous that heavy stigma and civic exclusion are appropriate. But
most felonies are not even serious enough to warrant
348
imprisonment.
If the same act could be charged either as a
misdemeanor or a felony, a state could just as easily err on the side of
inclusion as exclusion. A state could also tie the length of exclusion
to the length of a sentence, so that short sentences allowed for
relatively swift restoration of jury eligibility.
Perhaps too, a jurisdiction could distinguish between violent and
non-violent crimes, victimizing and victimless crimes, malum in se and
malum prohibitum, deceptive versus non-deceptive felonies, or
repeated versus first-time offenses. In each case, it could elect to
make only the former a ground for disqualification. Alternatively,
different categories could be paired with different terms of exclusion:
zero, life, or any number of years in between. The point is not that
one or another of these distinctions should be made. Rather, the
point is that more jurisdictions should be willing to consider making
349
such distinctions in the first place.

future changes).
347. See infra Appendix 1.A (detailing how each U. S. jurisdiction addresses felon
exclusion from jury service).
348. See supra note 322 (noting that the majority of felons are not imprisoned); cf.
Note, supra note 28, at 411 (noting that minor felonies may not “indicate
irredeemable moral turpitude”).
349. Generally, states that make distinctions do so to extend exclusion to specified
misdemeanors, not to eliminate its application to specified felonies. See infra note
435 and accompanying text. That said, one state does carve out more liberal
treatment for first-time offenders. See infra note 378 (noting Arizona’s statute that
grants automatic restoration of civil rights to first-time felons). States also must be
careful that they use neutral considerations, given the historical use of racist
distinctions. See infra text accompanying notes 563-64.
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B. Individualized Treatment of Criminals
Even if a jurisdiction is not willing to rely wholly on voir dire to
screen felon jurors, each step in the criminal justice process provides
an opportunity to filter out felons who do not need to be excluded
per se from juries. A state could decide to require a prosecutor to
recommend exclusion—in effect, a charge of conduct unbecoming a
citizen—before that disability could be imposed. A sentencing judge
could decide to impose exclusion—in effect, a conviction for conduct
unbecoming a citizen, with a “sentence” of variable length depending
350
on the extent to which the conduct was unbecoming. A parole or
probation authority could determine, based on its personal file on a
particular offender, whether and when he should be able to be
readmitted to the citizenry.
None of this is inconsistent with the idea that felon exclusion is a
351
means of defending the jury rather than punishing the felon.
A
state still must decide whom it is defending the jury from. A state
might decide that all felons pose a threat to all juries, or that none
do, but it can just as easily make an individualized determination—
along with the others it already makes—that some offenders do and
others do not.
Governors and pardon boards are already involved in the
enterprise of redeeming the most earnest and worthy felons, but
352
clemency is typically reserved for exceptional or unusual cases. The
everyday job of determining who should be punished and how, or
who is fit for jury service, belongs to the courts and its representatives
in the parole and probation system. If a state believes that felon
exclusion should be the rule with rare exception, then relying on
clemency may be appropriate. But if a state believes that every freed
felon should be judged for readmission as a citizen, it should expand
its consideration beyond the clemency process.

350. See Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5, at 154 (“Sentencing
courts should announce all collateral consequences publicly and factor them into the
overall sentence.”); Grant et al., supra note 3, at 1235-36 (arguing that civil disabilities
“should be imposed only when a convict’s offenses bear a direct relationship to the
functions and responsibilities of the right or privilege”); see also infra notes 403
(excluding persons from jury service in Nebraska when they have been convicted of a
felony in another state and incarcerated after the conviction) and 421 (excluding
felons from jury service in Vermont only if they were incarcerated after a felony
conviction); cf. Demleitner, Continuing Payment, supra note 5, at 760-61 (discussing
the German system of deciding whether to disenfranchise a felon on a case-by-case
basis as a part of the individual sentencing decision).
351. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
352. See infra note 451 and accompanying text.
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C. Individualized Treatment of Trials
Even if all felonies and all felons were the same, all trials are not.
The core of the jury selection system is individualized, because any
generally qualified juror might be unfit to serve in a particular case.
Even if, hypothetically, most felons would be struck for cause because
they exhibit anti-government bias or anti-social tendencies, this may
still leave others who would not be struck. More directly, a felon
might be too biased to sit for one kind of case, such as one involving
353
either the same crime that he himself was convicted of or the same
arresting officer, but perfectly fine to sit for another, like a simple
354
civil case.
Distinguishing between types of trials, therefore, makes sense.
Unless a state can justify a total ban, felons should only be excluded
from those cases where they are not fit to serve. Luckily, the usual
jury selection process is designed to make that determination. Where
total bans are rejected, felons should be allowed the chance to get at
least to voir dire, where the relevance of their criminal conviction to
their fitness for jury service can be assessed by the court and the
355
parties. If a state believes that most felons will be unfit, it need only
make a criminal conviction the basis of a challenge for cause, which
would still allow the judge to make an individual determination on
356
service.
If it believes that many felons will be unfit, it can make
felons challengeable for cause if other criteria (like a connection
between the crime committed and the issue in the current trial) are
357
met.
D. Waiting for Recidivism
A final avenue for fine tuning felon exclusion involves recidivism.
Some states may accept the faults of lifetime exclusion but be
353. Cf. Crockett v. State, 38 Ala. 387, 387 (1862) (following a state statute to
uphold exclusion in a murder trial where the prospective juror had been indicted
within the past year of assault with intent to commit murder).
354. See infra notes 413 (restoring more quickly a felon’s right to serve on civil
juries than criminal juries in Oregon) and 419 (excluding some misdemeanants
from criminal juries but not from civil juries in Texas).
355. See Singer, supra note 3, at 245 (suggesting that the disclosure of a would-be
juror’s criminal history is preferable to an outright ban on felons serving on juries).
356. See, e.g., infra notes 389 (discussing Illinois’s lenient standard of allowing
felons to be dismissed for cause during voir dire), 391 (noting that in Iowa, a felony
conviction is cause for dismissal during voir dire in both civil and criminal trials),
and 397 (reviewing Massachusetts statute allowing courts to strike jurors on the basis
of past felony convictions).
357. Cf. supra note 344 and accompanying text (discussing occupational licensing
statutes that disqualify felons only if the crime is related to the occupation for which
the license is sought).
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disturbed by high recidivism rates. Indeed, some put a time limit on
felon exclusion, excluding recently released felons from juries but
358
A
acknowledging that they can eventually rejoin the community.
larger number of states achieve a similar effect by allowing felons on
juries only after they have successfully completed their terms of
359
parole or probation.
The recidivism justification is compelling when one considers that
360
most incarcerated felons return to prison within three years. If an
individual who is excluded from jury service is more than likely to redisqualify himself, there is less reason to hurry to lift the exclusion.
On the other hand, the argument that felons should be barred from
juries because they are, as a group, likely to re-offend seems
incompatible with notions of due process and the individual
presumption of innocence. Any other group singled out for
exclusion on the basis of a high probability that its members will
361
commit crimes in the future would have a valid complaint.
But
felons are excluded from jury service while in prison; the issue is
362
when to permit them to serve again. There is a difference between
excluding an individual and refusing to re-include him.
Therefore, providing a minimum wait to regain juror eligibility
363
after completion of a sentence may make sense.
States could
358. See, e.g., infra notes 382 (excluding felons from jury service in Connecticut for
up to seven years), 384 (excluding felons from jury service in D.C. for ten years), 392
(excluding felons from jury service in Kansas for up to ten years), 397 (excluding
felons from jury service in Massachusetts for up to seven years), and 413 (excluding
felons from service on criminal juries in Oregon for fifteen years).
359. See infra notes 377 (Alaska), 378 (Arizona), 388 (Idaho), 390 (Indiana), 392
(Kansas), 399 (Minnesota), 409 (North Carolina), 415 (Rhode Island), 417 (South
Dakota), and 425 (Wisconsin). Most parolees do not successfully complete their
terms. See A Stigma That Never Fades, supra note 313, at 26 (reporting that only 42% of
parolees successfully completed their parole in 1999).
360. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 7 (2002) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
1994] (reporting that 67.5% of prisoners released in 1994 were re-arrested within
three years, and more than half were sent to prison either for new convictions or
parole or probation violations), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
rpr94.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
361. See Mark H. Moore, Purblind Justice: Normative Issues in the Use of Prediction in
the Criminal Justice System, in 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS”, supra note
216, at 314, 317-18 (discussing the problems and benefits of identifying proper
variables upon which to rely in predicting future criminal behavior).
362. But see infra notes 381 (providing no exclusion of prisoners from petit juries
in Colorado) and 395 (allowing, in theory, felons currently incarcerated in Maine to
serve on juries).
363. See Grant et al., supra note 3, at 1239 & n.402 (recommending that felons’
civil rights be restored within a maximum of five years of their release from
incarceration). England and Wales have a system that relies on fixed terms. See
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5, at 162 (describing the English
model of automatic restoration of civil rights for some felons after a fixed waiting
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determine the length of the wait by seeking the point at which a
felon, having not yet committed a new offense, is not appreciably
more likely to do so than is anyone else.
Unfortunately, there are probably not enough data extant to make
such a determination very precisely. The most comprehensive recent
study on recidivism was the Department of Justice’s study of prisoners
364
released in 1994. That study found that 68% of the prisoners were
rearrested within three years, 47% were reconvicted, and 25% were
365
re-sentenced to prison. In addition, another 27% were imprisoned
for parole or probation violations, meaning that more than half were
366
back in prison within three years.
These figures did not differ
367
The
much from a previous study conducted on 1983 releases.
timing of recidivism is telling, but not altogether clear. The
incidence rises steeply in the first two years and begins to level off by
368
the third year.
The study does not provide data after three years,
and the curve does not level off completely at that point, though
there is some reason to believe that it would have flattened
369
significantly after five years.
Some recidivism undoubtedly occurs
after three years, but in the absence of firm data, drawing the line at
three to five years seems reasonable.
period); Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending
Convictions, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 602 (1997) (describing the English system of
excluding from jury service for life convicts sentenced to over five years
imprisonment and excluding all other convicts from jury service for ten years).
364. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, supra note 360 (tracking the rearrest rates
of prisoners released from U. S. prisons in 1994).
365. Id. at 1, 7.
366. Id.
367. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 1983, at 1 (1989) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1983]
(reporting that of prisoners released in 1983, within three years 63% were rearrested,
47% were reconvicted, and 41% were returned to prison), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf (on file with the American
University Law Review).
368. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, supra note 360, at 3 (noting that, of
criminals released in 1994, 59% had been rearrested within two years and 68% had
been rearrested within three years); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1983, supra note
367, at 3 (reporting that, of criminals released in 1983, 55% had been rearrested
within two years and 63% had been rearrested within three years).
369. Recidivism is generally measured based on a one- to five-year observation
period. 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS”, supra note 216, at 27. One
study tracked criminals for six years and found that the recidivism rate continued to
increase through the sixth year, although the rate of increase decelerated over time.
See Peter B. Hoffman & Barbara Stone-Meierhoefer, Reporting Recidivism Rates, 8 J.
CRIM. JUST. 53, 57 (1980). The annual increments of increase in the rates of
reconviction from year one to year six were 15%, 10%, 7%, 4%, 3%, and 3%. Id. In
Uggen et al., supra note 178, at 2, the authors derive a trend line from Hoffman and
Meierhoefer to calculate ten-year and fifty-year recidivism rates, though they appear
not to have taken life cycle data into account, which might cause them to overstate
recidivism among elderly ex-criminals.
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A more individualized waiting period may be provided by
probation and parole. These may be part of a felon’s sentence, and
even if they are applied in cookie-cutter fashion, they provide an
individual test of the felon’s ability to stay “clean.” Because they also
represent continued constraints on everyday life, continuing civic
restrictions in the mean time is less inappropriate. The end of a term
of parole or probation is a symbolic (if not always accurate)
declaration that the felon is now fit to rejoin society without
restrictions.
To be sure, using probation and parole as the backstop is not
perfect. Almost twenty percent of prisoners are released without any
term of supervised release because they were either ineligible or
adjudged unworthy, neither of which are good criteria for allowing
370
an immediate return to jury service.
Why such offenders should
enjoy restored rights sooner than offenders on parole or probation is
unclear. In such cases, a mandatory minimum term of exclusion
after release might be appropriate.
It is worth considering, then, that felons be excluded while on
parole or probation, and/or for a fixed term of three to five years
after the expiration of their sentence. The number of felons who
return to prison during that time may be too high to justify ending
their exclusion any earlier. Then again, it might not; individual states
should consider the question carefully and decide accordingly.
CONCLUSION
371

Lifetime felon exclusion is the majority rule in the United States.
It affects an estimated thirteen million people and about thirty
372
percent of black men.
Though its historical roots are deep, those
roots reflect notions of narrow juries and scarce felons that are alien
to our current system; recent history has transformed felon exclusion
373
into something too novel to be justified by its long practice.
Admittedly, one would be hard pressed to argue that the biggest
problem facing the American legal system is that our juries do not
have enough felons on them. Moreover, felon exclusion is probably
acceptable under current constitutional law. But this reveals the flaws
370. See PETERSILIA, supra note 307, at 59, 73-74 (discussing the unintended
negative consequences of unsupervised release).
371. See infra Appendix 1.A (reviewing the duration of felon exclusion from jury
service in all United States jurisdictions).
372. See infra Appendix 2 (discussing the number of people who are excluded
from jury service as felons).
373. See infra Appendix 3 (detailing the history of the exclusion of felons and
other socially undesirable people from juries in England and the United States).
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of recent doctrine more than the virtues of excluding felons. Those
virtues—a jury with enhanced probity, free from people who
probably hate the government and have cast themselves out of
society—are reasonable enough to be legal, but are flawed enough to
warrant more serious debate. In a system of otherwise inclusive jury
venires and carefully selected jury panels, casting out every felon in
every case, forever, is excessive. This is evident from the fact that the
jury system still functions in the minority of states that allow felons to
serve, and in the majority that do not, but allow felon-tainted verdicts
to stand.
While a successful campaign has been waged against felon
disenfranchisement, felon exclusion has been largely ignored.
Whether or not it should continue as the majority rule is a matter on
which reasonable minds can disagree, but not one that they should
ignore any longer.
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APPENDIX 1: FELON EXCLUSION STATUTES
Most jurisdictions bar felons from juries for life, but many do not.
Jurisdictions apply a patchwork of standards of different durations,
applied to different crimes and to different kinds of juries.
Jurisdictions also vary in their treatment of foreign convictions,
clemency, and pending charges, and their methods of resolving
errors in application. This Appendix will survey the diversity of
approaches to felon exclusion.
A. Duration of Exclusion
The following list categorizes the duration of felon exclusion in the
fifty states, the District of Columbia, and federal courts. Exclusion
laws ban felons from juries either for life, during sentence or
supervision (prison, parole, and probation), during imprisonment, or
some combination thereof. Many “life” states bar felons unless civil
rights have been restored, but have broad restoration provisions.
Others make restoration automatic; for such states, felon exclusion is
374
not listed as lifelong.
375
FEDERAL: Life
376
ALABAMA: Life
377
ALASKA: During supervision
374. Some “automatic” restorations of rights are not actually automatic. In Texas,
for example, an eligible felon must actually apply for a discharge, and if he fails to do
so, the state can continue to bar him from jury service. See Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d
270, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (rejecting a challenge to the exclusion of a juror
who had not applied for an order of discharge).
375. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000) (disqualifying from grand and petit juries
anyone who “has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been
convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored”).
376. See ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (1995) (qualifying for jury service only one who
“is generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and is esteemed in the community
for integrity, good character and sound judgment” and who “[h]as not lost the right
to vote by conviction for any offense involving moral turpitude”), § 12-16-150(5)
(allowing challenges for cause if juror “has been convicted of a felony”); ALA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 182 (disqualifying from voting “those who shall be convicted of treason,
murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, receiving stolen
property, obtaining property or money under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of
perjury, robbery, assault with intent to rob, burglary, forgery, bribery, assault and
battery on the wife, bigamy, living in adultery, sodomy, incest, rape, miscegenation,
crime against nature, or any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary,
or of any infamous crime or crime involving moral turpitude”). Alabama also
disqualifies those with pending felony charges, or charges for “an offense of the same
character as that with which the defendant is charged.” ALA. CODE § 12-16-150(3)
(1995).
377. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.020(2) (Michie 2002) (disqualifying from jury
service anyone who “has been convicted of a felony for which the person has not
been unconditionally discharged”), § 33.30.241 (excluding felons from jury service
until they have been unconditionally discharged), § 12.55.185(15) (defining
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ARIZONA: Life (repeat offenders) or during sentence (first
378
offenders)
379
ARKANSAS: Life
380
CALIFORNIA: Life
381
COLORADO: No exclusion for petit juries; life for grand juries
During incarceration or seven years from
CONNECTICUT:
382
conviction, whichever is longer
383
DELAWARE: Life
384
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: During supervision plus ten years
385
FLORIDA: Life
386
GEORGIA: Life
unconditional discharge as release from imprisonment, parole, and probation).
378. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904(A)(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2002)
(suspending the jury service “right” upon felony conviction), § 21-201(3)
(disqualifying from grand or petit jury service those “convicted of a felony, unless
[their] civil rights have been restored”), § 13-912(A) (restoring “automatically” firsttime offenders’ civil rights after completion of sentence).
379. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102(a)(4)-(5) (Michie 1999) (disqualifying from
grand or petit jury service those “who have been convicted of a felony and have not
been pardoned” and those “who are not of good character or approved integrity, are
lacking in sound judgment or reasonable information, are intemperate, or are not of
good behavior”).
380. See CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 8(b) (requiring legislature to make laws “to
exclude persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other
high crimes . . . from serving on juries”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203(a)(5) (West
Supp. 2003) (disqualifying from jury service those “who have been convicted of
malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights have not been restored”).
381. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-105(3) (2002) (disqualifying “prospective grand
juror[s]” who have “previously been convicted of a felony” but not mentioning petit
jurors). Colorado disqualified felons from petit and grand jury service until 1989.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 78-1-1 (1963) (repealed 1989); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY,
supra note 328, at 33 (describing changes in Colorado law).
382. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-217(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003) (disqualifying
from jury service anyone who “has been convicted of a felony within the past seven
years or is a defendant in a pending felony case or is in the custody of the
Commissioner of Correction”).
383. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4509(b)(6) (1999) (disqualifying from jury
service “[c]onvicted felons who have not had their civil rights restored”).
384. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1906(b)(2)(B) (2001) (disqualifying felons from jury
service for “not less than one year after the completion of the term of incarceration,
probation, or parole”), § 11-1904(a) (delegating power to promulgate a specific jury
plan to the Board of Judges of the Superior Court); JURY PLAN FOR THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 7(f) (1988) (requalifying felons for jury
service “ten years after the completion of their entire sentence, including
incarceration, probation and parole”).
385. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.013(1) (Harrison 1998) (disqualifying from jury
service those “under prosecution for any crime,” and those convicted anywhere “of
bribery, forgery, perjury, larceny, or any other offense that is a felony in this state or
which if it had been committed in this state would be a felony, unless restored to civil
rights”).
386. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-60(b)(2) (Harrison 1998) (disqualifying from
grand juries anyone “who has been convicted of a felony and . . . not been pardoned
or had his or her civil rights restored”), § 15-12-120 (stating that petit jurors are
selected “in the same manner that grand juries are drawn”), § 15-12-163(b)(5)
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387

HAWAII: Life
388
IDAHO: During supervision
389
ILLINOIS: Challengeable for cause (for life)
390
INDIANA: During sentence
391
IOWA: Challengeable for cause (for life)
During supervision or ten years from conviction,
KANSAS:
392
whichever is longer.
(stating a basis for challenge for cause if a “juror has been convicted of a felony in a
federal court or any court of a state of the United States and the juror’s civil rights
have not been restored”), § 17-7-95(c) (specifying that conviction based on nolo
contendere plea does not disqualify one from service); see also 1983 Ga. Op. Att’y
Gen. 69 (No. 83-33), available at 1983 WL 41667, *4 (stating that “the qualifications
for serving on a trial jury are the same as for service on a grand jury”).
387. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 612-4(b)(2) (Michie 2002) (disqualifying from
jury service those “convicted of a felony in a state or federal court and not
pardoned”).
388. See IDAHO CODE § 18-310(1) (Michie 2002) (specifying suspension of civil
rights during incarceration and restoration of “all civil rights that are not political”
during parole or probation). Although jury service arguably is a civil right and not a
political right, political rights are “consistent with direct or indirect participation in
establishing or administering government,” which would seem to include jury
service. 1986 Idaho Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (No. 86-16), available at 1986 WL 193894, *3
(giving as examples of political rights “the right of sufferage [sic], the right to hold
public office, and the right of petition,” as opposed to merely civil rights such as
“property, marriage, contract, protection of law, etc.”); see also supra text
accompanying note 135.
389. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/2-3 (West 1999) (requiring jurors to be
“[f]ree from all legal exception, of fair character, of approved integrity, of sound
judgment”). It appears that a felony conviction will satisfy this standard, but that the
ultimate decision to exclude is within the discretion of the trial judge. See People v.
Gil, 608 N.E.2d 197, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that “[a] venire person may be
excused for cause where he or she has been previously charged with various crimes”)
(citing People v. Seaman, 561 N.E.2d 188, 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)); see also
Telephone Interview by Jane Edwards with Barbara Maddex, Jury Commissioner,
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Lake County, Ill. (May 28, 2003) (indicating that
potential jurors with recent or extensive criminal histories are automatically excused
on request); cf. HAZEL B. KERPER & JANEEN KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED
34 & n.132 (1974) (characterizing Illinois standard as equivalent to barring those
with criminal records); John F. Decker, Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction in
Illinois, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731, 741 (1980) (summarizing the more lenient
interpretation, which did not bar felons from jury service, in place prior to the
Seaman decision).
390. See IND. CODE § 33-4-5-7(b)(4) (Lexis 1998) (disqualifying from jury service
anyone “under a sentence imposed for an offense”), § 33-5.5-11(b)(4) (disqualifying
felons whose rights are not restored); see also United States v. Brown, 235 F. Supp. 2d
931, 934 n.6 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (clarifying that disqualification includes probationary
period, and that restoration of rights implicitly occurs with expiration of sentence).
This statute would seem to disqualify misdemeanants as well.
391. See IOWA CODE ANN. R. 1.915(6)(a) (West 2002) (making a civil juror
challengeable for cause for “[c]onviction of a felony”), R. 2.18(5)(a) (making a
criminal juror challengeable for cause for “previous conviction of . . . a felony”).
392. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4615(1)-(2) (2002) (disqualifying from jury service
any “person who has been convicted in any state or federal court of a felony” until he
“has completed the terms of the authorized sentence”), § 43-158(c) (“excus[ing]
from jury service” anyone convicted “within 10 years immediately preceding”). In
Kansas, a felon is not discharged from parole or probation until he applies for a
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393

KENTUCKY: Life
394
LOUISIANA: Life
395
MAINE: No exclusion
396
MARYLAND: Life
During incarceration or seven years from
MASSACHUSETTS:
397
conviction, whichever is longer; removable for cause for life
certificate of discharge, which he cannot do until a year after the end of parole or
probation. Id. § 22-3722.
393. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.080(2)(e) (Banks-Baldwin 2002) (disqualifying
from jury service one who “[h]as been previously convicted of a felony and has not
been pardoned or received a restoration of civil rights”).
394. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 401(A)(5) (West 2003) (disqualifying from
criminal jury service one “convicted of a felony for which he has not been pardoned”
or “under indictment for a felony”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3041 (West 1991)
(incorporating criminal standard by reference for civil juries). The Louisiana
Constitution provides that “[f]ull rights of citizenship shall be restored upon
termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for any offense.”
LA. CONST. art. I, § 20. However, jury service is not considered a “right of citizenship”
for these purposes. See State v. Haynes, 514 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (La. App. 1987)
(explaining inapplicability of art. I, § 20 to jury service).
395. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1211 (West 2003) (providing
disqualifications for jury service, none of which refer to criminal history). This does
not necessarily permit criminals to serve on Maine juries. As one court official from
Maine explained: “Although [incarcerated criminals] could be bound over day to
day until they are free from incarceration, it is logical to excuse them from service
for this term. Again, [it is] up to the individual judge.” E-mail from Connie
Fletcher, Judicial Secretary, Cumberland County (Maine) Superior Court, to Jeff
Jocks, researcher at Michigan State University-DCL College of Law (June 28, 2002)
(on file with the American University Law Review).
396. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-207(b)(5) (2002) (excluding from
jury service one charged with or convicted of “crime punishable by a fine of more
than $500, or by imprisonment for more than six months,” who has received such a
sentence, “and has not been pardoned”). Maryland law contains several other
provisions disqualifying jurors. In sum, Maryland excludes:
(1) Felons and misdemeanants sentenced to more than six months or fined more
than $500. Id.
(2) Others with lesser sentences convicted of lying on a jury form, MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-207(b)(6) (2002), or jury bribery, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 9-202(c) (2002).
(3) Others who have lost their right to vote which, in addition to the offenses already
mentioned, may be for “theft or other infamous crime” if the offender is either
under criminal supervision or is a repeat offender, or for “buying or selling votes.”
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-207(b)(1) (2002) (excluding from jury service
those who lack the right to vote); see MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102(b) (2002)
(excluding criminals specified above from voting). “Infamous crimes” probably
comprise common-law felonies, treason, and crimen falsi such as perjury,
embezzlement, theft, and fraud. See State v. Giddens, 642 A.2d 870, 874 & n.5 (Md.
1994) (defining infamous crimes and crimen falsi in the context of a rule for
impeaching witnesses).
397. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234A, § 4(7) (West 2000) (disqualifying from
grand or petit jury service one who “has been convicted of a felony within the past
seven years or is a defendant in pending felony case or is in the custody of a
correctional institution”), ch. 234, § 8 (allowing the “justice holding court” to relieve
or strike jurors “convicted of any felony” or “guilty of gross immorality”). Oddly, a
Massachusetts criminal sentenced to life and paroled after ten years can serve on a
jury the day he leaves prison, while a small-time drug dealer sentenced to two years of
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MICHIGAN: Life (effective October 2003)
399
MINNESOTA: During sentence
400
MISSISSIPPI: Life
401
MISSOURI: Life
402
MONTANA: Life
403
NEBRASKA: Life
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398

probation must wait for five years after his probation expires before he is eligible to
serve. See United States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (asserting that
“[s]ome might think it odd that a felon still on parole should be seated on a jury”).
Of course, the judge can still dismiss our hypothetical parolee for cause sua sponte.
398. See Act of Dec. 30, 2002, Pub. L. No. 739, 2002 Mich. Legis. Serv. 739 (West)
(effective Oct. 1, 2003) (amending MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1307a to disqualify
felons convicted in any jurisdiction from jury service for life). Though the official
legislative history contains no evidence, one commentator described this new
legislation as “[a] late add-on” to legislation raising juror pay. Just Wage for Justice,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 7, 2003, at A6, available at 2003 WL 4839862. Michigan’s
previous system disqualified only those “under sentence of felony at the time of jury
selection,” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1307a(1)(e), though felons could be excluded
for cause for life in criminal cases. See Froede v. Holland Ladder & Mfg., 523 N.W.2d
849, 852 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
399. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02(5)(1)(2) (West Supp. 2003) (making felon jurors
challengeable for cause in criminal cases unless rights have been restored); MINN.
GEN. R. PRAC. 808(b)(6) (West 1993) (qualifying for jury service convicted felons who
have had their civil rights restored); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.165(2) (West 1987)
(restoring rights “[u]pon expiration of sentence”).
400. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2002) (qualifying for jury service only those who
have “not been convicted of an infamous crime, or the unlawful sale of intoxicating
liquors within a period of five years”), § 1-3-19 (defining “infamous crime” as a
felony). It is possible to interpret section 13-5-1 as restoring the right to serve on a
jury five years after the conviction. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328,
at 81 (permitting the restoration of the right to serve on a jury as long as the
individual is either a qualified elector or a resident freeholder). Mississippi courts,
however, apparently do not. See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 687 So. 2d 146, 148 (Miss.
1997) (citing section 13-5-1 as establishing simply that “persons convicted of
‘infamous crimes’ are not competent to serve on juries”). In either case, section 135-1 also excludes from jury service those who are not “qualified elector[s],” and the
Mississippi Constitution disenfranchises those convicted of “murder, rape, bribery,
theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery,
embezzlement or bigamy.” MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241.
401. See MO. REV. STAT. § 494.425(4) (1996) (disqualifying from grand or petit jury
service “[a]ny person who has been convicted of a felony, unless such person has
been restored to his civil rights”), § 561.026(3) (providing that a person convicted of
a felony “shall be forever disqualified from serving as a juror”). The latter statutory
language is apparently not as absolute as it sounds. See id. comment to 1973
proposed code (clarifying that a pardon would restore a jury right).
402. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-303(2) (2001) (declaring incompetent to serve
on a jury anyone “who has been convicted of malfeasance in office or any felony or
other high crime”). But see § 46-18-801(1) (requiring civil disabilities imposed on
convicts either to come from the state constitution or to be “specifically enumerated
by the sentencing judge as a necessary condition of the sentence directed toward the
objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of society,” and if the latter, to be
restored upon expiration of the sentence). One source indicates, without citation,
that the Montana Attorney General has advised that “the right to sit on a jury [is]
restored only by a pardon.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328, at 86.
403. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601(f) (1995) (disqualifying from grand or petit jury
service “persons who have been convicted of a criminal offense punishable by
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404

NEVADA: Life
405
NEW HAMPSHIRE: Life
406
NEW JERSEY: Life
407
NEW MEXICO: Life
408
NEW YORK: Life
409
NORTH CAROLINA: During supervision
410
NORTH DAKOTA: During incarceration
411
OHIO: Life
imprisonment in a Department of Correctional Services adult correctional facility,
when such conviction has not been set aside or a pardon issued”), § 29-112
(declaring incompetent for jury service “[a]ny person sentenced to be punished for
any felony, when sentence shall not have been reversed or annulled”), § 25-113
(barring those convicted in other jurisdictions and actually imprisoned from jury
service). At one time, Nebraska restored civil rights automatically upon the
completion of one’s sentence, but it changed that practice when it amended section
83-1,118 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes in 2002. See L.B. 1054, 97th Leg., 2d Sess.
§ 28 (Neb. 2002) (providing that restoration of civil rights requires an application
and hearing before the Board of Pardons).
404. See NEV. REV. STAT. 6.010 (2001) (qualifying for jury service those “who ha[ve]
not been convicted of treason, felony, or other infamous crime”).
405. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:7-a(V) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that “[a]
juror shall not have been convicted of any felony which has not been annulled”).
This law became effective in 1999. Id. history. Previously, New Hampshire placed no
restrictions on felons, either before or after incarceration, though trial judges could
exclude a felon sua sponte. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328, at 92
(describing previous law); Burton et al., supra note 28, at 52 (describing the
discretionary power of the court).
406. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1(e) (West 2002) (requiring that jurors “shall not
have been convicted of any indictable offense under the laws of this State, another
state, or the United States”). Between 1995 and 1997, New Jersey allowed felons to
serve on juries after they had completed their sentences. See id. Assembly Judiciary
Committee statement (indicating that the statute removed the per se disqualification
any person serving a sentence); Senate O.K.’s Girgenti Bill to Bar Convicted Criminals
From Jury Duty, THE ITALIAN VOICE, Mar. 7, 1996, at 1, available at 1996 WL 15721471
(explaining the concerns underlying restoration of the exclusion, including citizens’
aversion to “go[ing] down to the courthouse and find[ing] convicted criminals
sitting next to them in the jury box”).
407. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-1 (Michie 1998) (requiring for jury service
eligibility that one “is not a convicted felon”).
408. See N.Y. JUD. § 510(3) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2003) (qualifying for jury
service those not convicted of a felony).
409. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (2002) (qualifying for jury service persons who “have
not been convicted of a felony . . . or if convicted . . . have had their citizenship
restored pursuant to law”), § 13-1 (restoring rights automatically upon unconditional
discharge from prison, parole, or probation).
410. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-08(2)(e) (Supp. 2001) (disqualifying from jury
service anyone who “[h]as lost the right to vote because of imprisonment in the
penitentiary . . . or conviction of a criminal offense which by special provision of law
disqualified the prospective juror for such service”), § 12.1-33-01(1)(a) (1997)
(specifying that felons cannot vote while incarcerated). Until 1993, North Dakota
made felons challengeable for cause for life. See City of Mandan v. Baer, 578 N.W.2d
559, 563 (N.D. 1998) (describing legislative changes that allowed felons to serve on
juries after incarceration).
411. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (Anderson 1996) (declaring “[a] person
convicted of a felony under the laws of this or any other state or the United States . . .
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412

OKLAHOMA: Life
OREGON: During incarceration plus fifteen years (criminal and
413
grand juries) or during incarceration (civil juries)
414
PENNSYLVANIA: Life
415
RHODE ISLAND: During supervision
416
SOUTH CAROLINA: Life
417
SOUTH DAKOTA: During supervision
418
TENNESSEE: Life
419
TEXAS: Life
incompetent to be . . . [a] juror”).
412. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 28(B)(6) (1999) (deeming unqualified for jury
service “[p]ersons who have been convicted of any felony” if not “fully restored to his
or her civil rights”).
413. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 45(1)(a)-(b) (restricting criminal and grand jury
service to those not convicted of or serving sentences for a felony within the last
fifteen years, or convicted of a “misdemeanor involving violence or dishonesty”
within last five years); OR. REV. STAT. § 10.030(2)(d) (2001) (declaring ineligible for
civil juries one who has had rights and privileges withdrawn pursuant to
section 137.281(1)(a), (7), which provides for the loss of the right/privilege to serve
on a jury until “discharge[] or parole[] from imprisonment,” at which point the
right/privilege is “restored automatically”). The constitutional provision was
adopted by a citizen initiative in 1999. OR. CONST. art. I, § 45(1), historical notes. A
similar initiative was passed in 1996 but voided on a technicality. See Armatta v.
Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49, 51 (Or. 1998) (striking down 1996 initiative).
414. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4502(a)(3) (West 1981 & Supp. 2002)
(disqualifying from jury service one who “has been convicted of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year and has not been granted a pardon or
amnesty therefor”).
415. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-9-1.1(c) (Supp. 2002) (barring from jury service one
“convicted of a felony . . . until completion of such felon’s sentence, served or
suspended, and of parole or probation”).
416. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-810(1) (Supp. 2002) (disqualifying from jury
service anyone “convicted in a state or federal court of record of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year and [whose] civil rights have not been
restored by pardon or amnesty”).
417. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-13-10 (Michie Supp. 2002) (declaring ineligible
for jury service “[a]ny person who has been convicted of a felony unless restored to
civil rights”), § 23A-27-35 (declaring the right to serve on a jury “suspend[ed]”
during “sentence of imprisonment”), § 24-15A-6 (mandating that a prisoner be
either imprisoned or under parole supervision for “total sentence length”). But see
DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328, at 122 (stating that felon exclusion in South
Dakota is only during incarceration).
418. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-102(a) (1994) (declaring incompetent to serve as
jurors those convicted of “certain infamous offenses, specially designated in this
code,” theft, “perjury or subornation of perjury,” as well as “[p]ersons of unsound
mind and habitual drunkards”). While it is unclear what is meant by “certain”
infamous offenses, all felons are treated as infamous. See id. § 40-20-112 (stating that
“[u]pon conviction for any felony, it shall be the judgment of the court that the
defendant be infamous”); Tennessee v. Bishop, No. 01C01-9309-CR-0033, 1994 WL
474874, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 1994) (holding that “[f]elons are rendered
infamous and are disqualified from service on a jury”).
419. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.102(7) (Vernon 1998) (disqualifying from
petit jury service all but those “not . . . convicted of a felony”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 19.08(4)-(5) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (disqualifying from grand jury service
those convicted of or indicted for “theft or of any felony”), 35.16(a) (disqualifying
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420

UTAH: Life
421
VERMONT: Life
422
VIRGINIA: Life
WASHINGTON: During supervision (life if committed before July
423
1984)
424
WEST VIRGINIA: Life
425
WISCONSIN: During sentence
426
WYOMING: Life
Thus the clear majority rule, used by the federal government and
thirty-one states, is to exclude felons from juries for life, unless their
427
rights have been restored pursuant to discretionary clemency rules.
from petit criminal jury those convicted of or indicted for “theft or . . . any felony”).
There is currently a dispute under Texas law regarding the restoration of the right
to serve. The law, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 2003),
gives trial courts the power to restore the rights of worthy felons sentenced to
community supervision. See Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815, 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (citing law). In 1994, however, a panel of the Texas Court of Appeals held
that the statute conflicted with the state constitution’s exclusive grant of the pardon
power to the executive branch. R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. App.
1994). Subsequently, other panels have disagreed. See, e.g., Hoffman v. State, 922
S.W.2d 663, 668 (Tex. App. 1996) (providing a list of cases differing from the
holding in Glenn).
420. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-7(2) (2002) (declaring incompetent for jury
service anyone “who has been convicted of a felony that has not been expunged”).
421. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 962(5) (Lexis 1999) (declaring qualified for jury
service those who “ha[ve] not served a term of imprisonment in this state after
conviction of a felony”).
422. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338(2) (Michie 2000) (disqualifying from jury
service anyone “convicted of treason or a felony”).
423. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.36.070(5) (West Supp. 2003) (declaring
incompetent for jury service anyone “convicted of a felony [who] has not had his or
her civil rights restored”). Disabilities from offenses committed before July 1, 1984
are subject to discretionary restoration. See §§ 9.92.066, 9.95.240, 9.96.050. For postJuly 1, 1984 offenses, restoration is automatic upon completion of one’s sentence,
including parole or probation, with a possibility of early discretionary relief after half
of the term of probation has been completed. Id. § 9.94A.637.
424. See W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b)(6) (2000) (disqualifying from jury service one
“convicted of perjury, false swearing or other infamous offense”); State v. Bongalis,
378 S.E.2d 449, 455 (W. Va. 1989) (holding all felonies “infamous” for jury exclusion
purposes).
425. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 756.02 (West 2001) (disqualifying from jury service
anyone who “has been convicted of a felony and has not had his or her civil rights
restored”), § 304.078 (restoring rights upon completion of sentence).
426. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-102 (Michie 2001) (disqualifying from jury service
any “person who has been convicted of any felony” and not had rights restored).
427. See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT std. 4(e)
(rev. ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA JUROR USE] (barring from jury service felons whose
civil rights have not been restored); MODEL SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS ACT § 4-1002
(1979), cited in 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 169 (1995) (barring felons from jury service for
life); cf. UNIF. JURY SELECTION & SERV. ACT § 8, cited in 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 169 (1995)
(barring felons from juries if they are disqualified as voters). But see MODEL PENAL
CODE § 306.3 (1998) (excluding a convict from jury service only “until he has
satisfied his sentence”); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE std. 23-8.5 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE] (barring jury service only by those
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At the other extreme, two states do not exclude felons as felons from
428
juries at all. Three others allow parties to challenge felons for cause
for life at the discretion of the court, the effect of which obviously
429
varies.
These rules are ultimately a matter of degree: No state
manages to keep all felons off of its juries, and no state lets all of
430
Lifetime disqualification still means that a felon may
them on.
appear on a jury if an error is made, even though errors are common
431
and rarely corrected. On the other extreme, no felon will serve on
a jury unless both parties accede; even with no law mandating
exclusion, either party can still use a peremptory strike.
The remaining states fall somewhere in between. Ten states simply
exclude felons during the time that they are under sentence, under
432
the supervision of the criminal justice system, or in prison.
The
other five jurisdictions provide hybrids of various severity, either
providing different rules for different situations, or using a rule
433
combining penal status and some term of years.
B. Distinctions
The law of felon exclusion touches on several factors.
A
jurisdiction must determine what crimes to include; how to treat
convictions from other jurisdictions; how to treat pardons; whether to
correct erroneous application of the standard; how to treat pending
charges; and whether to distinguish between civil juries, grand juries,
and criminal petit juries. Most of the litigation over felon exclusion
has centered on these technical details rather than on the validity of
434
felon exclusion itself.
1.

Felonies and misdemeanors
Although the focus of this Article is the exclusion of felons from
435
The
jury service, some states also exclude some misdemeanants.
common law traditionally included some misdemeanors in the
currently under criminal supervision).
428. See supra notes 381 (Colorado; petit juries) and 395 (Maine).
429. See supra notes 389 (Illinois), 391 (Iowa), and 397 (Massachusetts).
430. See supra Part II.E and accompanying text (listing common errors made in
jury selection and subsequent jury decisions).
431. See id.
432. See supra notes 377 (Alaska), 388 (Idaho), 390 (Indiana), 399 (Minnesota),
409 (North Carolina), 410 (North Dakota), 415 (Rhode Island), 417 (South Dakota),
423 (Washington), and 425 (Wisconsin).
433. See supra notes 378 (Arizona), 382 (Connecticut), 384 (District of Columbia),
392 (Kansas), and 413 (Oregon).
434. See Grant et al., supra note 3, at 1058 (describing felon exclusion litigation).
435. See supra notes 376 (Alabama), 380 (California), 390 (Indiana), 396
(Maryland), 402 (Montana), 413 (Oregon), 418 (Tennessee), and 419 (Texas).
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category of “infamous crimes” or “moral turpitude,” whose violators
436
437
Some states followed suit,
were deemed unfit for jury service.
though most do not, or else simply equate infamous crimes with
438
felonies.
Some states exclude those who have committed “crimen falsi”—
crimes involving deception, such as fraud or perjury—and maintain
439
that exclusion even if the crimes in question were misdemeanors.
Others specify that particular misdemeanors, such as those involving
violence, theft, or official misconduct, are disqualifying alongside
440
felonies.
Another ambiguity of the generic term “felon” is that a felony
convict may not be sentenced to any imprisonment (indeed, most are
441
not) yet will still be considered a felon.
The typical rule excludes
those convicted of a crime for which the possible sentence included
442
A young adult might plead
imprisonment for at least one year.
guilty to a minor felony, be sentenced only to probation, and
nevertheless be excluded for life from jury service, which is the most
443
extreme result of the majority approach.

436. See Beasley v. State, 96 So. 2d 693, 697 (Ala. App. 1957) (discussing the
common-law history in a decision treating misdemeanor adultery as a disqualifying
crime of moral turpitude).
437. See, e.g., supra notes 376 (Alabama) and 396 (Maryland); State ex rel. Hannon
v. Ryan, 312 N.Y.S.2d 706, 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (describing and approving
systematic exclusion of “individuals convicted of misdemeanors involving moral
turpitude”).
438. See supra notes 400 (Mississippi), 404 (Nevada), 418 (Tennessee), and 424
(West Virginia); see also Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 (1958) (defining a
Fifth Amendment “infamous crime” as one punishable by more than a year in
prison). This reflects a trend that began in the Supreme Court in the late
nineteenth century. See Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 351-52 (1886)
(holding that any crime punishable by imprisonment is infamous); Ex Parte Wilson,
114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885) (ruling that an infamous crime is one punishable by
imprisonment); Grant et al., supra note 3, at 958 (describing the Mackin and Wilson
shift from defining infamy based on crime to defining it based on punishment).
439. See supra notes 385 (Florida), 396 (Maryland), 418 (Tennessee), 424 (West
Virginia).
440. See supra notes 380 (California), 396 (Maryland), 402 (Montana), 413
(Oregon), 418 (Tennessee), 419 (Texas). Some states mention treason distinctly
from felonies, though treason is certainly not a misdemeanor. See supra notes 376
(Alabama), 396 (Maryland), 404 (Nevada), 422 (Virginia).
441. See supra note 322.
442. See, e.g., supra notes 375 (federal), 376 (Alabama), 403 (Nebraska), 414
(Pennsylvania), 416 (South Carolina). But see supra notes 403 (Nebraska), 421
(Vermont) (disqualifying, in some cases, only those actually imprisoned).
443. See Mauer, supra note 5, at 248 (referencing a felon’s loss of the right to vote
even if the felon was never incarcerated for the crime). Consider that in some cases,
however, probation may be a more troublesome sanction than prison. See generally
Joan Petersilia, When Probation Becomes More Dreaded than Prison, 54 FED. PROBATION 23
(1990) (noting that prison sentences can be much shorter than intensive supervision
programs).
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2.

Convictions from other jurisdictions
Generally, states that disqualify felons after release do so regardless
of whether the conviction occurred in that state, another state, or
444
federal court.
This policy creates two difficulties. One such
difficulty, the issue of undoing the effects in one jurisdiction of a
conviction from another, is discussed in Appendix 1.B.3.
The other difficulty occurs when the would-be juror’s crime is a
felony in one jurisdiction, but not in the other. The forum state can
either exclude those convicted of a crime that the convicting
jurisdiction considered a felony, or it can exclude those whose crime
would have been a felony if committed in the forum state. Although
445
the latter practice is not unknown, it is rare.
For a state to exclude someone that it would not have branded a
felon seemingly conflicts with the notion that felon exclusion is
446
supposed to protect juries rather than punish or degrade felons.
This can be explained, however, by the fact that reciprocal treatment
is easier to administer and causes fewer errors. Obtaining proper
answers from prospective jurors to the question “have you ever been
convicted of a felony?” is difficult enough when they know the correct
answer; if a criminal remembers only what the sentencing court
called his crime, or if he lacks a detailed knowledge of the
felony/misdemeanor distinctions in his new state, it is doubly
447
difficult.

444. Some states explicitly provide in their statutes that foreign convictions are
considered. See, e.g., supra notes 375 (federal), 386 (Georgia), 387 (Hawaii), 392
(Kansas), 398 (Michigan), 403 (Nebraska), 406 (New Jersey), and 411 (Ohio).
Others implicitly do because of their requirement of a presidential pardon before
considering a federal felon restored to eligibility. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra
note 328, at 2 n.3 (listing fourteen such states); see also Grant et al., supra note 3, at
961-64 (describing this as the majority approach for civil disabilities). The explicit
exceptions are either outdated or limited in scope. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 338 S.E.2d
269, 271 (Ga. 1986) (holding a person convicted in another state not barred from
grand jury service); supra note 385 (providing that foreign convictions are used in
Florida only if the offense would be a felony in Florida). Compare Wagers v. State, 370
P.2d 567, 570 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962) (stating a broad rule against applying foreign
convictions), with Gann v. State, 397 P.2d 686, 692-93 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964)
(refusing to distinguish between foreign and local convictions for jury qualification).
445. See supra note 385 (Florida); see also State v. Davis, 1896 WL 1598, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. 1896) (holding that a man guilty of a felony in Indiana for stealing
twenty-five dollars could serve on a jury in Ohio, which has a thirty-five dollar
threshold for felonies).
446. See supra note 330 and accompanying text (discussing state interest and
public policy in excluding felons from juries).
447. See supra Part II.E (noting reasons why felons do not disclose criminal
history).
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3.

Restoration of rights
As one pair of commentators declared, “[t]he right to sit on a jury
448
is perhaps the hardest right to regain.”
Processes for restoring
rights vary greatly from state to state in terms of their criteria and
449
their liberality.
Restoration can be more or less routine. Some
states that purport to exclude all felons from jury service for life
simply restore rights automatically upon the completion of a
450
sentence.
Most states, however, require an individual application
451
for a pardon, and grant them very sparingly. Some have excluded
452
felons even when their rights purportedly have been restored.
The thorniest issue concerning restoration of rights stems from the
complicated treatment of convictions from foreign jurisdictions.
Some states maintain that their clemency power does not extend to
foreign convictions, which means only a pardon from the convicting
453
jurisdiction can restore the right to serve on a jury.
Most states
448. Ellis & Scherr, supra note 328, at 43.
449. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328, app. A (describing each state’s
restoration process).
450. See, e.g., supra notes 377 (Alaska), 399 (Minnesota), 409 (North Carolina),
and 425 (Wisconsin); see also supra note 378 (Arizona) (restoring rights automatically
to first-time offenders).
451. The states listed as lifetime excluders in Appendix 1.A, supra, fit into this
category. A few examples of the rarity of pardons are illustrative. Florida apparently
rejects over eighty percent of applications for restoration of civil rights. See 2001-02
FLA. PAROLE COMM’N ANN. REP. 11 (noting the disposition of 36,047 applications in
fiscal year 2001-02); Letter from Janet H. Keels, Coordinator, Florida Office of
Executive Clemency, to Jane Edwards, Research Librarian, Michigan State UniversityDCL College of Law (May 5, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review) (stating that Florida restored civil rights to 1,394 felons in 2001 and 6,486 in
2002). Georgia restored the rights of only 289 people in 2002. Telephone Interview
by Jeff Jocks with Tanya Cooper, Georgia State Board of Pardons (Mar. 10, 2003). In
Virginia, 404 pardons were granted in 1996-97 out of a population of over 200,000
felons who had completed their sentences. See Demleitner, Continuing Payment, supra
note 5, at 769-70 (citing Human Rights Watch estimates); see also PETERSILIA, supra
note 307, at 217 (“For all practical purposes, pardons are irrelevant for most inmates
coming out of prison today.”); Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 5, at
155 (discussing typically “limited number” of pardons); Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note
5, at 727 (characterizing the prerequisites for a pardon as “perseverance, financial
resources and perhaps political contacts”).
452. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 964 P.2d 875, 884 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (holding
that the trial court did not err in removing a juror who had committed a felony in
another state, but whose civil rights had since been restored); Anderson v. State, 120
So. 2d 397, 404 (Ala. App. 1960) (stating that a pardon does not excuse prior felons
from juror challenges), rev’d on other grounds, 366 U.S. 208 (1961). This practice,
while not widespread, has a venerable pedigree. See 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 750 (London, Strahan, 1807) (“[I]nfamy is a good cause of
challenge to a juror . . . [and] such exceptions are not solved by a pardon.”).
453. Sixteen states are listed in DEP’T OF JUSTICE SURVEY, supra note 328, as limiting
the use of clemency to undo foreign convictions. See id. at 30 (California), 37
(Delaware), 48 (Hawaii), 65 (Louisiana), 83 (Missouri), 86 (Montana), 89
(Nebraska), 90-91 (Nevada; federal convictions), 95 (New Jersey; federal
convictions), 97 (New Mexico), 111 (Oklahoma), 116 (Pennsylvania; federal
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maintain the opposite, and hold that their own clemency power can
restore the right to serve on their own juries, regardless of whether
454
the convicting jurisdiction has pardoned the felon.
4.

Error resolution
Some felons who, under the law, should be barred from jury
service are not excluded, and some non-felons who should be allowed
to serve are not permitted. Many courts are surprisingly ambivalent
about rectifying these sorts of errors, allowing verdicts that “illicit”
juries rendered to stand despite supposed concerns about felons’
455
inherent bias or the threat they pose to jury probity.
Disqualified felons commonly end up on juries by simply failing to
456
Jurisdictions take
disclose their criminal history when asked.
457
several different approaches to resolving such failures.
Most
require some sort of showing of prejudice, because “[a] trial
represents an important investment of private and social resources,
and it ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean,”
458
in the absence of true harm.
Showing prejudice may be difficult,
though, given that the evidence of a particular juror’s disposition in
convictions), 120 (South Carolina; federal convictions), 130 (Utah), 132 (Vermont;
federal convictions issue “not . . . settled”), and 139 (West Virginia; federal
convictions).
454. See Hoffman v. State, 922 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. App. 1996) (listing
jurisdictions that do not recognize pardons issued by other states).
455. See, e.g., State v. Neal, 550 So. 2d 740 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
juror’s failure to disclose a prior felony conviction was not cause for a new trial).
456. See supra Part II.E (detailing reasons why felons often do not disclose criminal
history).
457. See generally Robert G. Loewy, Note, When Jurors Lie: Differing Standards for New
Trials, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 733 (1995) (surveying all American jurisdictions). The
federal standard is sketchy. The leading case, McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548 (1984), purports to require a showing that “a juror failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir dire,” and “that a correct response would have
provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Id. at 548. The dishonesty
requirement is not exclusive, though, as noted in two concurring opinions
representing five justices. See id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that
trial courts should search for bias “regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or
dishonest”); id. at 558-59 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I . . . cannot agree . . . that a
new trial is not warranted whenever a prospective juror provides an honest answer to
the question posed.”). The circuits have tended to agree, allowing other ways of
showing bias besides McDonough’s distorting dishonesty in voir dire. See Jones v.
Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a showing of actual bias may
suffice to warrant a new trial regardless of the McDonough test); see also Zerka v.
Green, 49 F.3d 1181, 1186 & n.7 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that McDonough does not
foreclose the use of the “pre-existing rule requiring proof of actual juror bias”).
Given that the federal exclusion law will make it very easy to satisfy the second prong
of McDonough, a party in federal court who can show that a juror knowingly lied
about his criminal record should be able to obtain a new trial automatically. Failing
that, a showing of actual bias, while hard to muster, should suffice.
458. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555.
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deliberations or his effect on others is often inadmissible or
459
unknowable.
Despite the difficulty of showing prejudice, some jurisdictions
nevertheless require a direct showing of actual bias by the offending
460
juror to establish the requisite level of harm.
Others will infer
prejudice from a showing of “juror misconduct,” such as a false or
negligent answer to a material question (e.g., “are you a convicted
461
felon?”).
Several jurisdictions require a showing of both
462
misconduct and bias. On the other extreme, a handful of sticklers
require neither, on the theory that even innocent misrepresentations
463
interfere with a party’s rightful exercise of peremptory strikes.
One reason for courts to tolerate the presence of supposedly unfit
jurors is the risk of strategic behavior. If a party knows that a juror is
not qualified but thinks that the juror might be sympathetic, the
party has an incentive to withhold protest unless and until the jury
464
comes back with an adverse verdict.
The threshold requirement
459. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (limiting testimony by jurors to evidence of
exposure of jury to “extraneous prejudicial information” or external pressure); see
also United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J.,
dissenting) (discussing fruitlessness of inquiry as to “prejudicial effect of the felonjuror’s presence”); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 609 A.2d 175, 177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(“[W]e believe that it would be virtually impossible for a criminal defendant to prove
that a juror’s prior conviction prejudiced his trial.”). One court took this “see no
evil” approach to an extreme, ruling that a juror who failed to disclose his felony
conviction did not prejudice the result in a criminal case because the verdict was
unanimous and only ten of twelve jurors needed to vote to convict. State v. Neal, 550
So. 2d 740, 744-45 (La. Ct. App. 1990). Such a vision of atomized jurors completely
ignores the importance of jury deliberation.
460. See, e.g., Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997)
(affirming verdict where no actual bias could be shown); Loewy, supra note 457, at
751-53 (listing twenty-two such states); cf. Boney, 977 F.2d at 634 (holding that a
dishonest answer regarding criminal history in voir dire does not constitute a
showing of bias, but warrants an evidentiary hearing on that question).
461. See Loewy, supra note 457, at 749-51 (describing eleven such states); see, e.g.,
State v. Read, 965 S.W.2d 74, 77-78 (Tex. App. 1998) (detailing when trial court must
grant new trial as a result of juror misconduct); Fleming v. State, 687 So. 2d 146, 148
(Miss. 1997) (holding that failure of juror to respond truthfully in voir dire caused
prejudice). Some states say that a showing of misconduct is a substitute or a
presumptive basis for a finding of bias; others do not tie the analysis to bias at all. See
Boney, 977 F.2d at 641 (Randolph, J., dissenting) (discussing distinction between
challenges for “cause,” which should not require additional showing of bias, from
challenges for “favor,” which should require it).
462. See Loewy, supra note 457, at 754-55 (describing seventeen such states).
463. See id. at 748 (describing four such states and their reasoning).
464. See, e.g., Strang v. United States, 45 F.2d 1006, 1007 (5th Cir. 1930) (holding
that the appellant could not withhold information about a juror’s prior conviction as
a strategy to challenge the jury’s decision); Turley v. State, 104 N.W. 934, 936 (Neb.
1905) (ruling that an objection to a juror should be made upon impanelment and
not withheld in hopes of acquittal); TEXAS HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex.
S.B. 46, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (listing as an argument in favor of harmless error
legislation that “criminal defense lawyers purposely neglect to challenge prospective
jurors they suspect of felony convictions because they want to ensure a sympathetic

KALT.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC

164

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/23/2004 2:18 PM

[Vol. 53:65

that actual bias be shown is one way to undercut such behavior, but in
many states, the fact that a juror has lied about his criminal history
465
suffices to prove bias. More important, then, is the requirement of
due diligence by the complaining party:
[A]ll states require that defendants and their lawyers exercise “due
diligence.” Essentially, this means that defendants will not be
allowed to raise on appeal any error that could have been
corrected at the trial level. The rule has two main applications in
practice. First, the lawyer must ask specific questions during voir
dire designed to elicit the concealed information from the
prospective juror. Second, defendants and their lawyers must
immediately notify the court of any evidence they have, or should
466
have, concerning the validity of the juror’s responses.

Some states take this requirement extremely seriously, even in the
467
Mississippi, for example,
face of a showing of clear prejudice.
specifies by statute that seating a felon on a jury “shall not . . . vitiate
468
an indictment or verdict.”
Texas had long granted a new trial
469
automatically if a felon made it onto the jury. It changed its statute,
though, to require that a conviction by a felon-ridden jury be
affirmed unless the defendant objected before the verdict was
ear on the jury and at the same time have a sure bet for reversal in case the verdict is
unfavorable for their client”).
465. See supra note 461 (detailing circumstances where courts will find that a juror
is biased).
466. Loewy, supra note 457, at 744 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1867
(2000) (defining similar timeliness requirements that apply to objections about the
members of a grand jury); United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 69 (1883) (finding a
threat to criminal proceedings if the defendant knew a grand juror was a felon, yet
did not object until after the verdict); United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 261
(8th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that a defendant must question and challenge the
status of a felon juror before a verdict is rendered).
467. See, e.g., State v. Bongalis, 378 S.E.2d 449, 455-56 (W. Va. 1989) (finding
waiver despite the fact that three jurors changed their vote to guilty when it was
discovered that the other juror they were voting with was a felon); Lollar v. State, 422
So. 2d 809, 811-12 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (noting that even though one juror failed
to answer in the affirmative questions relating to whether she had been convicted of
a crime, the burden was on the defendant, who had knowledge of the juror’s
criminal record, to notify his counsel). The federal government places a time limit
on objections to illegally constituted juries. See 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (2000) (listing this
time limit as before the voir dire examination begins or within seven days after the
defendant could have discovered the problem). This probably does not apply,
however, to problems stemming from individual jurors, especially those whose
criminal histories were concealed. See United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865-1867 relate only to the district court
procedures for administering the selection of a jury and do not apply when a juror
fails to reveal that he was a felon on the jury qualification form).
468. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (Lexis 2002).
469. Two of the earliest such “hard line” cases in Texas are Amaya v. State, 220
S.W. 98, 99-100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920) (setting aside verdict where a juror was a
convicted thief) and Rice v. State, 107 S.W. 832, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908)
(reversing conviction where a juror was found to be a convicted perjurer).
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rendered, or could show both that he was prejudiced and that he had
470
no way of timely knowing about the juror’s criminal record. Texas’s
471
automatic reversal standard had always placed it in the minority;
when it abandoned it, Texas joined the majority of states that are
interested more in preserving verdicts and preventing abuse than in
rooting out supposedly unfit jurors.
Another wrinkle in the prejudice requirement is the use of
peremptory challenges. If a would-be juror is challenged for cause as
being unqualified and the challenge is unjustly denied, the objecting
party is forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror.
That party can complain that it was effectively deprived of its full
number of peremptory challenges (assuming it used all of its other
472
ones). In response, though, courts have stated that the use of the
peremptory eliminates any prejudice, and many courts have so held,
requiring a showing that a biased juror sat before reversing a
473
verdict.
470. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.46 (Vernon Supp. 2003). See Thomas v.
State, 796 S.W.2d 196, 197-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc) (remanding for a
new capital murder trial after it was revealed that one of the jurors in the first trial
had lied about her criminal history); Perez v. State, 973 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1998) (“In 1993, in an apparent response to Thomas, the legislature enacted
article 44.46 of the code of criminal procedure.”), rev’d, 11 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000); New Law Upholds Trial Verdicts Even If Juror Later Is Disqualified, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 9, 1993, at 31A (“The law will help avoid future reversals of
convictions in criminal trials, such as the one that occurred in the so-called
‘cheerleader hitman’ case in Houston.”).
471. See, e.g., Queenan v. Territory, 71 P. 218, 220 (Okla. 1901) (citing alien
disqualification case, Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895), as well as various state
cases, and declaring that allowing waiver “has been upheld by the supreme court of
the United States, and by nearly every state in the Union”), aff’d sub nom. Queenan v.
Oklahoma, 190 U.S. 548 (1903); Commonwealth v. Wong Chung, 71 N.E. 292, 294
(Mass. 1904) (citing cases and listing states on both sides of the question); Garrett v.
Weinberg, 31 S.E. 341, 344 (S.C. 1898) (overturning verdict rendered by a jury that
included a thief who should have been disqualified because of South Carolina’s clear
constitutional language that “[t]he petit jury of the circuit courts shall consist of
twelve men, all of whom must agree to a verdict,” that “[e]ach juror must be a
qualified elector,” and that “persons convicted of . . . larceny” were disqualified from
voting). South Carolina has never overruled Garrett in a felon juror case, but it
almost immediately backed away from this absolutist approach. See Mew v.
Charleston S. Ry. Co., 32 S.E. 828, 830 (S.C. 1899) (requiring a defendant to exercise
due diligence and consult public books of registration to determine whether a juror
was registered in the county).
472. See, e.g., State v. Ramos, 564 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 1997) (using extra peremptory
theory to automatically grant new trial), overruled by State v. Lindell, 629 N.W.2d 223,
236-46 & n.14 (Wis. 2001) (noting systemic problems with Ramos, and providing a list
of cases from additional states in which reversal is automatic in such situations, and
stating that “there is no clear majority rule”).
473. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000) (finding
that defendant had a choice whether to use one of his eleven peremptory challenges
to remove the felon juror or to allow the juror to remain and initiate a Sixth
Amendment challenge on appeal if convicted); Lindell, 629 N.W.2d at 245-46 n.14
(furnishing a list of cases from thirteen other states that reached similar results).
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Improper inclusion of a felon juror is not the only possible error;
non-felons might be improperly excluded as well. If a party
incorrectly but successfully objected to a juror’s presence for cause,
the other party can argue that this amounted to giving the objecting
474
party an extra peremptory strike. This argument has been rejected
almost unanimously, thereby limiting a party’s rights to the ability to
use one’s own peremptories and to the requirement “that the jurors
475
who do serve be qualified.”
Understandably, courts that do not perceive evidence of actual
unfairness will not be particularly anxious to throw away a perfectly
good verdict just because a felon served on the jury. But this belies
the concerns that supposedly justify felon exclusion in the first place.
If a felon’s service on a jury is a real threat to its probity, it is a threat
regardless of whether there is any evidence of prejudice. If felons are
unfit because they are inherently biased, then prejudice should be
presumed regardless of whether the felon bumbled or lied his way
476
onto the jury.
Perhaps, though, this contradiction between the ideals and reality
of felon exclusion just means that states value efficiency higher than
felon exclusion. A total ban on felons might be the best way to
achieve a goal of minimizing the number of felon jurors rather than
wholly eliminating them, especially given that truly willful violators
are still likely to spur the reversal of a verdict.
States that wish to minimize the number of felons on juries,
however, would do well not to rely on self-reporting of criminal
histories. States that are so willing to shrug off the presence of illegal
474. See, e.g., Day v. State, 784 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. App. 1990) (finding the trial
court erred in allowing the state’s motion to excuse a felon juror for cause after he
qualified as a juror, in effect giving the state an extra peremptory challenge); Walker
v. State, 645 S.W.2d 294, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that a qualified juror
was improperly excused by the court without the state utilizing a challenge); cf.
Dodys v. State, 37 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (characterizing jury
requirements as such in a case where a juror was properly excluded).
475. State v. Mendoza, 596 N.W.2d 736, 747-48 (Wis. 1999); Jones v. State, 982
S.W.2d 386, 392-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (noting unanimity of other jurisdictions);
accord United States v. Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that
although the district court excused two potential jurors without additional questions,
over the defense’s objections, their release did not result in affording the
government two extra peremptory strikes or create a biased jury); State v. McCulley,
782 S.W.2d 733, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (advocating erring on side of exclusion).
The state of Texas law is not clear. The Court of Criminal Appeals in Jones did not
address its earlier decision in Walker. See 43 GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON,
TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 35.57 (2d ed. 2001)
(discussing and criticizing Texas case law).
476. Cf. United States v. Humphrey, 982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the mere presence of a felon on a jury is not prejudicial, given that statutory
disqualification does not make a felon “necessarily . . . fundamentally unfit to serve”).
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jurors should question whether their commitment to probity or their
belief in felons’ inherent bias is misplaced. States that tolerate the
presence of some felons on juries—the ones who are not informed
enough to realize that they are felons, or are not honest enough to
admit it—should contemplate how helpful or worthwhile it is to try to
exclude all of the other smarter, more honest ones. Most of all, states
that rely on the voir dire process to screen every other juror should
consider why they lack confidence in that process when the would-be
477
juror is a felon.
5.

Pending Charges
Several jurisdictions explicitly ban people charged with felonies
478
from serving on juries.
One rationale is that individuals awaiting
trial may be beholden to the state; a vote to convict in an important
479
case might lead to lenient treatment in one’s own case. This sort of
disqualification is categorically different from felon exclusion, at least
for felons who have completed probation or parole.
Surprisingly, though, the more commonly expressed (if contested)
rationale for pending-charge exclusion is the same as that for felon
480
exclusion.
The Eighth Circuit, for example, has held that barring
indicted criminals awaiting trial is appropriate because such
individuals have character questionable enough to threaten the
probity of the jury, and conviction rates are so high that this is a
481
permissible inference.
The court rejected the obvious opposing
argument on which other authorities have relied—that this is
“offensive to the presumption of innocence given to criminal
477. See Singer, supra note 3, at 245 (suggesting that disclosure of a would-be
juror’s criminal history is preferable to an outright ban); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 427, std. 23-8.5 & cmt. (“Persons convicted of any offense should be entitled
to . . . serve on juries except while actually confined or while on probation or
parole . . . [because] peremptory challenges and challenges for cause can remove
individuals who cannot, in fact, be fair and impartial.”); TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS,
supra note 346, at 91 (footnote omitted) (calling for an individualized assessment of
felon jurors’ qualifications).
478. See, e.g., supra notes 375 (federal), 382 (Connecticut), 394 (Louisiana), 397
(Massachusetts), and 419 (Texas); cf. Tellier, supra note 12, at 518-21 (collecting
then-current case law on jurors with pending criminal charges).
479. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 300 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
480. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing
probity and inherent bias rationales for excluding jurors charged with a felony);
United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing probity rationale);
United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 594 (10th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (citing probity
rationale); United States v. Arnett, 342 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D. Mass. 1970) (citing
probity rationale); Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1319, 1331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)
(affirming exclusion of a juror who had been arrested, in a state requiring “integrity
[and] good character”).
481. Greene, 995 F.2d at 795-96.

KALT.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC

168

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/23/2004 2:18 PM

[Vol. 53:65

482

defendants.” The Seventh Circuit has agreed, noting that pending
charges indicate that there is probable cause to believe the person
483
committed a crime, which is enough to warrant exclusion.
Admittedly, any unfairness represented by this overinclusiveness is
substantially mitigated by its temporary nature. Similarly, excluding
individuals with pending charges from juries seems trivial when
compared with the jail time or bail payment that they face, even
though some will be proven not guilty.
6.

Civil or criminal, petit or grand
Further undercutting the “inherent bias” rationale, only two states
distinguish between criminal and civil juries in their felon exclusion
484
laws. Felons might have an ax to grind when judging a prosecutor’s
case, but it is hard to see how a felony conviction would prejudice
485
them in a civil case.
Maintaining separate jury pools for civil versus criminal trials might
486
simply represent an unacceptable administrative burden.
On the
other hand, increasing the number of potential jurors, even if only in

482. Id. But see Turnipseed v. State, 185 S.E. 403, 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936)
(refusing to vacate a verdict where a juror was convicted of a felony but had not gone
to jail and had an appeal pending); ABA JUROR USE, supra note 427, std. 4(e) cmt.
(rejecting the exclusion of those with pending charges because of the inconsistency
with the presumption of innocence); People v. Astle, 503 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986) (approving of the presence of a juror who was an unknowing target
of a grand jury, and who was later indicted and convicted).
483. United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1995); see Jenkins v. State,
42 S.W. 263, 264 (Tenn. 1897) (describing an interesting twist on this issue in which
a potential juror was excluded because he was guilty of illegal activity). The juror in
Jenkins had never been charged, and the determination was made after the trial
judge, “from the testimony of witnesses, based on general rumor, became satisfied”
of his criminality. Id.
484. See supra notes 413 (Oregon) and 419 (Texas); see also Cantu v. State, 842
S.W.2d 667, 685 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (discussing Texas law). Case
law in a third state suggests differential treatment, but with less strict standards for
criminal trials than civil trials. See Proudfoot v. Dan’s Marine Serv., 558 S.E.2d 298,
305-06 (W. Va. 2002) (Starcher, J., concurring) (criticizing majority rule of granting
an automatic reversal when a juror is a felon in a civil case, in light of the less strict
standard used in a prior, criminal case). Michigan recently changed its law and
abolished its distinction. See supra note 398.
485. See Froede v. Holland Ladder & Mfg., 523 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Mich. Ct. App.
1994) (“[T]he existence of potential biases or prejudices of a juror with a prior
felony conviction is substantially lessened in a civil case as opposed to a criminal
case.”); cf. Developments in the Law, supra note 251, at 1436 (“If the legal system has
sufficient faith in the ability of citizen-jurors to make reasoned moral judgments to
entrust them with such extensive responsibility in the criminal context, then it
should similarly trust and respect jurors in the civil context.”).
486. See COMM. ON SELECTION OF JURORS, JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON SELECTION OF JURORS 42 (1942)
(making administrative burden argument).
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civil cases, would reduce the burdens of jury service faced by nonfelons.
On the criminal side, only two states distinguish between grand
487
and petit jury service.
One might argue that grand jurors wield
more power and are not subject to the possibility of strikes by the
parties, and should be selected with greater care. On the other hand,
grand juries are larger and do not require unanimity, reducing the
imperative for those who distrust felons to achieve perfect moral
cleansing. In any case, the administrative burdens of maintaining
separate selection tracks again seems significant; in the absence of a
stronger rationale, the general failure to treat grand juries differently
is unremarkable.
APPENDIX 2: THE STATISTICS OF FELON EXCLUSION
This Appendix will discuss the magnitude of felon exclusion.
Though the available data are spotty, felon exclusion undoubtedly
excises a significant share of the citizenry, especially black men, from
the jury pool. While felon exclusion is an old tradition, the enormity
of its effects is a very recent development, resulting from tougher
488
sentencing and the War on Drugs.
Incarceration rates have
skyrocketed. After staying around 0.1% of the population from the
489
1920s to the early 1970s, they nearly quintupled by 2000.
The
percentage of felons in the population as a whole probably more
490
than doubled during the same period.
Precisely quantifying the reach of felon exclusion is difficult. While
jurisdictions maintain careful count of prison inmates, parolees, and
probationers, they are less circumspect about tallying felons once
491
they have completed their terms of supervision.
Like any other
487. See supra notes 381 (Colorado) and 419 (Texas). This distinction, while
uncommon, has deep roots. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 811, 851 (Hopkins et al., 1896)
(requiring grand jurors to be “most experienced, intelligent and upright men,” and
traverse jurors only to be “intelligent and upright men”) (emphasis added); Stephen
K. Roberts, Juries and the Middling Sort: Recruitment and Performance at Devon Quarter
Sessions, 1649-1670, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN
ENGLAND, 1200-1800, at 182, 185 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988)
[hereinafter TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE] (showing that seventeenth-century
English “[t]rial jurors were a separate and lower caste” than grand jurors).
488. See RAFTER & STANLEY, supra note 149, at 1, 15-19 (discussing the recent and
rapid growth of prison facilities).
489. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 178, at 494 tbl. 6.23.
490. See, e.g., Uggen et al., supra note 178, at 17 (estimating that felons were 3% of
the adult population in 1968, and 6.5% in 2000).
491. For example, the federal “Megan’s Law” requires states to keep track of sex
offenders after release, but these efforts often falter. See Andrew Murr & Rebecca
Sinderbrand, Holes in the Safety Net, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 2003, at 40 (“As many as one
quarter . . . of the nation’s paroled sex offenders are currently unaccounted
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citizen, a felon may be subsequently imprisoned, move to another
state, or die, all of which make it difficult to count the ex-convicts
who live in our midst. Counting the felon population precisely by
race is even more problematic. While exact figures are hard to pin
down, however, there is no question that black and Hispanic
Americans are more likely than white Americans to be convicted
492
felons.
There are ways, moreover, to attempt to answer these questions.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics in the Department of Justice compiles
statistics on crimes, convictions, releases, and recidivism, at both the
493
state and federal level, and in many cases broken down by race.
Some states keep track of the number of people whose rights have
494
been restored.
All keep track of their current supervised
495
population.
A significant attempt to cobble these data into an estimate of the
felon population appears in a 2000 paper by Christopher Uggen,
496
Melissa Thompson, and Jeff Manza.
The authors consider each
year’s cohort of released felons, subtract the estimated number of
recidivists (to prevent double counting) and deaths, and aggregate
497
the cohorts into a grand total.
They conclude that in 2000, four
million felons were currently under supervision and another eight or
498
nine million felons’ supervision had expired.
Of these thirteen
million Americans (6.5% of the adult population), they estimate that
four or five million are black, that 16% to 21% of the adult black
population are felons, and that between 29% and 37% of the adult
499
black male population are felons.
for . . . .”).
492. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 178, at 498 tbl. 6.28
(describing incarceration rates by race, age, and gender); cf. United States v. Barry,
71 F.3d 1269, 1271 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting in a case challenging felon
exclusion on grounds of its racial disparities that a party’s argument that the
disproportion was “on the order of eight- to thirteenfold,” was “for the most part
undisputed”).
493. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 178, at 477-537 (detailing
population under criminal supervision); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1998, at 8 (2001) (detailing
criminal history statistics for felony defendants); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994,
supra note 360 (providing recidivism statistics).
494. See, e.g., supra note 451.
495. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 178, app. 4, at 568-69 (describing
federal collection and use of state data).
496. Uggen et al., supra note 178.
497. Id. at 2-4.
498. Id. at 17; cf. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 178, at 487 tbl. 6.1
(estimating the total population in jail, prison, on parole, or on probation—a count
that includes misdemeanants—in 2001 at 6.6 million).
499. Uggen et al., supra note 178, at 17. The lower bound is based on using a
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The Uggen paper has several limitations as applied to felon
exclusion—as would anything short of a perfect enumeration. First,
it does not take into account any restoration of rights, which is a fairly
500
automatic process in some states.
Second, it is based on outdated
501
Third, it does not consider the higher
recidivism numbers.
502
mortality rate for black Americans than for white Americans.
Taking factors like these into account, the percentage of black men
who are convicted felons may be different, and lower, than reported
in the Uggen paper. Still, the lower end of the 29 to 37% range is
503
consistent with other estimates in other contexts.
These national figures are relevant to federal juries; federal law
504
excludes for life any felon whose rights have not been restored.
This means that felon exclusion likely excises about 6.5% of the
federal jury pool, including at least 30% of adult black males.
(Though, to be sure, some of these people would be excluded
anyway, because of lack of citizenship or residency, illiteracy,
disability, or other disqualifications.) Even excluding only those
felons still under supervision takes a large and racially disparate toll:
almost 2% of adults, 7% of black adults, and more than 12% of black
505
men.

higher recidivism number for black felons. Id. at 5-6.
500. See supra notes 378 (Arizona), 388 (Idaho), 399 (Minnesota), 409 (North
Carolina), 417 (South Dakota), 423 (Washington), and 425 (Wisconsin). An
estimate that is not adjusted to exclude those whose rights have been restored
overstates the number of felons.
501. The Uggen paper uses the federal recidivism study from 1989 that was
updated in 2002. Uggen et al., supra note 178, at 2; see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
1994, supra note 360, at 11 (comparing studies). Uggen, Thompson, and Manza are
in the process of updating their work to reflect the new recidivism figures.
502. See Uggen et al., supra note 178, at 3 (discussing the use of the black mortality
rate for both black and white criminals). This overstates the percentage of black
felons.
503. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LIFETIME
LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON 2 (1997) (estimating future
imprisonment odds for black men at 15.9% by age 25, 26.6% by age 40, and 28.5%
over a lifetime). Including felony convictions that do not result in imprisonment
might push these numbers into the 29 to 37% range at the median adult age. Of the
eight states that permanently disenfranchise felons, see infra note 588, Fellner and
Mauer have data for six. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 122, at 7 n.21 (describing
data problems with Kentucky and Nevada).
Their estimates of the
disenfranchisement rate of black men in those states ranges from 25.0% to 31.5%.
Id. at 9 (estimating Alabama at 31.5%, Florida at 31.2%, Iowa at 26.5%, Mississippi at
28.6%, Virginia at 25.0%, and Wyoming at 27.7%).
504. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000).
505. Uggen et al., supra note 178, at 17; see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra
note 178, at 478 tbl. 6.2 (estimating the totals—including misdemeanants—in 1997
at 2.8% of adults and 9.0% of black adults of both genders).

KALT.AUTHORCHANGES2A.DOC

172

2/23/2004 2:18 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:65

APPENDIX 3: HISTORY
The history of felon exclusion does not compel any one legal or
policy conclusion, but it does provide important perspective. For
example, felon exclusion has an old pedigree, but so do exceptions
and changes to the institution. The Anglo-American jury system has
gone full circle from excluding felons as felons, to excluding “bad
people,” and back to excluding felons as felons. Another lesson is
that some American felon exclusion laws were born out of explicit
racial animus, a fact that should give us pause when we contemplate
the racial disparities they present today.
The Greek, Roman, and Germanic origins of the practices of
“infamy” and “outlawry,” which exclude criminals from public life,
506
have been much discussed and disputed. This Appendix will focus
on more recent practice, from English law through the colonial,
antebellum, Jim Crow, and modern eras in America.
A. English Practice
The question of who served on early English juries has been the
507
basis of a great deal of study.
English juries were supposed to
comprise high-ranking and honorable people, but early English jury
practice reflected a paradoxical divide between those ideals and
reality.
Much of the tension over jury membership in pre-modern and
early modern England centered on class rather than criminality.
Early trial juries were drawn “from a broad band in the middle classes
508
of society.”
Legislative attempts to restrict membership to knights
and others of high station failed in practice because there were not
enough such people to go around. Their place was taken by those
with “legal and administrative experience and social standing,” more
of whom were “yeomen and prosperous husbandmen” than
509
gentlemen. In certain eras, the difficulty in filling trial juries was so
506. See generally 9 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 191
(1926) (noting “roots both in Roman and Germanic law” of excluding criminals
from jury service); Damaska, supra note 323, at 350-51 (outlining development of
civil disabilities to provide reference for current disabilities); Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra
note 5, at 721-24 (analyzing the roots of disenfranchisement and other civil
disabilities); Grant et al., supra note 3, at 941-42 (detailing the history of civil
disabilities).
507. See, e.g., TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 487 (collecting eleven
historical works on English juries).
508. J.B. Post, Jury Lists and Juries in the Late Fourteenth Century, in TWELVE GOOD
MEN AND TRUE, supra note 487, at 65, 68 (describing late-fourteenth-century jurors).
509. See id. at 78, 83, 88-89, 95-96 (describing the composition of early-fifteenthcentury Midland juries).
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severe that “talesmen” (i.e., whoever happened to be standing about
the court) were commonly pressed into service even if they were a
510
Administrative changes around 1650
“poor and simpler sort.”
relieved this pressure, however, and restored elite control over the
511
trial jury. Even if the jury drew consistently from a select stratum of
society, though, it was still by far the broadest and most democratic
512
governing institution in the country.
Felons were excluded from early English juries more successfully
than were common folk. Nevertheless, some still found their way
onto juries. The ideals of felon exclusion were expressed in such
sources as the twelfth-century Assize of Clarendon, which established
grand juries composed of a selection of the “more lawful men” of the
513
hundred and the vill.
In a more specific act in 1314, those
514
Despite
convicted of conspiracy were barred from jury service.
these earlier provisions, a 1410 statute of Henry IV noted the
presence of outlaws on a particular grand jury; the King annulled its
indictments and declared that “henceforth no Indictment be made
by any such Persons, but by Inquests of the King’s lawful liege People,
515
in the Manner as was used in the Time of his noble Progenitors.”
In the ensuing centuries, this ideal was extended to trial juries in
516
both civil and criminal cases.
510. P.G. Lawson, Lawless Juries? The Composition and Behavior of Hertfordshire Juries,
1573-1624, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 487, at 117, 117-25 (quoting
1584 statute, 27 Eliz. 1, c. 6); see J.S. Cockburn, Twelve Silly Men? The Trial Jury at
Assizes, 1560-1670, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 487, at 158, 160-61
(discussing sixteenth- and seventeenth-century trial juries).
511. See Cockburn, supra note 510, at 165-67 (describing the successful plan of
using jurors for multiple cases).
512. See Douglas Hay, The Class Composition of the Palladium of Liberty: Trial Jurors in
the Eighteenth Century, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 487, at 305, 349
(describing the democratic breadth of seventeenth-century English governing
institutions); see also Roberts, supra note 487, at 182 (recognizing that the
seventeenth-century jury system was “the most representative institution available to
the English people”).
513. Assize of Clarendon (1166), available at http://www.constitution.org/
eng/assizcla.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). The hundred
and the vill were feudal subdivisions of counties.
514. 1 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM [Parliamentary Rolls] 289 (London 1767-77) (on
file with the American University Law Review) (“Ordinatum est per Consilium . . .
quod nullus, quicumq[ue] fuerit, de Conspiracone prius convictus ponautr in Assis,
Jurat’ seu Recogniconibus aliquibus infra Com’ vel extra . . . .” [It has been ordained
by the Council, that no one, no matter who he be, who has earlier been convicted of
conspiracy, be appointed to the Assizes, to jury service, or any inquests within the
counties or without.]). Thanks to Dr. Anna Graham for this translation.
515. 11 Hen. 4, c. 8 (1410).
516. See, e.g., SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE 59-63 (S.B.
Chrimes ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1942) (c. 1468-71) (describing contemporary
civil jury as “[t]welve good and lawful men” and “sound in repute”); SIR THOMAS
SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLIE 113 (Mary Dewar ed., 1982) (c. 1565) (describing
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These restrictions on felon jurors paralleled similar exclusions for
felon witnesses; indeed, jury exclusion probably evolved from witness
exclusion, owing to the ancient overlap between jurors and
517
witnesses.
The two have long since diverged—felon testimony is
much more common than felon jury service, perhaps because jurors
are more fungible than witnesses.
By the early 1600s, the common law had settled the matter
decisively enough that Coke could declare that those “attainted or
convicted of treason, or felony, or for any offence to life or member,
or in attaint for a false verdict, or for perjury as a witnesse” were “not
legalis homo,” and could be challenged as jurors “propter delictum”
518
(because of crime). A century and a half later, Blackstone adopted
Coke’s construction and expressed it thus:
Challenges propter delictum, are for some crime or misdemesnor that
affects the juror’s credit, and renders him infamous. As for a
conviction of treason, felony, perjury, or conspiracy; or if for some
infamous offence he hath received judgment of the pillory,
tumbrel, or the like; or to be branded, whipt, or stigmatized; or if
he be outlawed or excommunicated, or hath been attainted of false
519
verdict, praemunire, or forgery . . . .

To be precise, English practice cannot be simply labeled “felon
exclusion,” as several other categories of offense are listed.
Considering that virtually all felonies in early modern England
were capital offenses, one would think that felon exclusion would

contemporary jury selection process, with jurors who are “substantial yeoman, that
dwell about the place, . . . acquainted with daily labour and travaile, and not with
such idle menne, as be readie to doe such mischiefes” being declared “good men
and true”).
517. The linkage to restrictions on felon testimony is explored further at Part II.H,
supra. See also Moore v. State, 67 So. 789, 790 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915) (deciding that a
jury can consider a witness’s prior felony conviction in determining the validity of his
testimony); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 506, at 185-86 (asserting that in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries certain people were deemed “incompetent to be
witnesses”); Grant et al., supra note 3, at 1051 (stating that the rule of felon exclusion
“developed from the common law disqualification of criminal offenders as witnesses
in judicial proceedings”); Harrison, supra note 3, at 255 n.1 (citing 9 HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 186, 191 (1938)).
518. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
§ 234, at 158e (London, E. & R. Brooke 1794) (1628); see also id. at 155d (explaining
that only one “accounted in law liber et legalis homo” should be “suffered to be sworn”).
The practice had been noted centuries before Coke. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
506, at 186 (noting the attention paid to felon exclusion by Glanvil, Bracton, and
others in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries); see also JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 308-09 (Brookfield, E. Merriam & Co. 1832)
(expounding upon the exclusion of criminals from grand juries); KERPER & KERPER,
supra note 389, at 33 (“Exclusion from jury service of convicted persons has its origin
in the common law.”).
519. BLACKSTONE, supra note 173, at *363-64.
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have gone without saying; put simply, a convicted felon would be too
520
But not all individuals who committed
dead to serve on a jury.
521
felonies were executed or even rendered “civilly” dead. Juries that
felt the death penalty was too harsh for the crime committed (say,
stealing a shilling’s worth of food) could convict of a lesser charge if
522
they did not acquit the defendant outright.
Moreover, pardons
523
“were surprisingly frequent.”
Even some unpardoned convicts
524
The doctrine of “benefit of clergy”
emerged relatively unscathed.
allowed in some cases for any clergymen, and then any literate man,
and eventually anyone at all, to escape the death penalty for a first
525
offense. Some convicts were “transported” to America or Australia
instead of being killed, though this obviously left them unavailable
526
for jury service in Britain. In any case, enough convicted criminals
were in the jury pool to require the adoption of a disqualifying rule,
such as that described by Coke and Blackstone.
Indeed, it appears that reality fell somewhat short of the ideals of
felon exclusion. The best evidence is English case law that mitigated
the mandatory nullification rule from the 1410 statute, by requiring
520. Convicted English criminals essentially were either dead or “civilly dead,” in
either case surrendering property and all civil rights. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 13 n.11 (1985) (“The roots of the concept of a ‘felony’ lie not in capital
punishment but in forfeiture. Not all felonies were always punishable by death.
Nonetheless, the link was profound.”) (citations omitted); Fletcher, supra note 4, at
1899 (“I suppose that at the time when all felons were in principle subject to capital
punishment, it probably did not do much harm to treat felons who were not
executed as civilly dead.”); Grant et al., supra note 3, at 942-43 (describing the nature
and practice of civil death).
521. See SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT
IN AMERICA 21-23 (1998) (describing the gap between the law and the practice of
capital punishment in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain).
522. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND
IN THE ANCIEN RÉGIME 40 (1977).
523. Id.
524. See CHRISTIANSON, supra note 521, at 22 (explaining that judges frequently
declined to sentence convicts to deaths).
525. See Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855,
2151 (1985) (explaining that “clerical felons” could use the “benefit of clergy” a
single time; when this occurred, they were usually branded on the thumb to indicate
their felon status). The doctrine ebbed and flowed and was generally allowed only
for minor offenses, a category that shrank along with the doctrine. See John H.
Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37-41 (1983) (indicating that felons could not claim the “benefit
of clergy” after crimes such as burglary were declared “nonclergyable”); Phillip M.
Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 516-19 (2002) (noting
that judges narrowly interpreted statutes that prevented the use of the “benefit of
clergy” to protect criminals from the death penalty).
526. See CHRISTIANSON, supra note 521, at 20-25 (discussing how individuals
convicted for petty larceny were shipped to the United States for seven-year terms of
servitude); LANGBEIN, supra note 522, at 39-43 (detailing the transportation of nearly
4,500 convicts from England between 1661 and 1700). The Australian experience
with felon jurors is similarly interesting. See infra note 532.
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that “objection to the constitution of the grand jury must be taken
527
before trial.” In other words, felons were getting onto grand juries.
If grand juries had this problem, it is easily conceivable that the more
528
lowly petit juries had it as well.
The tensions underlying the English practice of felon exclusion—
elitism struggling against a short supply of elites—do not resonate
with the tensions, detailed below in Appendix 3.C, that underlie
modern American practice—democratic sentiment struggling against
punitive sensibilities. Nevertheless, the deep common-law roots of
felon exclusion may be asserted as a justification for its continued
presence, emphasizing the importance of appreciating the true
529
nature of those roots.
B. Early American Practice
Early American practice, both before and after the Founding,
530
reflected the same tensions as English practice. Like their English
predecessors, state and local governments in the United States
wanted to restrict jury service to “appropriate” members of the
531
community.
Also paralleling the English experience, the realities of scraping
532
together a full jury sometimes meant seating “inappropriate” jurors.
As St. George Tucker described in his 1803 annotated edition of
527. United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65, 67-69 (1883) (reviewing the English
doctrine as described by Chitty, Bacon, Hawkins, and Hale).
528. Cf. Roberts, supra note 487, at 205 (relating results from the author’s data
sample showing that some seventeenth-century English jurors “strayed into crime” or
“came from families not above theft or delinquency”).
529. See supra Part II.A.
530. There is a relative paucity of information on early American juries. See David
J. Bodenhamer, The Democratic Impulse and Legal Change in the Age of Jackson: The
Example of Criminal Juries in Antebellum Indiana, 45 HISTORIAN 206, 206 (1983)
(describing scholarship).
531. See Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 57 (describing eighteenth-century American juries as being
“expected to embody the elevated moral judgment of the community”); cf. Nancy J.
King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673,
2684-90 (1996) (describing wealthy citizens’ traditional evasion of jury service).
532. See Bodenhamer, supra note 530, at 215 (citing contemporary description of
bystanders as “idle and dissolute persons”); King, supra note 531, at 2682-83, 2691
(describing the use of bystanders “whom many considered to be inferior specimens
for the jury”). But see Bodenhamer, supra note 530, at 216, 218-19 (citing
contemporary defenses of bystanders and finding no evidence of a general lack of
qualification).
The Australian experience puts the felon juror question in sharp relief. Given the
demographics of early Australia, the only way to have a functioning jury system was to
allow felons to participate. See David Brown, Prisoners as Citizens, in PRISONERS AS
CITIZENS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIAN PRISONS 308, 314 (David Brown & Meredith
Wilkie eds., 2002). In 1893, this solicitude was ended legislatively, though the
Australian jury system had survived well enough in the mean time. Id. at 315.
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Blackstone, civil juries in “country places” were often “composed . . .
of idle loiterer[]s about the court, who contrive to get themselves
summoned as jurors, that they may have their expences borne: and
are in every other point of view, the most unfit persons to decide
533
upon the controversies of the suitors.”
Tucker continues with the
most striking (if not typical) example of such use of talesmen as
jurors, and one that gives lie to the notion that criminals could not be
jurors:
Some years ago eleven or twelve persons were indicted in a district
court for a riot, it happened that at the same time when their trial
was expected to come on, a man was sent from the same county to
be tried for horse-stealing; the venire summoned was composed
534
chiefly, if not wholly, of the defendants for the riot . . . .

There is, of course, a difference between alleged criminals and
535
convicted ones. Still, Tucker’s tale suggests that in the early United
States, the high standards for jurors imported from Blackstone could
lose out to the realities of low population density.
More directly relevant for felon jurors was the new trend of using
536
incarceration as a routine punishment for crimes.
The prison
movement began in earnest in the early nineteenth century, and was
rooted in notions of penitence (hence the “penitentiary”) and
salvation, as distinct from the notions of retribution and deterrence
537
in the preceding age of death penalties both actual and civil.
533. 4 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. 64 (photo. reprint 1969)
(Philadelphia, Birch & Small 1803). This and other similarly colorful sentiments
about the quality of the people serving on juries can be found in Alschuler & Deiss,
supra note 237, at 880-82 & n.83.
534. 4 TUCKER, supra note 533, app. at 66 n*.
535. See supra Appendix 1.B.5 (noting that pending charges do not necessarily
warrant exclusion from jury service).
536. See Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the Age of
Prisons, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 497, 522, 527-35 (1995) (describing the
philosophy that led to the creation of prisons); see also Grant et al., supra note 3, at
949 (stating that imprisonment replaced more severe methods of punishment, such
as death or forfeiture of property and civil rights). To be precise, prisons had existed
in early colonial times to punish convicts, but they were not the principal form of
punishment. See, e.g., CHRISTIANSON, supra note 521, at 39-41, 59-63 (describing
Massachusetts Bay Colony provision for prison “for the punishment of . . . offenders”
among others, but also describing more typical punishments).
537. See Grant et al., supra note 3, at 949 (explaining that the implementation of
“the penitentiary . . . was based on reformative principles” that sought to replace
harsher penal sanctions). Civil death—by which the convict was stripped of all
rights, deprived of property, and automatically divorced—persisted until very
recently. See id. at 950-51 (finding that civil death provisions existed in thirteen state
statutes in 1970); Olivares et al., supra note 326, at 13-14, 16 n.1 (stating that civil
death provisions existed in four states in 1996). Only two states appear to maintain
civil death today, and both apply it only to prisoners with life sentences. See N.Y. CIV.
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Despite the fact that imprisonment was designed to replace these
earlier, harsher penalties, civil disabilities, such as exclusion from
538
juries, remained. As one source describes this persistence:
[T]here is no legislative history to explain the enactment of these
disabilities . . . . It is likely, however, that civil disabilities in
America were actually the result of the unquestioning adoption of
the English penal system by our colonial forefathers and the
succeeding generations who continued existing practices without
539
evaluation.

This unthinking consistency has continued ever since.
Perhaps the most significant development in the history of felon
jurors is the evolution from subjective to objective determinations of
juror qualification. On one hand, the increasing application of
objective criteria like criminal history has reduced the potential for
abusive and arbitrary exclusion of social and racial minorities. On
the other hand, it has entrenched those exclusions that remain, such
as literacy and criminal history, making it difficult to broaden
participation further. This is not to say that literacy and criminal
history cannot be relevant to one’s ability to serve on a jury. The
point, rather, is that the use of objective criteria makes it too easy to
accept such exclusions blithely rather than tailor them carefully. If a
statute subjectively excludes from juries anyone who is not “sober and
judicious” or “of good demeanor,” and it is used to keep control of
juries in the hands of elites, it will be subject to democratic pressure.
If it objectively excludes criminals and illiterates, it will be subject to
much less pressure, even if illiteracy and criminality are defined more
broadly than is necessary.
At around 1800, statutory limits on jury service by felons per se
540
were rare. It seems fairly certain, though, that service by felons was
rare too. First, the common-law restriction on felon jurors would

RIGHTS LAW § 79-a (McKinney 1992) (“Except as provided in subdivisions 2 & 3, a
person sentenced to imprisonment for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead.”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (2001) (“Every person imprisoned in the adult correctional
institutions for life shall, with respect to all rights of property, to the bond of
matrimony and to all civil rights and relations of any nature whatsoever, be deemed
to be dead in all respects . . . .”).
538. See Grant et al., supra note 3, at 949 (describing the transformation to
imprisonment).
539. Id. at 950.
540. But see Act of Feb. 28, 1803, § 1, reprinted in 4 THE PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 104 (Boston, Thomas & Andrews 1807) (“And if
any person, whose name shall be put into either [jury] box, shall be convicted of any
scandalous crime, or be guilty of any gross immorality, his name shall be withdrawn
from the [jury] box by the Selectmen of his town.”).
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likely have been followed, if not perfectly. Second, jury service was
commonly limited to a subset of the population—male property
542
holders —that excluded not just the bulk of the population in
543
general,
but convicted felons sentenced to “civil death” in
particular. Third, most states required that jurors be “judicious” or
544
“of fair character,” or exhibit some other criterion of moral quality,
545
which would have made it harder for felons to serve.
For these
reasons, felon exclusion was likely the rule, rather than the
exception.
By around 1850, after the Jacksonian expansion of democratic
institutions to include new swathes of the population, many property
546
With broader participation it
qualifications for jurors were gone.
541. See supra notes 518-19 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusion of
felons from grand juries in early England).
542. See, e.g., CONN. PUB. STAT. LAWS tit. XCVI, ch. 1, § 1 (1808) (freehold); LAWS
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE ch. 158, §§ 2, 7, at 445, 449 (Dover, Wootten & Allee
1806) (freehold); Act of Dec. 17, 1796, §§ 51-52, reprinted in LAWS OF KENTUCKY 201
(Lexington, Bradford 1799) (twenty pound estate, or ten pound estate for quarter
session); Act of Feb. 28, 1803, § 1, reprinted in 4 THE PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 540, at 104 (restricting jury service to
voters); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE tbl. A.1 (2000) (listing
Massachusetts property requirement for voters); Act of Feb. 8, 1791, reprinted in
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE 104 (Dover, Bragg 1805)
(“Estate of fifty pounds” for grand juries); Act of June 17, 1785, reprinted in
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE, supra, at 107 (fifty pounds
or freehold for petit juries); Act of Nov. 10, 1797, reprinted in LAWS OF THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY 259 (William Paterson ed., Newark, Day 1800) (freehold); N.Y. REV. STAT.
pt. III, ch. VI, § 13 (1829) ($250 or freehold); A MANUAL OF THE LAWS OF NORTH
CAROLINA ch. 6, § 2, at 279 (John Haywood ed., Raleigh, Gales 1814) (freehold; 1779
law); VT. LAWS ch. III, §§ 58-59, 63 (1798) (freehold); VA. REV. CODE ch. 75, §§ 1, 2,
12 (1819) (freehold and visible estate of $150 or $300).
543. To be sure, these qualifications probably did not exclude most white men.
Cf. KEYSSAR, supra note 542, at 24 (citing estimates that property requirements
allowed “roughly 60 to 70 percent of adult white men” to vote).
544. See, e.g., CONN. PUB. STAT. LAWS tit. XCVI, ch. 1, § 3 (1808) (“judicious and
lawful”); LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, supra note 542, ch. 158, §§ 2, 7, at 445, 449
(“judicious,” and “lawful men of fair characters”); Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 52, reprinted
in LAWS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 542, at 201 (“good demeanor”); 1 THE GENERAL
PUBLIC STATUTORY LAW AND PUBLIC LOCAL LAW OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND ch. 87, § 2,
at 349 (Clement Dorsey ed., Baltimore, Toy 1840) (1797 law requiring sheriffs’ and
coroners’ oath to select “judicious” jurors “of good reputation”); Act of Feb. 28,
1803, § 1, reprinted in 4 THE PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 540, at 104 (“good moral character”); N.Y. REV. STAT. pt.
III, ch. VI, § 13 (1829) (“of fair character, of approved integrity, of sound
judgment”); PA. LAWS ch. 2577 (1806) (“sober and judicious”); VT. LAWS ch. III,
§§ 58-59, 63 (1798) (“judicious”).
545. Cf. Ewald, supra note 5, at 1063 (describing the use of similar character
standards in early years of the Republic to disenfranchise felons).
546. Cf. KEYSSAR, supra note 542, at 29, 33-38, 51 (describing the decline in
property qualifications for voting between the 1790s and 1850s). Some of the states
with property requirements around 1800, see supra note 542, that had dropped them
around 1850, are Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. See DEL. REV.
STAT. ch. 109, § 1 (1852) (all electors qualified); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1
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became more important, and thus more common, for states to rely
on detailed statutory specifications of who was exempted or
disqualified from jury service. Jury qualification often began with
547
being an elector, followed by other hurdles. Some criteria, such as
possessing “judicious” or “esteemed” character (presumably
548
excluding felons), were similar to those from fifty years earlier.
(providing voter qualification standard without property requirement); MD. CODE
art. 50, § 5 (1860) (“No property qualification shall be required in any juror.”); MASS.
GEN. STAT. ch. 132, § 1 (1860) (stating that all voters are qualified); MASS. CONST.
amend. art. III (1821) (providing voting qualification standard without property
requirement) (amended 1891); Act of Feb. 28, 1851, § 2, reprinted in A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF NEW JERSEY 386 (Lucius Q.C. Elmer ed., Philadelphia, Lippincott 1855)
(eliminating the freeholder requirement). Compare VA. CODE tit. 49, ch. 162, § 1
(1849) (disqualifying those without $100 in real or personal property), with VA. REV.
CODE ch. 75, §§ 1, 2, 12 (1819) (requiring a freehold and visible estate of $150 or
$300). Some states did, however, maintain their freeholder requirements. See, e.g., A
DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS ch. 98, § 5, at 641 (Josiah Gould ed., Little
Rock, Johnson & Yerkes 1858) (“Every grand juror shall be . . . a householder or a
freeholder . . . .”); N.C. REV. CODE ch. 31, cl. 25 (1855) (stating that the jury list is to
consist of freeholders, identified by their tax returns); VT. COMP. STAT. ch. 35, § 1
(1851) (requiring county officials to summon “freeholders” for the venire); cf.
KEYSSAR, supra note 542, at 130-36 (discussing the persistence of property
qualifications for voting after 1850).
547. See, e.g., DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF CALIFORNIA art. 2699, at 510 (William H.R.
Wood ed., San Francisco, Valentine, 1857) (“A person shall not be competent to act
as juror unless he be . . . [an] elector of the county in which he is returned.”); CONN.
REV. STAT. § 106 (1849) (providing that jurors must be “able and judicious electors”);
DEL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, § 1 (1852) (“All persons qualified to vote . . . shall be liable
to serve as jurors.”); A CODIFICATION OF THE STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA art. III, § 1, at
578 (William A. Hotchkiss ed., Augusta, Grenville 1848) (stating that a juror must be
qualified to vote to be a member of a jury for the trial of “treason, felony, breach of
peace, or any other cause of a criminal nature”); IOWA CODE ch. 96, § 1630 (1851)
(establishing that eligible jurors are those qualified electors of good character who
do not have seeing or hearing impairments); THE REVISED STATUTES OF LOUISIANA
293 (U.B. Phillips ed., New Orleans, Claiborne 1856) (stating that the juror must be
“a duly qualified voter of the State of Louisiana”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. IX, ch. 106, § 2
(1857) (mandating that jurors must be “qualified . . . to vote”); MASS. GEN. STAT. ch.
132, § 1 (1860) (stating that “[a]ll persons who are qualified to vote” can serve as
jurors); MICH. COMP. LAWS ch. 128, § 9 (1857) (stating that persons must qualify as
electors to serve as jurors); OHIO STAT. ch. 62, § 1 (1854) (providing that 108 electors
shall be selected to serve as jurors in a given year); R.I. REV. STAT. tit. XXV, ch. 172,
§ 1 (1857) (indicating that eligible jurors are those who can vote on propositions to
tax or expend money); Act of Mar. 10, 1871 (No. 419), § 1, reprinted in 14 STATUTES
AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 690 (Columbia, Republican Print Co. 1873) (providing
that, aside from a list of exemptions, “persons who are qualified to vote in the choice
of Representatives in the General Assembly shall be liable to be drawn and serve as
jurors”); WIS. REV. STAT. ch. 118, § 1 (1858) (stating that jurors shall be selected from
the pool of United States citizens who are electors of Wisconsin).
548. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 3438 (1852) (limiting jury pool to those “esteemed in
the community for their integrity, fair character and sound judgment”); A DIGEST OF
THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, supra note 546, ch. 98, § 28, at 644 (directing officers to
avoid selecting as jurors “persons of ill-fame”); CONN. REV. STAT. § 106 (1849)
(“judicious”); IOWA CODE § 1630 (1851) (“good moral character [and] sound
judgment”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. IX, ch. 106, § 2 (1857) (“good moral character”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ch. 128, § 9 (1857) (“of fair character, of approved integrity, of
sound judgment”); MO. REV. STAT. ch. 88, § 3 (1856) (“sober and judicious, of good
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Other statutory criteria were newly prominent, such as being white,
550
and, in a significant minority of states, not being a criminal. Per se
551
exclusion based on crimes ranged from felonies, to crimes that
552
were infamous or involved moral turpitude,
to various
553
The common law probably also continued
combinations thereof.
reputation”); OHIO STAT. ch. 62, § 1 (1854) (“judicious”); Act of Apr. 14, 1834, pt.
LXXXV, reprinted in THE GENERAL LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA 622 (James Dunlop ed.,
Philadelphia, Johnson, 1849) (“sober, intelligent and judicious”) (footnote omitted);
see also DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 266, at 225 (describing New England jury
selection practice of selecting jurors with upstanding reputations and voting rights).
549. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 2 (limiting franchise, hence jury
service, to white men); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1 (limiting franchise, hence
jury service, to white men); A CODIFICATION OF THE STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA, supra
note 547, art. III, § 1, at 578 (“free male white citizens”); A COMPILATION OF THE
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ch. LVIII, § 1, at 654 (N.H. Purple ed., Chicago,
Keen & Lee 1856) (“free white male taxable inhabitants”); LA. CONST. of 1852, art. 10
(limiting vote, hence jury service, to white men); MO. REV. STAT. ch. 88, § 3 (1856)
(“free white citizen[s]”); OHIO STAT. ch. 62, § 2 (1854) (“white male inhabitants”);
OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (1851) (limiting franchise, hence jury service, to “white male
citizen[s]”) (amended 1923); TENN. CODE § 4002 (1858) (“white male citizen[s]”).
See also Klarman, supra note 137, at 370 (stating that antebellum state laws barred
black men from juries in all of the southern states and most of the states in the
north).
550. Cf. KEYSSAR, supra note 542, at 62-63 (describing the origin and rise of felon
disenfranchisement in early nineteenth century).
551. See, e.g., DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 547, arts. 2122, 2124,
at 376 (disqualifying from voting, hence from jury service, those convicted of “any
infamous crime,” which includes crimes “punishable by death or imprisonment in
state prison”); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1 (disqualifying from voting, hence
from jury service, any person convicted of felony).
552. See, e.g., DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 547, art. 2699, at 510
(“felony, or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude”); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 2,
cl. 5 (disqualifying from voting, hence from jury service, those convicted of any
“infamous crime”); THE REVISED CODE OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI 497 (Jackson, Barksdale 1857) (“infamous crime”); R.I. CONST. of 1842,
art. II, § 4 (disqualifying from voting, hence from jury service, those convicted of
“crime deemed infamous at common law”); Act of Mar. 10, 1871 (No. 419), § 7,
reprinted in 14 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 547, at 691
(“convicted of any scandalous crime,” or “guilty of any gross immorality”); TENN.
CODE § 4004 (1858) (“convicted of certain infamous offences specially designated in
this Code”); see also WIS. REV. STAT. ch. 188, § 2 (1858) (“exempt[ing]” those
convicted of infamous crimes from jury service).
553. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 3 (disqualifying from voting, hence
from jury service, those convicted of “bribery, forgery, perjury, duelling, fraudulent
bankruptcy, theft, or other offence for which an infamous punishment is inflicted”);
A MANUAL OR DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA ch. IV, § 1, cl. 4, at
344 (Leslie A. Thompson ed., Boston, Little & Brown 1847) (“convicted, by the
verdict of a jury, of any crime or misdemeanor, the punishment of which extended to
life or limb, or to cropping, branding, whipping, standing in the pillory, or
confinement in a penitentiary”); A COMPILATION OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS, supra note 549, ch. LVIII, § 1, at 654 (“cases where legal disabilities may be
imposed for the commission of some criminal offense”); THE REVISED STATUTES OF
LOUISIANA, supra note 547, at 213 (“bribery, perjury, forgery, and other high crimes
or misdemeanors, punishable by imprisonment with hard labor in the penitentiary”);
OHIO CONST. art. V, § 4 (1851) (giving the General Assembly the right to
disenfranchise, hence disqualify from jury service, “any person convicted of bribery,
perjury, or other infamous crime”) (amended 1923); Act of Apr. 16, 1849, pt. X,
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to exclude many felons from juries in states that did not have statutes
554
specifying felon exclusion.
After the Civil War, discretionary qualification laws and felon
exclusion were used to keep black men off of juries. At first,
southern and border states simply continued to exclude black men
555
per se.
Because federal juries were selected (from 1789 to 1948)
according to state qualification requirements, there was no way for
black defendants in these states to avoid having an all-white jury, even
556
in a federal trial. The federal response to this problem was to bar
557
racial discrimination in jury selection.
In the Civil Rights Act of
1875, Congress mandated that “[n]o citizen possessing all other
qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be
disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous
558
The spirit of this law was bolstered
condition of servitude . . . .”
when the Supreme Court held that racist state jury qualification laws
559
were unconstitutional anyway.
Once southern states were rendered unable to exclude black men
qua black men, they successfully exploited the federal law’s “other
qualifications” loophole.
The Supreme Court permitted the
discriminatory application of facially color-blind standards, and by
1910 the exclusion of black men from southern juries was “virtually
560
total.”
reprinted in THE GENERAL LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 548, at 1198-99 (including
juror disqualification as punishment for arson).
554. See, e.g., A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, supra note 546, ch. 98, § 22,
at 644 (requiring petit juror to be “not otherwise disqualified”); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ch. 128, § 9 (1857) (requiring juror to be “free from all legal exceptions”).
555. See Klarman, supra note 137, at 370-71 (describing racist resistance by
southern and border states in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War). All
southern and most northern states excluded black men from jury service in the
antebellum period. See id. at 370 (describing racial jury laws before the Civil War).
556. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (1789) (requiring that “jurors
shall have the same qualifications as are requisite for jurors by the laws of the State of
which they are citizens”); Act of July 20, 1840, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 367, 394 (1840)
(equivalent provision); REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 800, 18 Stat. 89, 150 (1873) (equivalent
provision); Act of March 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 275, 36 Stat. 1087, 1164
(1911) (equivalent provision).
557. See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2000)) (preventing disqualification of jurors based on
race, color, or previous condition of servitude).
558. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2000) (“No citizen shall be excluded from
service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in the
Court of International Trade on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
or economic status.”).
559. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding that a West
Virginia law, which allowed only white males to serve as jurors, violated the equal
protection rights of “colored” men on trial).
560. Schmidt, supra note 7, at 1407; see also Klarman, supra note 137, at 376
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The simplest route was through discriminatory application of
561
subjective requirements, such as “fair character,” but southern
states may also have used felon and misdemeanant exclusion, often in
562
combination with disenfranchisement.
One example was
Mississippi, which decided in 1890 to exclude from voting and jury
service those convicted of “[b]ribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining
money or goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery,
563
embezzlement or bigamy,” but not of violent crimes like murder.
As the Mississippi Supreme Court explained approvingly at the time,
in a voting case, this was designed to exclude black men, who were
seen as “given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust crimes of
564
the whites.”
The United States Supreme Court approved this
provision in the context of grand jury service, reasoning that:
[T]he operation of the constitution and laws is not limited by their
language or effects to one race. They reach weak and vicious white
men as well as weak and vicious black men, and whatever is sinister
in their intention, if anything, can be prevented by both races by
the exertion of that duty which voluntarily pays taxes and refrains
565
from crime.
(describing near “nullifi[cation] [of] Strauder” by courts refusing to recognize
disenfranchisement challenges); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 538 (giving statistical
information in the parallel context of voting).
561. See Klarman, supra note 137, at 376 (describing racist use of such discretion).
This technique required general white control of local government, which was
achieved through disenfranchisement. Id. at 371.
562. As one commentator described the process:
In Georgia in 1877 and in Alabama in 1901, state constitutions barred the
vote forever to anyone convicted of a crime of “moral turpitude,” whether or
not conviction for that crime carried any prison sentence at all. In Alabama,
many misdemeanors were effectively included under the “moral turpitude”
catchall phrase, because between the lines was the intent and expectation
that the phrase would be used in a discriminatory manner.
Ewald, supra note 5, at 1094 (footnotes omitted). See also Hench, supra note 5, at 73843 (discussing Jim Crow uses of felon disenfranchisement); Klarman, supra note 561,
at 352-53 (commenting that lawmakers drafted criminal disenfranchisement laws to
reflect whites’ stereotypes of blacks); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 538-41 (discussing the
historical details of criminal disenfranchisement).
563. Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 867 (Miss. 1896) (quoting MISS. CONST. of 1890,
§ 241); see also S.C. CIV. CODE § 200 (Michie 1912) (disenfranchising those convicted
of “burglary, arson, obtaining goods or money under false pretenses, perjury,
forgery, robbery, bribery, adultery, bigamy, wife-beating, housebreaking, receiving
stolen goods, breach of trust with fraudulent intent, fornication, sodomy, incest,
assault with intent to ravish, miscegenation and larceny, or crimes against the
election laws” but not murder or rape), § 4017 (requiring jurors to be qualified
voters).
564. Ratliff, 20 So. at 868.
565. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898). The Williams Court
overlooked evidence of discriminatory application of the criminal law that is, to
modern eyes, quite obvious even from an appellate opinion. See id. at 225
(commenting that although the Mississippi statute allowed for “evil” administration,
it does not render the statute unconstitutional). The Court also ignored the fact that
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It should give one pause that this is the same rationale given today,
albeit in better faith, to justify felon exclusion in the face of its
substantial racial disparities.
By around 1900 many states used statutes to specifically exclude
566
felons as felons. Some provided character requirements—some in
Mississippi probably excluded all felons from jury service, not just “furtive” ones. See
MISS. PUB. STAT. LAWS § 2684 (1906) (excluding those convicted of “infamous
crime”).
566. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 199 (Bender-Moss 1909) (“malfeasance in
office, or any felony or other high crime”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 3668 (1908)
(“felony”); DEL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, § 1 (1893) (deeming qualified voters “liable to
serve as jurors”), ch. 38, § 1 (disenfranchising felons); FLA. GEN. STAT. § 1570 (1906)
(“bribery, forgery, perjury, larceny, or high or infamous crime”); IDAHO REV. CODE
§ 3942 (1908) (“felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude”); KAN. GEN. STAT.
§ 3976 (Dassler 1905) (requiring jurors to be qualified electors); KAN. CONST. art. V,
§ 2 (disenfranchising felons); KY. STAT. § 2248 (Carroll 1903) (disqualifying felons
from grand jury service); 2 LA. REV. LAWS art. 159 (Wolff 1904) (“treason, perjury,
forgery, bribery, or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary”);
MONT. REV. CODE § 6338 (1907) (“malfeasance in office, or any felony or other high
crime”); NEB. COMP. STAT. tit. XIX, § 657 (1901) (“criminal offense, punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary” or “by special provision of law”); NEV. COMP. LAWS
§ 3867 (1900) (“treason, felony, or other infamous crime”); N.D. REV. CODE
§ 514 (1905) (“criminal offense, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary” or
“by special provision of law”); OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 6797 (Anderson 1903)
(“felony”); OR. CODE § 965 (1902) (“felony, or a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude”); S.D. STAT. § 699 (Parsons 1901) (“criminal offense, punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary” or “by special provision of law”); TEX. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 3139(6) (Sayles 1897) (“felony”); UTAH COMP. LAWS § 1298 (1907)
(“malfeasance in office or any felony or other high crime”); VA. CODE ANN. § 3139
(West 1904) (“bribery, perjury, embezzlement of public funds, treason, felony, or
petit larceny”); WASH. CODE § 5939 (Pierce 1905) (“felony”); WIS. STAT. § 2524
(1898) (deeming qualified electors eligible for jury service); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2
(1848) (disenfranchising “any person convicted of treason or felony”) (amended
1986); WYO. REV. STAT. § 3341 (1899) (“malfeasance in office, or any felony or other
high crime”).
Other states specified that a conviction for an infamous crime would suffice. This
category may or may not have been coterminous with felonies. See supra note 436;
see, e.g., MINN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5599, 7173 (West 1894); MISS. PUB. STAT. LAWS § 2684
(1906) (“infamous crime”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 279, § 1 (1909) (requiring jurors to be
qualified to vote); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, § 4 (disqualifying from voting, hence
from jury service, those convicted of “crime deemed infamous at common law”);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 5815 (Marshall & Bruce 1896) (“certain infamous offenses,
specially designated in this Code”).
Still other states had incomplete standards that did not necessarily rise to the level
of felon exclusion. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. § 4490 (1904) (requiring grand jurors to be
electors), § 2767 (disenfranchising those who “for the commission of some felony
[are] deprived of the right to vote by law”); ILL. REV. STAT. § 279 (Hurd 1901)
(“Every person convicted of the crime of murder, rape, kidnaping, willful and
corrupt perjury or subornation of perjury, arson, burglary, robbery, sodomy or other
crime against nature, incest, larceny, forgery, counterfeiting or bigamy, shall be
deemed infamous, and shall forever be rendered incapable of . . . serving as a
juror . . . .”); IND. REV. STAT. § 1393 (Lawyers’ Co-op 1901) (requiring jurors to be
voters), § 89 (empowering the legislature to disenfranchise those convicted of
infamous crimes); ME. REV. STAT. ch. 108, § 5 (1904) (mandating removal from jury
box if “convicted of any scandalous crime, or guilty of any gross immorality”); MASS.
REV. LAWS ch. 176, § 5 (1902) (allowing convicted criminals to be kept off a jury list
at discretion of town board), § 8 (mandating removal from jury box if “convicted of
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addition to felon exclusion, and others instead of it.
The
569
common law was still a factor, but because so many states provided
for felon exclusion in statutes, the failure to have such a statute could
now indicate that the state specifically meant to take a more forgiving
approach than the old common law. In 1904, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts explained its moderate standard:
[I]n this commonwealth it is not the law that persons convicted of
crime shall be permanently deprived of their civil rights. Our
legislation, more humane and charitable than the law of early
times, recognizes the possibility of repentance and reformation. . . .
[T]here is nothing to prevent the board from putting upon the
jury list the name of a former criminal, if they find him to be of
570
good moral character and otherwise suitable.

Even Massachusetts had its limits, however. The next year the court
affirmed a trial judge’s grant of a new trial after it was discovered that
one of the jurors had been prosecuted thirty-six times, and had been
571
convicted in most of them.
To summarize, felon exclusion was widespread in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century America. It evolved from a common-law doctrine

any scandalous crime, or guilty of any gross immorality”); MO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1870,
1991, 2031, 2083 (West 1906) (disqualifying those convicted of various specific
crimes); S.C. CIV. CODE § 4017 (Michie 1912) (requiring jurors to be qualified
voters), § 4036 (mandating removal from jury box if “convicted of any scandalous
crime, or guilty of any gross immorality”), § 200 (disenfranchising those convicted of
“burglary, arson, obtaining goods or money under false pretences, perjury, forgery,
robbery, bribery, adultery, bigamy, wife-beating, housebreaking, receiving stolen
goods, breach of trust with fraudulent intent, fornication, sodomy, incest, assault
with intent to ravish, miscegenation and larceny, or crimes against the election laws”
but not murder or rape).
567. See, e.g., DEL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, § 2 (1893) (“sober and judicious”); GA. CODE
§§ 811, 851 (Hopkins et al. 1896) (“upright persons”); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 3976
(Dassler 1905) (“fair character and approved integrity”); KY. STAT. § 2248 (Carroll
1903) (“discreet and of good demeanor” petit jurors); OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 5164
(Anderson 1903) (“judicious and discreet”).
568. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7239 (1907) (“esteemed in the community for their
integrity, good character, and sound judgment”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 656 (“esteemed
in their community as men of good character, approved integrity, sound judgment”);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 332 (1897) (“good moral character”); ME. REV. STAT. ch. 108, § 2
(1904) (“good moral character, of approved integrity, of sound judgment”); MASS.
REV. LAWS ch. 176, § 4 (1902) (“of good moral character, of sound judgment”); N.Y.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1027(5) (Parsons 1899) (“of fair character; of approved integrity;
of sound judgment”); N.C. REVISAL § 1957 (1908) (“good moral character”); S.C. CIV.
CODE § 4017 (Michie 1912) (“sound judgment”); VT. PUB. STAT. § 1464 (1907)
(“judicious” grand jurors).
569. See Queenan v. Territory, 71 P. 218, 220 (Okla. 1901) (explaining that
statutes allowing for disqualifications of jurors, including those excluding felons, are
merely “declaratory of the common law”), aff’d sub nom. Queenan v. Oklahoma, 190
U.S. 548 (1903).
570. Commonwealth v. Wong Chung, 71 N.E. 292, 293 (Mass. 1904).
571. Manning v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 73 N.E. 645, 645-46 (Mass. 1905).
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to a statutory one, which allowed states wishing to include felons from
jury service to do so more directly. While the specification of felon
exclusion in statutes increased during this time, other qualifications
declined, and jury service began a general shift from being the
province of a select few “judicious and temperate” citizens to being a
more objectively defined domain of virtually any literate citizen
lacking a criminal past. The next century saw the trend accelerate.
C. Recent American Practice
Current felon exclusion law reflects recent shifts in jury
participation, which have made felon exclusion less arbitrary, but
more pervasive. As previously, in the 1940s almost all states excluded
felons from juries in one way or another; most excluded felons as
felons, and most required “good moral character,” which is a
572
standard that felons would find hard to meet.
Many—or at least
more than today—disqualified those convicted of some
573
misdemeanors.
572. A 1942 report indicated that thirty-three states (plus D.C.) excluded people
with criminal records from jury service. The states were: Alabama, Arizona,
California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See COMM. ON SELECTION OF JURORS, supra
note 486, at 35 (footnote omitted).
This list appears to be over- and underinclusive. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 29.020(2)
(1948) (not excluding felons qua felons from petit juries); MO. REV. STAT. § 697
(1939) (not excluding felons qua felons); S.C. CODE § 38-52 (Michie 1952)
(requiring jurors to be free from legal exceptions and qualified electors); S.C.
CONST. art. 2, § 6 (disenfranchising only those convicted of enumerated sex crimes,
property crimes, and crimen falsi, but not violent crimes) (amended 1971); ARK. STAT.
§ 3-101 (Bobbs-Merrill 1947) (disenfranchising felons), § 39-101 (requiring grand
jurors to be electors); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7906 (1949) (requiring jurors to be
qualified electors); CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 3 (disenfranchising those
sentenced to “infamous punishment[s]”); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4504 (West 1953)
(requiring jurors to be qualified electors); DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (disenfranchising
felons); ME. REV. STAT. ch. 103, § 2 (1944) (excluding those convicted of “scandalous
crime or gross immorality”).
Ten more states—Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Rhode Island—are listed as requiring jurors to have
“good moral character.” See COMM. ON SELECTION OF JURORS, supra note 486, at 34
(footnote omitted) (listing twenty-five states and D.C. as requiring jurors to have
“good moral character”). Fifteen states (plus D.C.)—Alabama, Arizona, the District
of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin—are listed as
requiring both a clear criminal record and “good moral character.” See id. at 34-35
(footnote omitted) (providing separate lists of states requiring “good moral
character,” and states precluding those with a criminal record from jury service).
573. Compare ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 21 (Michie Supp. 1955) (“offense involving
moral turpitude”), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 199 (West 1954) (including malfeasance
in office and high crimes along with felonies), FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (1951) (“bribery,
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The 1940s were also, however, an era when a new ideal began to
take hold: inclusion on juries of as many capable citizens as possible.
574
The
The “moral character” standards were extremely vague.
persistence of subjective standards reflected not just a desire to keep
juries in the hands of a vaguely “better sort of person,” but also the
575
practice of according wide discretion to local officials.
In many
states, the subjectivity of the system was also manifested in the “key
man” approach to selecting juries, in which upstanding members of
the community were responsible for selecting the jury venire, a
576
practice that undoubtedly dampened felon participation as well.
The problem with these imprecise formulations was not just that they
were underinclusive, overinclusive, or imprecise, but also that the
577
whim of local officials was relatively unconstrained.
If the jury
system was supposed to include as many capable citizens as possible, it
could not allow exclusion to turn upon the arbitrary caprice of a
potentially biased jury commissioner.
As a result of this new ideology, general participation on juries has
broadened since the 1940s. In that decade, the Supreme Court
began its attempts to guarantee that jury venires comprise fair cross578
sections of their communities.
A new federal statute in 1948
provided a set of minimum, objective qualifications for federal jurors,
though more stringent state laws continued to be applied and elitist

forgery, perjury, or larceny”), IDAHO CODE § 2-202 (Bobbs-Merrill 1948) (excluding
those convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude), MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 93-1303 (Smith 1947) (malfeasance in office and high crimes), N.Y. JUD.
LAW ANN. § 504 (McKinney 1955) (“misdemeanor involving moral turpitude”), N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 9-1 (Michie 1953) (“any crime involving moral turpitude”), OR. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 14-107 (Bancroft-Whitney 1940) (stating that those convicted of any
felony, or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, are not competent for jury
service), UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-0-9 (1943) (malfeasance in office and high crimes),
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-175 (Michie 1950) (bribery, perjury, public embezzlement, or
petit larceny), and WYO. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1-78 (Michie 1957) (malfeasance in office
and high crimes), with supra notes 439-40 (listing eight states that currently exclude
some misdemeanants).
574. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1803 &
n.1 (promoting jury service restrictions that are more objective than previous
standards); Jury Selection: A Critique, supra note 4, at 1080 n.57 (discussing diversity of
state approaches, and noting that state standards “have in common the vice of
vagueness”) (quoting Note, Psychological Tests and Standards of Competence for Selecting
Jurors, 65 YALE L.J. 531 (1956)).
575. On efforts to discourage service by the lower and working classes in the
1920s, 30s, and 40s, see Miller, supra note 286.
576. See Jury Selection: A Critique, supra note 4, at 1078-80 (explaining how the “key
man” approach allowed nonjudicial officers to create their own subjective standards,
and to exclude whatever groups they wished).
577. See id. at 1078 (providing evidence that some commissioners had
requirements that went beyond those stated in the statutes).
578. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
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practices for drawing up jury lists were maintained.
In 1957,
Congress stopped federal courts from applying state juror
qualification standards that were stricter than the federal minimum
580
(such as being male). In 1968, the goal of obtaining a broad crosssection of the community was written into statute, and voter rolls and
drivers’ registries replaced commissioners’ fiat as the source of
581
federal jury lists. Most state systems reflect a similar transformation
and broadening; jurisdictions using indefinite formulations gradually
turned toward more objective regimes, and today, only Alabama,
Arkansas, and Illinois retain subjective bans on the ‘wrong sort’ of
582
person.
The jury now represents “nearly the whole vicinage come
583
584
to judge,” with felon exclusion as a notable exception.
Felon exclusion also represents an exception to general trends of
585
liberalization concerning civil disabilities.
As discussed above, the

579. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 951-52; see
Miller, supra note 286, at 990-93 (describing elitist origins of impetus behind 1948
law); see also COMM. ON SELECTION OF JURORS, supra note 486, at 44 (explaining an
early version of the proposal for uniform federal standards, which included felon
exclusion); JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, MOORE’S JUDICIAL CODE 371-81 (1949)
(describing, contemporaneously, “radical” changes in the law). The remainder of
the Commission on Selection of Jurors report is a good source on the thinking
underlying the 1948 legislation.
580. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 152, 71 Stat. 634, 638 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000)).
581. See Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101,
82 Stat. 53, 54 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000)) (stating that juries should be
selected from a “fair cross section of the community”). The 1968 law also excluded
those with pending criminal charges from jury service. Id. at 58 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000)).
582. The transformation appears to have been gradual, from more than thirty
states in the 1940s, see supra note 572, to twenty-three in 1970, see Carter v. Jury
Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 333-34 n.31 (1970) (listing states that had subjective
limitations for jury service like “good character,” “approved integrity,” having “vicious
habits,” or being “unfit persons”), to the current three, see supra notes 376
(Alabama), 379 (Arkansas), and 389 (Illinois). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 893(2)
(West 2000) (providing character requirement for grand juries). See generally Fukurai
& Butler, supra note 229 (providing a good summary of roughly current law that also
illuminates remaining sources of subjectivity and underrepresentation).
583. Carrington, supra note 531, at 58 (describing federal juries).
584. Cf. Demleitner, Continuing Payment, supra note 5, at 787 (arguing that felon
disenfranchisement makes less sense in an age of an otherwise broad franchise).
585. See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 328, at 15, 18-25 (detailing trends in recent
decades in the use of civil disabilities). To be precise, Travis describes “a surge of
popularity beginning in the mid-1980s” ending an earlier period of liberalization. Id.
at 18. The closest analog to felon exclusion—felon disenfranchisement—has steadily
declined. See infra note 588 and accompanying text.
The ABA, caught in the middle of this trend, promulgated two contradictory
standards on felon exclusion in 1983. Compare ABA JUROR USE, supra note 427, std.
4(e) (barring felons whose civil rights have not been restored from jury service), with
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 427, std. 23-8.5 (barring jury service only by those
currently under criminal supervision).
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lifetime exclusion of felons from juries has stayed steady and
remained the majority rule throughout the twentieth century. Most
recently, state laws have changed in both directions, with some
586
momentum in favor of exclusion.
By contrast, felon
disenfranchisement has rapidly faded:
Only eight states now
587
disenfranchise felons for life, compared to fifteen in the late 1980s
and the more than forty states that had anti-felon voting provisions in
588
the late 1960s.
D. Conclusion
The practice of excluding felons from jury service has both a rich
pedigree and a sturdy presence in current law. Felon exclusion has
evolved from being a product of subjective juror qualifications or
anti-criminal common-law rules into being a product of objective
statutes. In the process, it has become firmly entrenched and has
avoided the general trend of expanded jury participation.

586. Between 1986 and 1996, four jurisdictions tightened restrictions while two or
three loosened them. See City of Mandan v. Baer, 578 N.W.2d 559, 563 (N.D. 1998)
(describing North Dakota as loosening standards); Olivares et al., supra note 326, at
12 (describing Indiana and D.C. as the only jurisdictions loosening standards). Since
1996, a few other states have tightened their standards, including Michigan,
Nebraska, and New Hampshire. See supra notes 398, 403, and 405.
587. The Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at 1300.
588. See KEYSSAR, supra note 542, at 302 (describing this shift); see also Green v. Bd.
of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967) (stating that forty-two states had
constitutions that “prohibited or authorized the legislature to prohibit exercise of
the franchise by convicted felons”); Terry Carter, Cell Block to Voting Bloc?, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 2002, at 16, 17 (listing Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada,
Virginia, and Wyoming as the only states that disenfranchise felons for life); One
Person, No Vote, supra note 5, at 1943-49 (describing recent liberalization, and
classifying state laws as either permanently disenfranchising, or practicing a modified
version of permanent disenfranchisement); The Purity of the Ballot Box, supra note 5, at
1300 (stating in 1989 that fifteen states disenfranchised felons for life).

